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CB.APTER I 
INTRODUO!ION: .A PROSPECTUS POR THE WHOLE PROJECT 
This chapter is introductory. It serves as a prospectus 
tor the entire stu47. In it will be given an overview ot the 
basic problem tor which an answer is sought as well as the over-
all purpose and general procedures to be followed in this study. 
Ea.ch of the succeeding chapters will be an elaboration ot the 
basic direction indicated in this chapter. But before the pro-
cedure is outlined it is necessary to state clearl7 the problem 
tor which an answer is sought. 
fW!. Problem this Stud.y Seeks 12, Answer 
The basic problem tor which this study seeks an answer is 
this: how can one discover adequate criteria for testing the 
reality of the transcendent ob~ect ot religious experience? 
That is, can sufficient tests be devised b7 which one can deter-
mine it there is a basis in reality tor the ultimate ob~ect ot 
his religious experience? This stud.7 does not attempt to come 
to a conclusion as to whether or not there is a transcendent 
reality. Rather, it seeks to discover some criteria by which an 
individual may determine whether or not there is a basis in 
reality' tor the ultimate ob~ect ot ~s religious experience. 
l 
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But in order to more fully understand what is implied in this 
basic problem it will be helpful to have a better understanding 
ot the meaning ot some key terms like experience, religious, and 
reality. 
Meaning ot J:x:perience 
Eq>erience is not easy to define. But in general experi-
ence •81' be described as consciousness or awareness such as indi· 
viduals have. Experience is something which subjects have, and 
it is in this sense that experience lD8.7 be said to be sub3ec-
tive.1 !l'b.is is not meant to imply, ot course, that all exper-
ience is merely sub3eotive, 1.e., that there are no ob3eetive 
referents tor at least aoae experiences. Experience is the state 
ot consciousness ot an 1ndiY1dual who may be aware of something 
as other whether or not it is really other. Ot course experi-
ence •81' be an awareness ot one's sell or self awareness. But 
even here there is at least a psychological distinction between 
the self which is the subject ot the awareness and the selt ot 
which it is aware. 
Experience may be viewed in two ways, generally and speci-
tically. Experience in general is the totality ot consciousness 
like that ot being alive. A apeoitic experience is a tocusing 
1Paul Van Buren seems to overstate the point when he says, 
"EYer.y experience is subjective by definition. Ve use the word 
with a person as its subject 'I' have an experience. A atcn·e 
does not ••• •" !'he Secular Meaning ot the Gos2el (New York: 
!he Macmillan Oompaiij°; !IJ63), P• 871'.. !liiri""is no good reason 
why we can't speak ot animals and even plants having awareness 01 
consciousness in our sense ot the word experience. In this wa:r 
1 t makes more sense to sT>eak ot overlat>'Dintt levels ot _ __. 
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on a given aspect of moment within the whole of one's conscious-
ness like a certain event in one's lite. Or, the difference 
respectively is like that ot the awareness of beins in a state 
ot marriage (i.e., the consciousness of being a married man) and 
that of settias married (i.e., the consciousness ot taking a 
wife in the ceremony of marriage). In this study we will be eon· 
cerned primarily with ~el1gious experience in general rather 
than with specific religious experiences for the following 
reasons. 2 Yirst, because experience in general is the backdrop 
and basis for particular experiences like Yi.sion is the general 
field which makes it possible to focus on this or that particula1 
object. Secondly, religious experience in general is more readi· 
ly available to men in general. Not everyone has had a special 
religious experience like a 117s~ical experience. But as shall 
be argued subsequently• religious experience in the general 
sense is both more readily available and understood by men in 
genera~. this will be made more explicit once religion is de-
fined. ~irst, however, we must distinguish different levels ot 
experience. 
the most basic level ot experience •ST be oalled prilla.J:7 
awareness. It is the basic unreflective oonsoiousness an indi-
vidual has. Secondary awareness is the consciousness ot being 
' conscious; it is being aware ot the fact that one has awareness ... 
2
•o.r a further discussion of this see chapter 3. 
'Michael Novak makes a similar distinction between primary 
and seconda17 awareness. See Beliet ~ Unbelief (New York: 
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Within this secondary awareness there are many activities such 
as remembering, reflecting, relating, and reasoning. All ot 
these presuppose or build upon primary awareness. 
!he study ot religious experience undertaken here will 
treat both kinds ot experience. It will recognize, however, 
that primary awareness is tund.amental to secondary awareness, 
even though secondary awareness may be necessary tor getting at 
primary awareness. Furthermore, it is recognized that in order 
to get at the religious awareness of other people one does not 
have direct access to either their primary or their seconda17 
awarenesses. In order to understand the religious experiences 
ot others one must depend on their expressions of these experi-
ences. In brief, expressions of experience will be studied to 
understand the experiences behind these expressions, and secon-
dary experience must be studied in order to understand the pri-
mary experience behind it. And primary religious experience in 
general (as opposed to special religious experience) will be 
the primary center of concern. Special religious experiences 
may be used to illustrate a focusing or intensifying of the 
experience which is more generally available tor men in general. 
But precisely what is meant by a religious experience? 
Meaning ot Religion 
Attempts to define religion have been notoriousl7 unsuccesa· 
'!he New American Librar;.r, 1965), PP• ?2-75• 
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tul at gaining universal acclaim, 4 And ;yet th.e vast majority ot 
these detinitions ot religion have at least one common element--
that religion involves awareness of the transcendent. fhey 
differt of course. in what kind or awareness is involved and 
what is meant by the transcendent. Ye will begin with what 
appears to be common to most definitions, and then attempt to 
discover what must be characteristic ot an awareness of the 
transcendent to make it qualify as a distinctive experience to 
which we may give the title of religious. 
!'here are at least 'two senses in which religious experience 
may involve transcendence. First, transcendence may refer to 
the Rrocess ot overcoming the conditions ot one's tinitude, 
frustrations, etc. !his may also be called selt-transoendence.5 
franscendence is also used in the sense ot the object of reli-
gious experience, viz., the transcendent. It is in this latter 
sense that we are primar117 concerned with religious transcen• 
dence in this study. 
It should be pointed out that the transcendent is not 
4w. O. Smith wrote: "It is perhaps not presumptuous to hold 
that no definition of religion so tar proposed has proven oom-
pelling, no generalization has come anywhere near to adequacy." 
The Keani? and End of Religion, !Wew Yorlu !he New American 
?3:'5rar.y o lJ&rid!I'tiraiure, Die;, 1964), p. 16. 
':But selt-transcendenoe can be misleading in a religious 
context it it is taken to mean transcending b7 one's selt or on 
one's own. Yor, as shall be seen, one ot the characteristics of 
religious awareness is what Schle1ermacher called a "feeling ot 
absolute dependence" (see chapter 3). It a religious experience 
involves a sense ot dependence, then it cannot in the same WB.7 
involve an attitude ot independence. 
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intended to be a synonym for God; it is not equivalent to a the-
istic conceptualization. God as defined by western theisms is 
one (specific) form or way of viewing the transcendent. What is 
meant by the transcendent is a much broader, more general and 
less specific notion which is inclusive ot pantheistic as well as 
theistic, personal as well as impersonal religious views. Brah-
man of Hinduism, !firvana ot Buddhism, the ko ot Taoism, Schleier-
•acher' s All, otto•s 1'uaen, and Tillich's Being beyond being are 
all ways ot viewing the transcendent. 
The transcendent not only has ma.n:r descriptions but it may 
also have many dimensiona.6 It need not be viewed·as being 
"above"; it may be thought ot as a transcendence in ndepth." 
~en too, it Dl&7 be the tr8.ll8oen4ent "origin" or even the "goal" 
ot one's religious experience. In brief, we do not intend in 
this analysis of religious transcendence to narrow down or limit 
the meaning of the transcendent to any particular direction or 
dimension. 
B7 the transcendent we mean simply two things. Jirst, 
something is transcendent it it goes beyond or is !!2£! !!!!!! one's 
immediate consciousness. In this sense the subconscious is 
transcendent, tor it goes beyond one's illlllediate consciousness 
and yet he is somehow aware that it is there.? !he transcenden-
6In chapter 3 a detailed analysis is given of the multidi-
mensional possibilities of transcendence. 
?w1111am James calls the subconscious the "hither side" of 
the transcendent but it is definitely beyond the individual's 
7 
tal ego is also an example,8 for we are conscious ot it but are 
conscious that it is beyond our conseiousness.9 Even other 
selves are transcendent, for we are conscious ot them but con-
scious ot them as being beyond ourselves. Kant's noumenon is 
transcendent, tor he somehow knows that the nou.menon is there 
even though he cannot say what it ia,10 further, it is more 
than what is experienced in the way that the whole is greater 
than its parts (e.g., there is a wholeness, struoture, or rela-
tionship missing when the parts are scattered). It is more in 
the wa:y that a word. or sentence is more than letters (viz., a 
unity of meaning not in the parts ta.ken separatel7) 1 11 or the WB:J 
conscious self. See Varieties of Reli~ious ;sxperienoe (Hew York: 
Modern Library, 1902) , p. 508';' Cl. p. ,2. 
8Peter KoestenbaUDl develops this point in an excellent sum-
mary of a phenomenological approach to religion, "Religion in the 
Tradition of Phenomenology• in Religion in Philosoih1cal and Cul-
tural PersReotive, ed. Ol&l'ton Jeaver ancr-w!ii!am orosz \Prince-
ton, N.J.: b. fan Nostrand Co., Inc., 1967), PP• 186-193· 
9ve are not here arguing for the existence ot the suboon-
scious, the transcendental ego or other minds. We are simpl7 
saying that it they exist, the7 would be real examples. ot what 
we mean by transcendent. It they do not exist they would be 
merely possible examples. 
10see Immanuel Kant, fht: Cri;g~ue ot Pure Reason, trans. 
Lewis White Beck (New Yorlfr-Tfie'6s-Hirrl11 t!o. , inc. , 1956), 
p. 273, where he says, "• •• on the contrary, it itself limits 
sensib111t7 by appl7ing the term noW1enon to things in themselves (things not regarded as appearances). llit in so doing it at the 
same time sets limits to itself, recognising that it cannot know 
these noumena through 8!17 of the categories, and that it must 
therefore think them onl7 under the title or an unknown some-
thing." 
11It is noteworthy that even Bertrand Russell uses this il-
lustration in &!1 *1!guln into Meaning !!lS. Truth. PP• 335-336. 
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there is more in a painting than the pigaent aad colors.12 !bat 
18 , something is transcendent it there is aore in it than •aeets 
the e7e.• It there ia a depth or perspective that ia aore than 
the empirical experience ot it, then it transcends the eapiri-
cal.13 
Second, 'b7 l!1!.. transcendent ob.tact ot religious experience 
is meant frhat we ue aware ot as going be:yond or being more in 81' 
ultiJlate W&.7• It ia tha• which is the ob~ect ot a total oomait-
aenti that tor which one would make eTen the supreme aacritice.14 
The uanacendent i• the object of ultiute coneern because it ia 
thought to be ultiaate or taal. It ia that be7ond which one 
sees no need to go. It ia the be7ond beyond which one seeks no 
more be7onda. Examples ot auoh coamitaent outside ot religion 
are ditticult to find but to aoae degree the patriot's "1'7 
country right or wrong," or the aoraliat•s "duty tor dutJ''• 
sake," or 1Jhe artist's ooaaitaent to Beaut7 are exaaples.15 
It he were consistent with the illplioations ot this illustration 
it would indicate the meaningtulneaa ot what we call the trans-
cendent. 
12ot. John Wisdom•a article •Clods• in !aaasigal and Oontea-




195x7an) Ramser~ ~lifiou1A~e41(New York:(~• Ma1c1a11-an o., , PP• -..c;- or a Q• sousaion •• th lua-
trationa) ot this point. Johll B. Smith calla this a "religious 
41aena1on" 1:0 experience, l!Hripce an.4 !Id, (Oxford Universit7 
Press, 1968), PP• 46 t. 
14~or a development ot what is meant b7 •total comaltment" 
see Ramae7, .22• git., PP• 172, 35-41, 55• 
15A further and clear elaboration of what we mean by this 
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!o restate the problem in view ot these clarifications: we 
seek to disoover adequate criteria tor testi~ the reality of 
that object of consciousness which is more than and goes beyond 
one•s consciousness and to which he makeA a total commitment or 
by which he is grasped with an ultimate concern. Or to put it 
another way, how does one know that beyond to which a man will 
commit himself without reserve is real? Row can one tell if 
there is a basis in rea.lit~ tor the object or a man's ultimate 
concern? Is the goal or ideal to which men are willing to dedi-
cate their whole lite, and for which they are willing even to 
die, real? But, before determil'ling whether the transcendent is 
real the word real must be detiaed.. 
Meaning of Reality 
J'irst there a.re several things that are not meant b7 real-
1 ty. Yor it would be easy to conolude that the transcendent is 
real it the word is used in a Yery broad sense. Only after one 
sees clearly what is not meant by the word reality (.tirst tour 
points below) can he fully appreciate the problem o.t trying to 
determine the reality of the transcendent. !he last two points 
attempt to provide a more positive characterization of the mean-
ing of reality. 
l. Realit1 !!. ?!2£! ~ ~ Sub~ective Condition a! Human 
§!;perience.--!'hat aen have experiences which they teel are ulti-
mate and religious no one can reasonably doubt; it is not the 
kind of concern or commitment will be found in Paul Tillich's 
Ult'1Jate Concern, ed. D. Jl!ackenzie Brown (London: SOM Presa L'td., I96 , pp. ?, 8, 11, 30, 106 and below in chapter 2. 
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experiences but their reali'fcy" basis which is in question. !he 
problem is compounded by the tact that in •8ll7 religious and 111'•-
tical experiences there seems to be no sure ws;r to separate the 
hallucinatory from the real. As Henri Bergson noted, even the 
great :mystics have recognized this fact and have warned their 
disciples about it.16 !here is alW&J"S the possibility that one's 
religious experience can be explained on a purely pa~ohologioal 
levei.17 Tb.ere is no question that religious experience is sub-
jective; if it were not, it would not be an experience. The 
important question is: i• it more than subjective. As even reli-
-- -
gious men admit, "• •• •here cannot be 8.J17 important sense in 
~bich God is &or !!. unless there is some real and ob~ective 
sense in which God !!.• irreapHtive of my belief or ST laok ot 
beliet.18 Beligious tranaoeadenoe must be more than a aub~eetive 
condition in religious experience before we are willing to call 
it real. 
2. Reality Ia ~ .!!!!!! .! Projection !!. Hwaan ~agination. 
In briet, religious transcendence is not real it LudWig Feuer-
bach is right that it is eotbing l!!!. a pro3eotion of hum.an nature 
16Kenri Bergson. !he ho §!urces of 11oral1tz and Relifion, 
trans. R. Ashl•~ Auclra~.-irerefon, W:-H. Oii'ier "{Biw'Tor ,--
Doubleday and Oo., Inc., 1935), P• 229. 
17aee William Sargant•s Batfle tor the l'lind (William Heine-
mann Ltd.• 195?), where he exp!a ns rel:igfouseiperience like 
brain washing in a behavioristic wa;y along the line of Pavlov's 
conditioned response. 
18David E. Trueblood, fb.il2•~f1~ .2! Religion (New Yorks 
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1 1 , P• '4. 
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which is commonly called God. He wrote, "• •• the nature ot 
God !!. nothing .!!!!. than an expression ot the nature ot teeling" 
tor "the object ot any subject is nothing !!!!, than the subject's 
own nature taken objectively." !hat is, the object ot religion 
is not real it man makes it. It what man thinks is God be 
nothing but an unconsciously worshipped projection of the best 
in his own human nature, then it is misleading to call it real. 
It consciousness ot God. be no more than unwitting self-conscious-
ness; it while adoring God one is worshipping nothing but his own 
nature; 19 if every adT&noe in religious thinking is nothing but 
an advance in self-knowledge, then certainly it is a meaningless 
use ot words to call it real. As Karl Marx wrote. •!fan, who 
looked for a superman in the fantastic reality of heaven and 
found nothing there but the £tflexion ot himself, will no longer 
be disposed to find but the 9eablanoe of himself, the non-hwaan 
D.!mienschJ where he seeks and auat seek his true reality."20 
!hat ia, it man is a reality aeeker and should discover religion 
is but a projection ot his own imagination, he will turn to the 
human realit7 instead of worshipping the mirror which retlects it 
3. Reality l!. !!!:!£! 91.an !I Object £l1. ~-f9:ltillment.-­
Jreud contended that religion was an illusion, not in the sense 
that it is necessarily untrue, but that it is suspect because it 
l9Ludwig :reuerbach. !he !!••nee ot Christianitz. trans. 
George Eliot (Bew York: Karper an! Bro-Ehers, lg51), PP• 9-12, 13t 
29. 
20Xarl ftarx and Jriedrioh Engels, On Religion (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1964) , p. 41. -
resulted trom a wish that there be a God, etc. "An illusion," 
he said, "is not the same as an error, it is indeed not necessar-
117 an error •••• It is characteristic ot the illusion that it 
is derived from men's wishes." He differentiates an illusion 
trom a delusion which ia necessarily talse, whereas "!he illu-
sion need not be necessarily talse, that is to s117, unrealizable 
or incompatible with reality.• However, the religious illusion 
is highl7 suspect ot not being true tor several reasons. 71rst, 
because ot the primitive (ignorant) period in which it arose, 
then because ot the specious, inauthentic grounds upon which aen 
would justify it. Jurtheraore, it is suspect because ot its 
very nature as an illusion, Yiz., that human wishes plq a domi-
nant role in its motivation. •we s117 to ourselves: it would in-
deed be very nice it there were a God who was both creator and 
a benevolent providence, it there were a moral world order and 
a tuture lite, but at the same time it is very odd that this is 
all ~ust as we should wish it ourselves."21 In view ot this, we 
hold as minimal to the definition of real that it be more than 
an illusion in :rreud.'s sense. !hat is, it must be more than 
something men wish, or even deeply wish, to be so; it must actu-
all7 )!,! so apart trom their wishes. 
4. Realitz !! !22!!. !!!.!!! !. fuboonscious 7orce !! Human 
;lxperienoe.--Villiam James somewhat side-stepped the basic issue 
21Sigmund 7reud, !he hfi?. ot an Illusion, trans. w. D. 
Robson-Scott (l'ew Yorki'"'louf; eq&ntroo., Inc., 1957), pp. 52-
53, 40-50, 54, 57·58· 
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when he defined the "hither" side o:t the transcendent in terms 
ot the subconscious. He wrote, "• •• whateTer it may be on the 
farther side (that is the crucial questionJ, the 'more' with 
which in religious experience we reel ourselves connected is on 
its hither side the subconscious continuation or our conscious 
li!e."22 !he "farther" side is a matter o:t what Jaaes called 
ttover-beliets" which he personally ~usti!ied on pragmatic 
grounds. 23 But the concern here is not with how James justified 
the •farther" side ot transcendence but whether or not there is 
a "farther" side. Oerbainl7 one should not consider the "hither" 
side or "subconscious continuation of our conscious lite" to be 
the transcendent of which the religious man speaks. 1'here would 
be no difficulty in saying, as James admits is possible, that the 
subconscious is the doorw8.7 to the divine,24 that the ultillate 
transcendence which men call God works in and through the sub-
conscious. But to identity the transcendent with the subcon-
scious torteits the right to call it real in a meaningful sense 
ot the word. 
Ia seems undeniable that certain subconscious patterns ot 
mental activity and symbolism occur and have depths ot meaning 
not always obvious to the consciousness ot the indiVidual in 
22Jam.es. 1!l! Varieties .2! ltl:l.gious §!Rerience, P• 502. 
23James 1 "!'he Vill to Believe," Prmatism and other Eas&s (liew York: Washington Square Press, tnc., !91,),pp. 193=213. 
24 Ibid., PP• 232, 23? 1 265. 
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whom they occur. 25 In view ot this tact men cannot help but won-
der whether the ob~ect ot their religious experience is any more 
than a product of subconscious S1Jllbolism. Nor Will it suffice 
to do as Jung and call the collective subconscious the real, tor 
as JTomm observed this does not in itself show that the tran.scen-
dent is more than a as.as delwsion. 26 As Alfred N. Whitehead 
indicated, to move toward the dark recesses ot the subconscious 
is to surrender finall7 &n7 hope ot a solid foundation tor reli-
gion. 27 I.t by the real1t7 ot ultimate tranaoendence one does not 
mean something more than the huaan subconscious, whether indivi-
dual or collective, it seems inadvisable to call it real to say 
nothing of the inappropriateness ot calling it ultimate or trans-
cendent. 
5. Realitt Means !2, have.!!! Independent Existence.28-
It the transcendent is to be more than a mere sub~ective experi-
ence, more than mere human imagination. more than what men deepl~ 
25111ntan Smart, '!he Reli5ious ~erience ot ftankind (New 
York: Charles Scribnerr& Dona, X'697P• !6. !Ven though Sartre 
strongly denounced Freud's view ot subconscious determination in 
bis Existentialism and Psychoanalzaia, he admitted to a 'depth of 
consciousness* that woU!d not necessarily conflict with the above 
assertion of Smart. 
Lo d 
26Eryic1 JTUomm.1 t Paghr;zst;,e;d Reliron (1'ew Haven and n on: a e n versi y ess, , P• l • 
27Altred North Whitehead, !'l15ion in !!!.! Hald.pg (Cleveland 
and New Yorks V-orld Publishing o., 1ggor. p. im>. 
281'.he word "existence" is not meant here to imply that the 
transcendent has to be a being to be real. It has a broader 
meaning such as the word "iresence" has as used b7 Leslie Dews.rt. 
Ot. 1ound.ations Sl1. Belief (Kew York: Herd.er and Herder, 1969). 
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wish to be true (viz., an illusion), more than the realm of hm•• ... 
subconsciousness, then it means that which has an independent 
existence of its own. 29 Tb.at is, the transcendent must mean that 
which exists outside of the minds ot the men who conceive it and 
outside the experience(s) of the men who experience it. Yor it 
is certainl7 not proper to attribute to the transcendent a real-
1 ty of its own it it exists onl.7 in the consciousness of finite 
men. Tb.at is to S&.y', it the transcendent is dependent on the 
consciousness of others.for its reality, then it seems unfitting 
to attribute to it an independent existence ot its own. Por 
example, by real we mean something like that a material object 
would have (viz., outside ot a Jlind) as opposed to the existence 
of a nwaber (which, •8.7• exista onl7 in a mind). fhis ia not to 
Sa.'7 that only things like material ob~ects can be real, tor 
things like minds can be real too. But this is to 887 that the 
transcendent will not be considered real unless it has an exis-
tence on its own, outside ot the reality of other things that 
exist. 
6. Realitz Means 12. b.ave an Q)?s1eotive Edstence.-Another 
we:r to describe what is meant by real is to &87 that itJ has an 
ob~eotive existence. By ob~eotive we do not aean aerely to be 
29!'his does not mean that nothing dependent oa.n exist; it 
can have a dependent existence (•87• de~endent on the Universe, 
God, etc.) and yet exist independentl7 {i.e., separately trom 
other things). That is, everything but a Necessary existence 
would in some way be a dependent existence. Jut things that are 
dependent ultimately tor their existence can still have (rela-
tively speaking) an independent existence of their own. 
16 
an object (of a mind) nor to objectify, tor in both of these sen-
ses something is got real. Rather by objective we mean what is 
not merely the objectification made by a subject but what is it-
self a subject or thing. It should be noted that the meanings 
ot subject and object have reversed since the Middle Ages. 7or 
the Scholastics, subiectum. meant that which exists (objectively) 
in itself and obiectwa meant that which is only (subjectively) 
represented in a mind. Whereas,_ in comm.on usage today (due to 
the influence of idealism) objective means real in itself and 
subjective means not having an independent existence ot its 
own.30 
So when it is said that real means to have an objective ex-
istence we mean objective in the modern sense which is to be a 
subject (subieotum) in the medieval sense. !o claim that the 
transcendent is objectively real is not to say that it is a mere 
object or objectification ot a Jlind. In this sense objectifica-
tion is that which is done by'·a subject, in which case if the 
transcendent were merel7 an ob~ect (or objectification), then it 
would not have an independent existence of its own. 
In summary, this stud;r seeks to discover adequate criteria 
tor testing the realit7 of the transcendent object ot religious 
experience. And in View of the further definitions given this 
means that we wish to find sufficient tests or W&.78 to determine 
30Heidegger makes this same point in "!he Problem ot a Hon-
Obj ectif ng Thinking and Speaking in Contemporary theology" in 
Philoso and 1tel1R1on, ed. Je1!J!7 H. 6111 (!11nneapolis: Burgess 
s tro:' • 62. 
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whether or not that be7ond or more to which a man. will collDlit 
himSelt without reserve has an independent and objective exis-
tenoe outside of man's subjective awareness. In other words, 
does the object ot man•s ultimate concern exist on its own apart 
trom his ideals and awareness ot it? So it ma;r be concluded 
that, whatever else 118.7 be implied by the word reality as applied 
to the transcendent, it means that which has an independent and 
objective existence ot its own apart trom ~ existence in the 
consciousness ot other things. It must be more than an object 
ot other subjects; it must be a subject (or thing) itself. 
!he f!!n?ose a! this Stuq 
!he basic reason tor this study is to examine the alleged 
reality basis tor religious experience. Believers do make real-
ity claims both implicitly and explicitly, and our purpose is to 
examine the basis tor such cla.ilts. 
!'he credal con.tessions ot the existence ot God common to 
major Western religions make an explicit claim tor the reality 
ot the transcendent and prayer is an implicit testimon,' tor it. 
Both the sacrifices ot preliterates and the ultimate commitment 
of moderns reveal a belief in the reality ot the ultillate object 
of their religious devotion. Mircea Eliade contended that it 
was part ot the very- genius of a religious man that he seeks 
reality and thirsts tor it with all of ltis heart.31 
31ru.rcea .lliade, !b.e Sacred and the Profane. trans. Willard 
i. Trask (New York: Harcourt, lraC.aiidW'or'.1'.'.CI, fnc., 1959), p. 
~o. 
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It a religious man ~ !!.21 seek reality, at least he ought 
to do so. Por ot all men the religious person should be con-
cerned with fidelitl' and maturity, neither ot which is evidenced 
a ref'usal to be concerned about the truthtulness ot one•s 
religious beliefs. As Freud observed, no mature man will be 
satistied with his childhood beliefs simply because he wants 
them to be true whether there be a 'basis for them in realit,' or 
not. !ro cling to religion sim.pl7 because it is a beautitul 
dream or to hold to it as !t 1t were true are insufficient 
grounds upon which to base the ultimate commitment which reli-
gion demands.32 
Jurther, the believer ought to· examine the reality basis to 
his belief in the transcendent because ot the haunting suspicion 
that he may be wrong.33 A.a enn religious men acknowledge, "It 
is hard to rid our minds completely of the haunting suspicion 
that the entire religious structure may be nothing more than a 
grand and beautiful castle in the air.~34 !he religious aan no 
less than an;r other man is sub~ect to self-deception. In tact, 
as Blaise Pascal pointed out, the individual has a thousand 
stratagems tor deception and there are not tour honest men in a 
century-.35 Ev'en allowing for some over-statement here, the 
32s1gm.unct :rreud, f!l! b.tlu'e a! !!! Illusion, P• 50. 
33see chapter 4 on the need for reasonable criteria in de-
ter.mining the reality ot the transcendent. 
34Trueblood, ~losg.:eb;y !! Jttl1gion1 p. 17. 
35Paacal as uoted by Michael lovak, I l t ,p. 89. 
19 
honest religious person will no doubt agree with Pascal that he 
has some doubts ot his own about the reality ot the transcendent 
object of his religious devotion. 
Jinally, whether there be serious doubts or not, anything 
which demands an ultimate commitment, as does religion. ought to 
be examined as to its realit'Tt 11' the commitment is to be worthy 
of a critical mind. It may be meritorious to belieTe in the 
reality ot the ultimate where one has had little eTidence or 
opportunity to examine it• but it certainl.7 is not very noble or 
worthy 01' a rational creature to totally subait hill8elt to some-
thing without haring reason t;o believe in its realit,-. !o be-
lieve in a cosmic Santa Olaua aiapl7 because one wills to believ 
or because it is comforting or aim.ply because it works is unsat-
isfactory tor a thinking man 1n search ot reality. 
!!!!,, Pr•SUPJ?OSitio~s !£. this St94z 
!here are several working principles involved in this atud.7 
which are not tormally ~ustitied but are clearly implied. Some 
ot them will be at least partially vindicated in a pragmatic or 
indirect way, while others will be valuable because ot their. con 
sistency with the problem and approach which we have chosen. It 
is not contended that th••• are the only WSTS to approach this 
sub~ect but that the7 do proride at least one significant way to 
understand and evaluate the reality basis tor religion. 
1. !he basic working principle throughout this study is 
that reli 1ous experience is a key to understanding the meaning 
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ot religion.36 !his implies that:mligious experience is at the 
heart of religious expressions. that religion can be understood 
well rrom the inside. !his means that the believer, i.e., the 
one who has the religious experience, is in a favorable position 
to understand what is at the basis or religion. 1'his does not 
mean that an outsider cannot understand a religious experience 
which he has never had. It means onl7 that if he is to under-
stand the religious experience ot another as a key to understand· 
ing religion that he must t~ ~o enter into this experienoe in 
an empathetic and imaginative W&.7• this does not mean that one 
has to become religious to understand religion, but it does implJ 
that he must exercise a sympathetic and penetrative insight into 
the situation or the one who does have a religious experience. 
2. Another presupposition or this work is that one is in a 
better position to determine the reality of religious experience 
attar he has a better understanding or the meaning ot it. That 
is• one is in a better position to e?aluate religion atter he 
knows more fully what it is. It is in view or this principle 
that it is deemed necessary to tully discuss the various kinds 
or dimensions or religious expel"ienee betore an evaluation or it 
is offered. ~or it is assumed here that one cannot sufficiently 
judge the reality or a religious experience without knowing the 
36!h1s is what w. L. King called viewing religion from a 
ttdetached within" as opposed to the "within" ot the partisan de-
Yotee, the "semi-within" of the mission&r'7t or the •semi-without• 
ot the theologian or the "without• of the social scientists, 
In'broduct!on to Religion (New York1 Harper and Row. Publishers, 
!9!52i')' pp. 1~ 
21 
meaning of it. J'rom this it tollows that a proper evaluation ot 
religious experience can be made either by a critical believer 
or by an understanding non-believer. 1'.b.e former has a,good "in-
side" vantage point for understanding the meaning of the experi-
ence, and he can develop the ability to oritieally evaluate it. 
The non-believer alrea<cy- has the critical faculties since he is 
not predisposed to believe it, and he oan develop the ab1lit7 to 
understand it by sympathetic insight. Consequently this study 
proceeds on the premise that both believers and non-believers 
will be able to add to our understanding and evaluation or reli-
gious experienoe.37 
3. :Further. it is assumed. here that religious expressions 
are the key to understanding religious experience. This means 
that initially at least the believer is in a better position 
than the non-believer to understand the meaning ot his own reli-
gious experience. It may be that once the believer has expressed 
these experiences that a more articulate non-believer can state 
them better. Nevertheless, the •insider" 1a in a better posi-
tion to express what his experiences really mean, even it he 
cannot express them as well as a more eloquent •outsider."38 
O~ oourse one who has both had the experience and the ability to 
37As Augustine confessed, •ao, many are awakened trom sleep 
b7 the heretics, so that they m.ay see God's light and be glad," 
.2( ~' Rtl~ion.1 trans. J. H. s. Burleigh (Ohieagot Henry Reg-
necy-Co., 1 6)• P• 16. · 
38~or a further discussion ot the relation between experi-
ence and expression see chapter 4. 
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express it well is in the best position at all. Thus it is that 
so tar as the meaning of religion is concerned the expressive 
believer plays a crucial role. 
4. :rinally. this study presupposes that verbal expressions 
are a key form ot religious expression.39 9lat is. since lan-
guage is one of the higheat and most expressive vehicles ot oom-
m.unicating human experiences it is assUlle4 that religious lan-
guage will be a key wa:r to understand. the religious lite behind 
it. !'his is not to 88.1' that verbalizations are the most vital 
part ot religion nor the best W8.7 to •oatoh' a religious experi-
ence, tor this may be done more efteotivel7 through ob.aracter, 
ritual, or art.40 It does imply, however, that since language 
is one of man's most efteotive powers of expression that it is 
to be expected that it is a key area in the analysis of man's 
deepest experiences. 
~ere are many ways to examine religion, but in view of this 
study's problem and purpose--to examine the reality basis tor 
39ot. \lilem ~. Zuurdeeg who characterises man as ef'o 
19guens, A!! .AnaJ!!ical 1't1loso:e!!z: !1£. Religiqn (1'ew Yo 1 Abing-
!on Pieaa), P• 2 • 
~olt Otto may very well have been correct when he said 
ot religious experience (not expression): "It can.not be 'taught,• 
it must be •awakened.' trom the spirit •••• More of the experi· 
ence liYes in reYerent attitude and gesture, in tone and voice 
and demeanour • • • than in all the phrases and ne!ative nomen-
clature whioh we b.aYe found to designate it," Atl dea Rt. the 
Hol:v. trans. John w. Harvey, (New York• Oxtord'Tniversity !rise, 
J. "H'\•1 "\.. n.. f;.l .. 
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religious experience--the following guidelines seem best suited. 
While this is not the only valid W8.7 to work out a philosoph;r of 
religion, it is .! valid W8.'3' to do so. 
1. .An Experiential Basie tor Studying Religion 
~· is perhaps the most basic guideline of our methodolo87. It 
argues that however essential religious expressions a.re to the 
understanding of religion that religious experience is )!fic.41 
In this approach consciousness of the transcendent is fundamental 
to conceptualizations about it. ~t i•• aa 1riedr1ch Sohleier-
macher pointed out, one must feel the absolute before he can for-
mulate it.42 Meardngtul affirmations about the transcendent are 
lnd.lt on prior awareness ot it. Whatever structure may be given 
to religion by reason the basic •stuff" ot religion comes from 
intuition. A man must somehow senae the supreme before be can 
state it. ~or experiencing the presence ot the divine is a pre-
requisite to stating propositions about it. Or as Whitehead put 
410tto makes this sam~oint b7 S8.7ing that rationalization 
or soheaatization ot the nous is the moat important part ot 
the histor,. of religion tor1 guards religion from falling into 
fanatioiem and 117sticalitJr. However, he assumes a Kantian view 
of the scheaa.,ization as a priori categ~t like Kant's oategor'l' 
of causality (via., it operates oonstifN1'\J1Yel7 not in.tuitivel7), 
fhe Ijff ot the lloiz' PP• 115, 146, 46-51, 116-120. But we re-
3ect 81!'.en""tiian aplication on the grounds t~: one cannot d~ 
an intuitive knowledP- ot res.lit;, (the noumena unless he alrea~ 
has an intuitive knowledge ot it. One can't I t the bounds ot 
knowledge unless he has ilread1' transcended those lill1ta. He 
can't ·~ that he knows that he doesn't know reality without oon• 
tradicti~ himself. As Wittgena!fin said1 "• •• lil order to draw a lliii t to thinking, we ahou.a.4 hay•. vo think both sides ot 
this limit," f;Eactatus L05ioo-Ph1loso2h1ous, Preface. 
42
:rriedrich Schleieraacher, On Rtl&fQof1 t~ana. John Oman (Kew York: l'rederick Un.gar Pu.blisliing Oo., ~55· 
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1t. "'l'b.e true method ot discovery is like the tlight ot the aero-
plane. It starts trom the ground ot particular observation; it 
makes a flight in the thin air ot imaginative generalization1 ~d 
it again lands tor renewed observation rendered acute by rational 
interpretation.43 But all these rational operations, William 
James reminded us, presuppose immediate experience as their sub-
ject matter. Er;planations do not replace the need tor the exper-
ience ot which it is the interpretation.44 
!bis does not render reason unessential in a philosoph)r ot 
religion. On the contr&r7, reason pl~s an essential role in 
understanding, expressing and evaluating the religious experi-
ence. However, experience pl~s a tundamental role, tor without 
it there would be nothing tor reason to understand, express or 
evaluate. 'What is being suggested is that !! we are to under-
stand religion experientiall7, then a man's awareness ot or con-
sciousness of the transcendent is tundamental. Like Whitehead's 
aeroplane, we seek constaAtl7 to keep in touch with down to earth 
experience lest we are carried awa;y in the thin air ot pure spec-
ulative imagination. 
2. Religious .Expressions as a Key to Understanding Reli-
gious Experience (chapter 2). In order to understand the basic 
religious experience(s) one will analyse their expressions, par-
43Whitehead Process and Realill; (New York: Harper and Row, 
Publishers 1929), p. 7. llirtehea! said elsewhere, "fhus the 
real! prac!ical problems of religion have never been adequatel7 
stud ed in the only way in which such problems can be studied, 
namel7, in the school ot experience," lleligio9 Di1b.e !!'!!d!& Pt 141. 
44Jamee, Varieties of Reli«ious erience, p. 424. 
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tioularly in language. Hence, it will be necessary not onl7 to 
iunderstand what the religious language intends to sa:r about the 
transcendent and its alleged reality but whether or not language 
is an adequate means for expressing religious experience. In 
other words, one muat tace squarely the challenge of Paul van 
Buran and others that language is inadequate to express God, the 
transcendent or any of its equivalenta.45 Once assured that 
~eligious language ia both basically and adequately expressive 
ot the transcendent, then we may proceed to analyze the meaning(•) 
of what religious language reveals. 
'· !he Need to Determine the Character and Dimensions of 
Religious BJcperienoe (chapter 3). In order to fully understand 
what is meant by religious experience an attempt will be made to 
determine its essential cha.racteristio(e). Religious experience 
must be distinguished from moral experience and from aesthetic 
experience. Once the common oore of religious experience is 
discovered, it must be clearly defined. And one it is defined, 
then we will examine the various dimensions which religious 
transcendence has taken. •or unleaa a t7Pology of the directions 
of transcendence is outlined, one may mistakenly reject as non-
religious what is essentially religious. In brief 1 one must 
have a full understanding of what religious expei-ience is in all 
of its basic oharaoteristics and dimensions before one can pro-
ceed to examine its alleged basis in realit7. 
45van Buren, !he Secular Meaning .!?! lh!. Gospel, P• 84. 
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4. Criteria for Testing the Reality of Religious Experience 
(chapters 4, 5). It is not enough for a philosophy of religion 
to discover and define the meaning of religious experience; it 
must also devise ways or testing its reality. The crucial ques-
tion is not what do religious statements about the transcendent 
mean. The important questions asks: is the transcendent real? 
Even proponents of the reality basis for religious experience ad-
mit that "All experience is liable to misinterpretation [andJ 
• • • much which the experiencer is inclined to take for 'reli-
gious• experience is illusion."46 To be successful these criter-
ia must show that the transcendent is more than a subjective 
reality; they must establish it to be an objective reality. 
Furthermore, the criteria must be more than logical tests which 
would show only the possibility or impossibility or the reality 
or the transcendent. They must be epistemological, establishing 
at least the probability or improbability or it. 
Conclusion 
The basic problem for which this study seeks an answer is: 
how can one discover adequate criteria for testing whether the 
transcendent object or religious experience is real? Can we find 
sufficient ways to determine whether that which goes beyond or 
is more than one's awareness in such a way as to make him willin@ 
to make a total commitment to it has an independent existence 
46A. E. Taylor, "The Argument from Religious Experience" in 
The Existence of God, ed. John Hick (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
~). p. 155.- -
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outside of himself? Are there ways to test whether the beyond 
to which men will devote themselves without reserve is more than 
a subjective part of their own experience, viz., to discover 
whether it is an ob~ective reality of its own? !rhis study will 
not attempt to apply the criteria discovered. Rather, it will 
content itself with the more modest (and yet essential) task of 
discovering and defining sufficient criteria which can be applied 
to religious experience. 
Th.ere are some decided advantages tor not attempting to 
determine whether the transcendent is real but instead to be con-
tent with merely laying down the criteria for doing so: (1) It 
may be that both believers and unbelievers can agree as to how 
the reality of the transcendent should be tested. If so, then 
there may be less disagreement in the end as to whether or not 
there are some reality-based religious experiences. (2) The 
believer will be able to discover tor himself whether all of his 
experiences are illusory or which (if any) are real. From this 
follows another advantage, viz., (3) No approval or disapproval 
of religious experience(s) in general need be concluded. Ea.ch 
experience must be judged on its own merit. It is not to be 
ruled out a priori because others are illusory nor is it to be 
accepted naively because others may be real. 
RELIGIOUS EIPRESSION AS A DY TO 
UNDERS'fANDING RELIGIOUS EXP:&'RIEICE 
'!his chapter ia built upon the premise that religious ex-
pression. especially in language. is an illlportant key to under-
standing the basic religious experience(s) these expressions 
intend to convey. It eeeka to answer two questions: what is the 
basic experience beneath religious expressions which character-
. 
izea religious awareness in general? And, is there an adequate 
language tor expressing what is experienced? 
• The discussion proceed.a on the asswaptions that: (1) there 
may be something coaaon to religious experience in general; (2) 
religious expressions, especially in language m~ be helpful in 
disooTering what element(s) 11117 be inTOlTed in religious aware-
ness. 
ZB!. Varie;t&r gt_ Religious Expressions 
Religious experience has been expressed in a Tariety' ot 
basically different ways. .Aaong these the aost COJlll'Don are rituali 
symbol, myth, and dog:ma.1 !he first three will be treated only 
10ther religious expression aay be found in art, image, con-
duct. and institution but they are not directly related to our 
study here. W'. C, Smith has a good comparison of many ot these, !!.! Meanipg ~a! ,2' Religion, p. 156 t. 
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briefly. 
Religious .Expression in Ritual 
Some have argued that ritual is the earliest formal reli-
gious expression, even before myth, because ritualima can be ob-
served in animals, while they are destitute of a l17thologr.2 
Others argue that ritual comes before 117'tholo87, since it ia 
more likely that pre-literates danced out their religious values 
before they thought them out.3 On the other hand, it aa;r be 
argued that the 'revelation• ot the Jll1"bh aust come before the 
re-enactment of it in ritual.4 Whatever the case m87 be, it is 
certainly reasonable to conclude that somewhere behind the ple-
thora of religious expressions there was tor someone an experi-
ence that gave rise to these religious expressions both mytholog-
ical and ritualistic.5 
In any event, ritual •8.7 be defined as that formalized •1B-
bolic way in which a social poup periodicall7 e:xpress4ts and 
strengthens its beliefs and 1"8.luea.6 Or, Whitehead described it 
2of. Alfred 1'. Whitehead, Religion in the ,. p. 25. 
However, he acknowledges that in apeclfiC-ciiis ah may pre-
cede the ritual. 
3v. L. Xing, Introduction 12 R911sion, pp. 141, 142. 
4ru.rcea Elia4e, lttth and Reality, trans. Willard R. Trask (Bew Yorka Harper and--i&ii,-i.siibX!elers, 1963), P• 8. 
Swb.ich comes first will probably depend on whether a Dcy"th or 
a ritual was used to evoke the relifd.ous experience. If the reli 
~ous experience came via a ~h, tfien the ritualistic expression 
of that experience would be subsequent and vice-versa. If, how-
ever, the religious experience caae some other WB.'3; then uhe 
tire~ means of expression would depend on whether ~he individual 
had greater propensity to act or to talk. 
6King, Introduction !!'!. Religion, p. 141. 
as "• •• the habitual performance of definite actions which 
have no direct relevance to the preservation of the p1l7sical 
organisms of the actor.•? 
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We are not concerned here with precise rituals or their 
signitioance.8 What is of significance is that religion is not 
found without ritual.9 !hat is, a religious experience inevita-
bly engenders symbolic expressions. It is through these expres-
sions that one is able to discover and analyse basic religious 
experience behind them. Since the ritualistic expressions are 
represented in the llQ"thical forms (whichever were first) we will 
analyze both of them together under the m;rthical. 
Religic\18 Expression in Symbol 
s,mbol is the broadest term tor religious expression includ-
ing both myth and rituai.10 Without pausing here to pass judg-
ment on the validity ot the distinction. Paul Tillich draws be-
tween a "sign" (which, he says, does not participate in the real-
ity to which it points) and a •syabol" which does,11 it is sutfi-
?Whitehead, Rel11ion !B the Making, p. 20. 
8ror a treatment ot this kind the works ot Eliade are sug-
gested, viz., ~~ Sacred and l!l! Pro.tane, ~t_}! and Rea113, and 
~ lt'rth ot the!tei'iiil llirurn, trans. Wiliiil r.-!rasli ew 
x ork Tl'intlieiii1foois , !nc. , 1954). 
201
• 
9see Bergson, .!!!!. !!.2 Sources !!.!. Moralitz ~ Religion, P• 
·lOPaul Tillich, ~ios of ·Paith (Bew York: Harper and Row, 
Pu.blishers1 1957}, p.~ fiITi!I calls these latter two the 
"intuitive and the "active" forms ot s:rmbol expression respect-
ivel7. 
llsee the discussion ot Tillich's special use of "symbol" 
later in this chapter. 
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cient to note that "81mbols have one characteristic in common 
with signs: they point beyond themselves to something else."12 
To summarize w. L. King, symbols are non-literal figures which 
point beyond themselves.13 !'hat is, religious symbols are direc-
tional but not contenttul pointers toward the transcendent. 
Michael Novak likens symbols to arrows shot in the directio~ 
of God but which fall back to earth betore they touch Him.14 In 
other words, since a syabol points beyond itself it is a titting 
way of getting at the transcendent which goes beyond man. And 
it may be safely assumed that aq long as religious experience 
involves something which transcends this empirical world, there 
will be a need tor so•e sort ot symbolical or non-literal means 
ot expressing it.15 !his is why !'illich argued that • ••• no 
symbol should be removed. It should only b~ reinterpreted.• 
"!heir symbolic character is their truth and their power. No-
thing less than symbols and .rqths can express our ultimate con-
12Till1oh, l?lpamics 2!. Paith, p. 41. 
131:ing, Introduction !2. Religion, PP• 134-136. 
14Miohael Novak, Beliet !Bi Unbelief, p. 110. 
l5"It (de~holizationJ ie an attempt which never can be 
successful, because symbol and JI01;h are torm.s ot the human con-
sciousness which are alw&.J"S preeent. One can replace one JITf;h 
by another, but one cannot remove the myth from aan's spiritual 
lite. ~or the JD.7th is the combination of symbols of our ultimate 
concern," fillich, ~cs o:t !'&1th, p. 50. With this Jaspers 
agreed when he wrot~e real-iiiilt, therefore, is not to dem;r-
thologize, but to recover J117thioal thought in its original puri-
ty •••• " Xarl Jas:eers, _M_b and Ohris'tiianity, ed. Karl Jaspers 
and Rudolf Bultmann Cl'ew rorJIT Ki loonC!ay Presa, 1958), P• l?· 
,2 
oern."16 Tb.at is, religious .,_bola are an attempt to express 
the object of one's ultimate concern, and no words in their or-
dinary meaning express this extraordinary object. Religious sym-
bols are an attempt to express what ca.nnot be literally and em• 
piricall7 stated. !hey point to something beyond the ordinary 
experience, something transcendent. 
Religious EJcpression ln liJ"th 
Religious experience spontaneously and inevitabl7 engenders 
myth.17 !hat is, as ~illich said, "-.rb.e symbols ot taith do not 
appear in isolation. fhe7 are united in •stories ot the gods,' 
which is the meaning of the Greek word 'J11thos'--IQ'th •••• Myths 
are s111bols ot faith combined in stories about di'f'ine•hUll&D en-
oounters. •18 Religious aan is a lll1'th-aalter, tor he has the irre-
pressable tendency to express what he experiences, and l17'tha are 
the verbal expression ot his religious experience(s). 
Perhaps the most important thing that can be said about JITtb 
to the modern reader is that tor the religious man a Ifl7th is a 
true sto17. 19 !he JQ'th is regarded 'by the primiti'Ye as a 'true• 
storJ' because it alw&T• deals with what they consider to be 
16!illich, Ultimate Oonoern, PP• 96, 97, 53. 
17ot. William James, The farietie~ .2t ~eligious 15»erience, 
p. 423. 
18ot. fillich, pznamios 91. Jaith, pp. 48, 49. 
k9"What is i.Jlportant, is the fact that •primitives' are al-
WQTS aware of the ditterenoe between lq'ths (•true stories') and 
tales or legends ('false stories')" .Eliade, ~h ~Reali.ti,• P• lln. Eliade points out that it has only 'bee!i'D ow 20th f ntu-
ry that western scholars have rediscovered myth as a •true sto-
ry as opposed to a •table' or 'fiction,• OD. cit., p. 1. 
realities. !he eosmogonio DIJ"'th is 
the World is there to prove it; the myth of the o~igin of death 
is equall7 true because man's aortalit7 proves it, and so on. 20 
Of course the mere tact that pr.1mitives belieTed their neyths to 
be true in no wa7 guarantees that they were true, but it does 
suggest that tor a tull appreciation ot their religious experi-
ence it is necessary to view them!.!. it the7 were true (1,e., by 
a &J'mpathetic insight). 
While the concern here is not to trace the origin ot Jcyths~1 
it suttices to say that the Jll1'th-making ability is coterminous 
with rational man. 22 What is iDlportant, however, is to note tha 
myths are the s:rmbolic forms b7 which the religious man expresse 
his awareness ot transoendence. 23 A myth, said Karl Jaspers, is 
20or. Eliade, ~ and ltealitz, p. 6. Jrom the time ot 
Xenophanes (c. 565-ZPlOJ iii'; fiie Greeks came to reject more and 
more the myt~ological expression• tound in Bomer and Hesiod unti 
the word 'JITth' was eventuall7 eaptied of 8.JJ7 metapb.7sical value, 
Ibid., p. 1, ct. pp. 152-153· 
210n the origin ot JITths aee 'I'. ft. Cornford, ~ Religion 
to l'hilo•oCf (?few York: Harper and Row, Ptlbiishera;-I9!~), pp. 
n'9 f.; Ii a e, .ltf'..i1! and Realiff~ pp. 145 t., and Bergson, the 
!!g_ Sources 5?! Hor&IitZE t!• gion, PP• U9 t • 
22Bergson writes, "Let us take, then, in the vaguel7 and 
doubtless artificially detined realm ot imagination, the natural 
•cut• which we have called Jll1"th-ll&k1ng and see to what use it is 
naturall7 put. ~o this tacult7 are due the novel, the drama, 
llJ'thology together with all that preceded it. But then, there 
have not always been novelists and dramatists, whereas humanity 
has never subsisted without religion," .22• cit., p. 108. 
23"1'ths have other tunctions too: (1) !hey are the means by 
which religious men became aware ot the transcendent (ct. Jas-
~ers.' 22•. cit., P• 3); (2) !hey supply models tor hwaan behaTior (ct. lllad~ ~Reali&, P• 8). 
34 
a "cipher" ot the transcendent, a "code" pointing to God. 24 In 
tact it is the very incomprehensible nature of the transcendent 
which a myth reveals that gives rise to the nature ot a uq-th as 
such. Yor "When the will to comprehend (which does not content 
itself with external cognition) runs headlong into the incompre-
hensible, the latter either shows itself in mythical figures and 
speculative concepts, as though it were striving to disclf')s" it-
self, but still concealed in magn.iticentl7 ambiguous language.•25 
So then it is because the object ot JQTth ia the transcendent 
which necessitates that a myth be understood symbolically but 
never literall7. "If a JQ'th is understood literall7," wrote !11-
lich, "Philosophy must reject it as absurd."26 On. the other 
hand, the myth understood symbolicall7 "• •• is the fundamental 
creation of ever7 religious communit7.•27 It is because a JDTbh 
is not to be understood literall7 that it cannot be eapiricall7 
verified. "•or the realit7 ot the uqth," said Jaspers, "is not 
eapirical, 1.e., it cannot be investigated in the world.•28 How-
ever, it is because the JD7th is not to be understood literall7 
that it becoaes a s111bolical wa7 to 'open up• to the transcen-
dence tor the religious man. 
24Jaspers, £!1Yjh and Obristi!:!\tz• PPe 8,, 87• 
25Ib1d., P• 29. 
26tillich 1 lz'A!Dd:cs at. Yaith, p. 121. 
2?Ibid. Of. also Jaspers, AD!! .f!!4. Christiyitz, pp. 16,17. 
28Jaspers, M.rth ~ Ohristiani:tq, P• 85. 
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!here have been m8J27 attempts to describe more tull7 what is 
meant by a myth. Mircea Eliade listed five characteristics ot a 
m:;yth, 29 but many ot them are applicable onl7 to l&Tths ot origin 
within primitive religions and are, therefore, too narrow to 
apply tol9ligion in general. Jaspers' analysis is more widely 
applicable. He wrote, 
(1) !he m.yi;h tells a story and expresses intuitive in-
sights, rather than universal concepts •••• (2) !he 
m;rth deals with sacred stories and visions, with stories 
about gods rather than with empirical realities. (3) 
!he myth is a carrie~ ot meaning which can be expressed 
onl7 in the language of a :acyth. !he m;rthical figures are 
S1ll.bols which, by their veey nature, are untranslatable 
into other languages.30 
fhis ma;y be sumaariezecl by saying that a lQ'th is a stor.y or 
series ot images through which the transcendent world is a7J1bol-
ized. 3l It ia a s;yabolic wa:r ot expressing one's awareness ot 
29El.iade aaid, •In general it oan be said that .,-th, as ex-
perienced b;y archaic societies, (1) constitutes the History- ot 
the acts ot the Supernaturals; (2) 'tfhat this Histor;y is consi-
dered to be absolutely ~ (beoause it ia oonoerned with reali-
ties) and sacred (becau~t is the work ot the Bupernatural•)t (3) that Dl!fbh ii always related to a •creation,• it tells how 
something came into exiatenceHr how a patte1"11 ot behavior, an 
institution, a manner ot work were established& thia is whJ' 
DJ.Tths constitute the paradiBllS or all si~ticant human acts; (4) that by knowing the JQ'tli one knows the 'origin' of 1ih1ngs ~ 
lience oan control and manipulate them at willt this is not an 
'external, • 'abstract' knowledge but a knowledge that one •exp•. r• 
iences' ritually, either ~ ceremoniall7 recounting the J17th o:r 
by rrtol'llin.g the ritual tor which it is the justification1 (5J 
tha in one wai or another one 'lives' the IO"f;h, in the sense 
that one is ae zed b7 the sacred, exaliiing power ot the events 
recollected or re-enacted," lfth and Reality, PP• 18-19. 
latabi~f;;P:?•: ~ GldtW.1Cl111li1~i~n!f;i:ble~:t:1!;~-
thical (1.e., into non-•Jmbol language}. Jltnhs are translatable f'rom one language (aa7, Greek) into another-(sq, English). 
31ot. Ninian Smart. The ReliiQoua Bg>erience 2! Mankind, 
P· a. 
.:x> 
ultimate transcendence1 it is an empirical W87 ot expressing the 
non-empirical transcendent. As men came to exercise more .tull7 
their powers of verbal and rational expression it was inevitable 
that these nqthologic·al expressions would take on a more perma-
nent verbal and credal tor.m. 
Religious Expressions in Creed and Dogaa 
It is otten not easy to draw a clear line between the Jll11;ho-
logical and the doctrinal dimensions ot religion. Usually the 
tor.mer is more colortult SJ"Dlbolic, picturesque, and story-like. 
"Doctrines," observed Binian Smart, "are an attempt to give sys-
tem, clarity, and intellectual power to what is revealed through 
the mythological and SJ"Dlbolic_lan.guage ot religious faith ••• ,3a 
In brief, doctrinal representations of one's faith are attempts 
to give a logos tor the mythos.33 "To the mystics of all ages," 
wrote ~. K. Cornford, "the Tisible world is a myth, a tale halt 
true and half' false, ea'boding a logs, the truth of which is 
one."34 fhat is, dopa gzoowa out ot a more sophisticated atteap1 
to generalize and universalise the earlier mTthologioal exprea-
32S'aa.rt, JU lt+isious 191£i•nc• !!. Mankind, pp. 15, a. 
33oorntord., Prom Belifion b Philosop)lz, p. 141. Oorntord'a 
discussion is helP!UI' on i s pO!'n~. BUt we need not follow him 
when he adds that "It then becomes ·an 'explanation' (aition), 
professing to ac~unt f'or the .Xistence and practice ot tne ritu· 
al, just as the L~latonic1 Idea is erected into an explanation oi 
account <•osos) ot the thI'ngs that partake ot it •• •" Jbi4., p. 
259. !here seems to be no reason why a logos can't be an ~res• 
f@on ot a m;ythos without being an expl!Qation or juatitioa ~n Ol 
• See the discussion below. 
34co:rntord, !£2!! Religion 12. Philosoppz, p. 187. 
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sions ot a religion. 'With this Whitehead agreed when he wrote, 
"A dogma is the precise e~unciation of a general truth, divested 
so tar as possible from partieular exemplitication."'5 
As a result ot this close connection between JQ'thos and 
logos, one can see wb7 man7 philosophical concepts have JBTtholog• 
ieal ancestors and that most JDTthological SJ11bols have conceptual 
elements.36 And because literate cultures tend to prize intell•o· 
tual knowledge, the historical religioDS generally have a sore 
developed doctrinal dimension than there is in tribal and preli-
terate religions.37 Tb.is ha.a proven to be both a pea't advantage 
and a grave danger tor religion. 
!he great advantage ot conceptualizing and rationalizing 
about one's religious experience is that by it he can better 
understand, propagate, and preserT• his .faith. .As Allred White-
head said, preeise expression is 11'1 the long run a condition tor 
the vivid realization, tor ettectiveness, tor apprehension, and 
for survival. ~or progress in 't:ruth--whether the truth ot sci-
ence Or 0 the truth ot rel1gion--1s maial7 a progress in the .fram-
ing of' concepts, in discarding artitioial abstractions or partial 
metaphors, and in evolving notions whieh strike more deeply into 
35Wh!tehead, Religion !! !.!!!. }1ak1ng, P• 122. 
36aorntord lists seYeral exaDlples ot concepts bo~rowed bJ' 
Greek philosopb7 trom their religious predecessors, Prom !!!!!-
gion !,2 Philoao1i$t, Chapters 1-4. 
31ot. Smart, fB!. Religious 15Rerience !£. Mankind., P• 27. 
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the root ot reality.38 Also, as Rudolf Otrto corzoeotl7 observed• 
the process ot conceptualization of religious transcendence 
gu.a.rcls a religion from sinking into tanatioisa and pure Jl1'Stioal-
11:Qr and qualifies it as a religion tor all of oiviliaed hUJl&D-
1t7 • 39 otto went ao tar as to •81' that this prooesa of rational-
ization and moraliziag of the l!!&afl! is the aost iaportan.t ,;.....; 
ot the llisto17 ot Beligioa.40 tt is 1D. this sense that lfartin 
Mart7 correotl7 obaert'94 that fashionable reaction in recent 
theology to re~ect a belief ihat tor a belief in 1a over exten-
ded. "Atteapts to J.'Ule out one at the expense of the other 40 
violence to the fuller expression of faith throughout Ob:natian 
h1 .. . . .,41 8v0'J!7• • • • 
hrthe:r, it mq be ugue4 that conceptualization ot reli-
gious experience 1• not o:nl7 helprul lntt it i• in aoae aenae 
neceaaa.17. Oertainl7 man's iaoeaaant propenaiv to o:reate SQ1;hs 
and creeds would lend auppo~ to '111• eontent;ion. It might even 
be ugaed with Jlegel tb.at a coDGept (lts&t() ia neoesaa.r.r to 
•graap together' experienoe.42 And eTen though experience ia 
foundational to expressions about it, nevertheless experience ia 
not meaningful. unless it is oonoeptualized. 
38Whitehead, Religion !! ~ht nff!!Hs• PP• 139, 127. 
39Ru4ol:t Otto, .I!!, Idea .U jhe HoJ:.z, P• 146. 
4011!&4•• P• 115. 
41Martin E. Pfart7t I•n•Ji•• !! Unbelief <•ew tork: Double-
481' and Oo., Inc., 1964), P• • 
42aee (I. w. 7. Hegel, Sgienoe !! ii!U01 III. 
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Ot course, as w. o. Smith rightly remarks, 8.117 attempt to 
conceptualize completely a religion is a contradiction in terms, 
tor there is always in principle more in any man's faith than aD1 
other man can see and even more than he himself can .l!Z•43 None-
theless he admits that man must somehow conceptualize and intel-
lectualize • ••• in such a way ae to do 3uatioe to the diversitJ 
of the phenomena and at the same time not to do violence to a 
conviction of those involved that through it all there is a com-
mon element of transcendence."44 
!he real dangers in doctrine and dogma, in creed and concep.. 
tualization are overextension and disassociation ~om experience. 
overextension means that what is contained in dogmas oan become 
distorted if it is stretohed be7ond its own sphere ot applioabil-
ity. 45 Disassociation means neglect of the experience which is 
at the basis of the oredal expression. ~or example, when such 
words as God, transcendent, and ultimate are used it is eas7 to 
deceive ourselves by having no concrete understanding of their 
meaning. As Josiah Royce observed, "Ve forget the experience 
from which the words have been abstracted. To these experiences 
43Smith, !he Me!»1.ns ~ .114 ,g,t Relision, P• 128. 
44~., P• 151. 
4
'w!utehead wrote, "Accordingl7 though dogmas have their 
measure of truth, which is unalterable, in their precise forms 
the7 are narrow, limitative, and alterable: in effect untrue, 
when carried over be7ond the proper scope ot their utility-," 
Religion !!_the Hakiy, P• 140. 
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we aust return when we want reall7 to comprehend the world.•46 
or, if one is an outsider to the experiences. he must remember 
not to substitute the rationalization tor what the believer feels 
to be the reality. Vb.itehead said it well: •!he laportance ot 
rational religion in the h1stoey ot modern culture 1a that it 
stands or falls with its fundamental position, that we know more 
than can be formulated in one finite systematized scheme of ab-
stractions •••• -4? It one is not oaretul with his creeds he 
may be guilt,. of clinging to words and neglecting the realit,. 
they represent. 
William. James was too severe in sa;ring that when a genuine 
experience becomes ortho40X7, its dlQ' of inwardness is over.48 
Dogmas, he said, "• •• are only bit;s of truth, expressed. in 
terms which in some •BT• are over-assertive and in other W81'8 
lose the essence of truth •• 49 At least we can satel7 Sa:/' that 
creeds :must be persoul and hOAest to be meaning:tul. As Smith 
pointed out, sentences have no meaning in themselves; on.17 per-
sons mean (or intend) things.'° And what religious persons in-
tend to express by their statements is th•ir experience with the 
transcendent. 
, 46Josiah Ro70e, "the P.N'bla ot Job" in NJ••oJ>N ot Beii-
iO!h ed. George L. Abe:rn.e'tb.7 aa4 thou.a A. Lai ora'. ewYo:r • e~ollillan Oo., 1968), P• 442. 
4?Wh1•ehead, Religion !!. the ~He• P• 137• 
48.ru.es, the Tariei;iea .9! Religious lgerieace, P• 330. 
49vhitehead, l!li&on ,!! the tfffiH• P• 139. 
50Smi th, !!!! ?!!Hil!I !!!! J!! al. Religion, p. 164. 
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In brief, religious conceptualizations or creeds are salua-
tory, even necessary, but they must never be a substitute tor 
religious experience. However, this does not mean that religious 
creeds cannot have authority, even final autborit,..51 Walter 
Kaufmann engaged in overstatement when he said, "!he original sin 
ot religion is to ob~eoti.ty the divine and to accept as final 
some dogma, sacrament• or ritual ... 52 tillich is less severe and 
more to the point in saying that creeds are not ultimate, rather, 
their function is to point to the ultillate.53 But the danger ot 
verbal idolatry is present wherever there are conceptualizations 
ot the ultimate. "It has led," said Erich Fromm, •to a new torm 
ot idolatry. An iaage ot God, not in wood and stone but in words 
is erected so that people worship at this shrine."54 ~t is, 
to consider an image ot the ultimate as ultimate is idolatr," 
51ot. Whitehead, Religion in the Maki~, p. 125. Whitehead 
said, "You cannot claim abaoiute-tinal!ty Cir a dogma without 
claiming a commensurate finality tor the sphere ot thought withim 
which it arose," Il!:Lg., P• 126. !his is not true it by "dopa" 
one means the tru"tll'Deing expressed and not the expression ot the 
truth. 7or surely the finality ot the truth which is being ex-
pressed does not necessitate the tinality ot the way in which it 
is bei.D§ expressed. 1urthermore, even a given expression ot trut~ 
can be final" within a given linguistico-cultural llilieu, in the 
sense ot being the very beat wa.7 possible to express that truth 
in those terms. !hen too, one should be caretul not to confuse 
"finality" and •authority,• tor a given expression ot truth (dog-
ma) J18.7 be authoritative within a given linguistico-oultural mel-
ieu without being tinal in the sense that no other or no f'uture 
expression ot it could be better. 
52walter Kautmann, 0r1519ue._.2t, Reli5ion !!!S Philosop:tg (Bew 
York: Doubleday and Oo., Inc., 1961), P• 2'}. 
53tillich, P;rp.am.ics .2! Paith, p. 29. 
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hether the image is mental or meta1.55 Perhaps this is why the 
God of the Old Testament so jealously guarded his own name, say-
ing to Moses who enquired, "I AM WHO I AM" (E.Xodus 3:14).56 
However, even if no doctrinal formula were ultimate and 
final, one need not concede that all doctrinal expressions are 
automatically fallible and insutficient. On the contrary, a dog-
a can be adequate without being final. Its adequacy, like all 
other representations of religious experience will depend not on~ 
ly on how well it expresses an awareness of ultimate transcen-
dence but how effective this expression is in identifying and 
clarifying this experience for others of like faith.5? The his-
tory of the Christian Church, e.g., is a continuous narrowing 
down and defining, without which many elements would have under-
cut and denied its existence. "The dogma, therefore, is not 
something merely lamentable or evil. It was the necessary form 
y which the church kept its very identity."58 In brief, intel-
lectual formulations of religious experience ref er only indirect-
ly to the transcendent. Doctrines are derived, historical con-
55John A. T. Robinson, Honest to God (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1963), P• !2?. -- ---
560n this point Ian Ramsey suggests, "Only God could know 
his own name •••• The inevitable elusiveness ot the divine 
name is the logical safeguard against universal idolatry," Reli-
gious Langµase, P• 129. 
5?0n this point Tillich wrote, "'Adequacy' of expression 
means the power ot expressing an ultimate concern in such a way 
that it creates reply! action, communication. SYJJ1bols which are 
able to do this are a ive. But the life of symbols is limited," 
Pmamics .2! Faith, p. 96. 
58Whitehead 
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structions which indicate but do not completely capture the real-
ity they express. In many respects, dogmas are negative and pro-
tective, trying to defend what is held to be a living reality 
against distortion.59 
What we must not forget about dogmatic (or any other kinds 
of) expression of religious experience is that "Religions comm.it 
suicide when they find their inspiration in their dogmas."60 
As Schleiermacher remarked, dogmas are but general expressions 
of definite religious experiences, but the dogmas are not abso-
lutely necessary to religion.61 !hat is, religious experience 
is tundruaental, and the dogmas of religion are the clarifying 
modes of external expression.62 "The Dogmas of religion," said 
Whitehead, "are the attempts to formulate in precise terms the 
truths disclosed in the religious experience of mankind."63 And 
closer examination of the religious experience of mankind will 
reveal the primary function ot a creed or dogma· is its expressio!l 
of the believer's awareness of the ultimately transcendent. It 
is his attempt to render the credible intelligible; to find a 
59!illich, Ultimate OonceX'Jl, p. 66. 
60Whitehead, Religion in ~h! Makin~, p. 138. But it is too 
much to say as Smith does, ilia a VITI'.Ctaith has little need for 
abstractions. On the contrary, one can't have a vivid understan-
ding of his faith without abstractions (i.e., conceptualizations; 
Smith, !!!!. Meaning ~ ~ .2! Religion, P• 116. 
61Sohleiermacher, S2!! Religion, P• 8?. 
62Wh1tehead, Religion !!! ~ Malting, P• 132. 
6311!li·. p. 57. 
losos in the nqthoa ot his faith, or to penetrate the meaning ot 
its ~st&r'T• Perhaps this is wlQ" so 11an7 Terbalizations are 
really only distilled J11.7Steries or paradoxes put in propositional 
torm, because there is more to the JV&te17 than a word (.}.ogos) or 
words can capture.64 
Perhaps, too, the inabilit,' ot words to completely conceptu-
alize transcendence is the reason so aany religious assertions 
are either direotl7 or indirectly negative. JCa~ suggested 
that eTen monotheism was not originall7 a positive concept but 
an expression againat pol1'theiaa.65 Possibly no one in the his-
tol7" of thought haa held to the absolute siaplieitT ot the trans-
cendent aore than did Pl.otirru, and he frankl7 conteaaea tha't 
even •unity" is a negative notion.66 Moses Maillonides and the 
medieTal. thinkers atter him stressed the "f'ia negati'Ya as we11.6? 
Ot course, it knowledge ot transcendence is completely negative, 
64-aee Vernon o. Grounds, •fb.e Postulate ot Paradox," ~­
tin ot the e•lioal ft•ologige.l §ooieb, Vol. 7 (Winter~) PP:- '3=°2Y-:- e7 sugges a, too, iblt ibli is the reason aany of 
the Ob.r1st1an•s verbal •od.els of locl are seeaingl7 incompatible, 
such as God is both •apass1ble" DI "loving." l'either ten, he 
said, is to be understood literaliy-but as a "model" (and we aay 
have Jl.8.D1' "models" with va.ryi.ng degrees ot adequao7) which must 
be understood not descriptivel7 as a "scale model" but as "dis-
closure model," capable ot eTOking a characteristicall7 religious 
awareness, RU18e7, Models and mt•g (Londonz Oxford University 
Presa, 1964), PP• 19=201 ana-Re iJ s 19&!1•• P• 101. 
65xautmann, Q£1'!1gue ~ Reli&on ~ Philosopbl, P• 28?. 
66Plotinus, 1PD1ads, V, 5,6 (qu.oted below, see n. 76). 
67see Moses Maimonides, ~ tor !!!.!. Per"Dlexed, trans. M. 
lriedlander (l'ew York: lover NliII'c'Mona, ~nc.t l~)J. Part one, LVIII-LX, and. !hoaaa .Aq\U.nas, 8wmaa Deologioa , 13, C! and 5. 
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it is legitimate to ask the question as to whether verbalizations 
ot man's religious Tision have 8Jl7 meaning at all. !hat is, is 
language reall7 adequate as a •ediua tor the expression ot the 
timate? 
.!!! Lia1tationa !! J,a.ngye !!. a Heans 2' 
15Pre1aing Vl.tiaate ~an.soendence 
ftan3" words have been uttered to lament the liJRits ot lan-
guage as a means ot expression. Among these lamentations J11'9tics 
have contributed not a few siseable voluaes which attempt b7 
language to S&7 what the7 sq language cannot reall.J' 8X})r'ess. 
!his ver7 1ro117 itself JllQ' be an indication ot the 1n.41apensabil-
1 t7 of language, whatever its inadequacies may be. ~. problem 
is thia1 how oan lia1te4 language express the unliaited? Bow 
oan earthl7 terms convey heavenl7 truths? Bow oan the immediate 
and immanent reveal the ultimate and. transcendent? 
Begative Language ot ~anscendence 
!he ton of the problem is so torboding that JDall7 have 'ri.r-
, 
tually despaired or speaking meaningfully ot the ultimate or God 
in anything more than negative terms. It is tor this reason that 
Hegel identified religion with a philosophical dialectic, insofar 
• as both aust negate the given. •Por religion equall7 with phil• 
osopb.7 refuses to recognise in tinitude a veritable being, or 
something ultimate and absolute, or non-posted, un.oreated and 
eterna1.•68 :!Yen Immanuel ~t admitted that "!he concept ot a 
nouaenon is thus a 11erel7 lillitiy concept • • • and it is there-
fore onl.7 of negative emplOYJlent.•69 Tillich, 11ltewise, admit• 
the need of negations to express the ultimate, s871ng it "• •• 
0 an.not be detined be7on4 these negative terms."?O Spinoza'• 
famous dictwas all determination is b7 negation,?l ia i;J'pical of 
a philosopb.7 of definition b;y negation that is traceable as far 
back as Plato's "non-being.•?2 
However, the classic example of negative theology in the 
west is Plotinus. the transcendent sou.t"Oe ot all things (which 
he often called the "One") is so tar beyond all sensible and even 
intellectual awareness that he sa7s it is even be7on4 all being?3 
Agreeing with Plato, Plotinus said of the "One" that "• •• it 
can neither be spoken nor written ot.•?4 When he does, neYerthe-
less, speak of it in 8!17 other terms than absolute simplio1t7 or 
oneness, he readil7 admits that these "• •• aasertions oan be no 
more than negations.•75 In taot, "If we are led to think posi-
tively of the One," said he, •1;b.ere would be more truth in ai• 
lence." Sillilarl7, "Even in calling it the first we mean no aore 
691tant, 2£a:tigue .!! Pare Jteaaop., P• 212. 
?Otillich• Vltiaate Concern, p. 43. 
711ene41ot Spinoza, JRistola 50 (QR!ra, IV, p. 240). 
72Plato wrote, "• •• what 1• not, in aoae rea1~ot11 baa 'being 
and conversel7 that what is, 1n a wa:y is not," Sg:p!QsS 241 d. 
?3 Ct. Enneads T, 2, l and T, 3t 11. 
'14ameads, TI, 9, 4, cf. Plato, Parmenides 142 a. 
?51Qaeads, VI, 8, 11, ct. also T, 5, 6. 
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than to express • • • that it ii. not of that compound nature 
which would make it dependent upon any constituents." .Although 
Plotinus says many apparently positive things about the transcen-
dent "One,• such as calling it good, supreme, absolute beaut7, 
nevertheless he carefull7 qualities all these with warnings like 
the following: "When therefore 70U seek to state or to conceiTe 
Him, put all else aside1 abstraeti.ng all •• •I aee that 7~u add 
nothing1 be sure that there is not something which 70U have taile< 
to abstract from Him in 7our thought.•?6 
Bow the merit of negative religious assertions cannot be de-
nied, for the danger of verbal idolat17 is alwa7s a real one. 
fo repeat, idolat17 ia 14olatJ:7 whether the illages are mental or 
metal. Literalism about the transcendent deprives it of its 111-
tiaao7 and its aa~eav, said ftllioh.77 But all of this is avoi• 
ded b7 negative a.sse~ions, for it ia preciael7 all limitations 
and fillitude which ia being negated so that the negative words 
may exp~ess the ualiaite4 and tranaeend.ent. 
However, there ia a serious, it not fatal, ditfioulUJ' with 
purel7 negative religious assertions. Plotinua hiaaelt touched 
on it when he admitted •It ia iapoaaible to aa,. •not that' if 
one is utterl7 without experience or conception ot the 'that.••?a 
!hat is, all negative predications presuppose some positive 
?61rmeads• II. 9t 1; emphasis Dline. 
??tillioh. PlB!!J.os 2£. taith, P• ,2. 
7819ga4s, n. 1. 29. 
1Understanding of that about which the predications are being 
made. Tillich said• "!here would be no negation if there were no 
preceding affirmation to be negated ••••• ?9 Peuerbach's re-
mark is instructive in this regard: "The truly religious man 
can't worship a purely negative being •••• Only when a man 
loses his taste for religion does the existence or God become one 
without qualities, an unknowable God.•80 Indeed, the llJ"Stic him-
self. said Henri Bergson, "• •• has nothing to do with proper-
ties which are mere negations and can only be expressed negative-
ly; he believes that he sees what God is, tor him there is no 
seeing what God is not.•81 
~course, that is precisely the problem. viz •• the believer 
sees the transcendent as a positive reali't7. but can he .!!l any-
thing about it in language with other than a purely negative mean 
ing (which would seem to be equivalent to no meaning at all)? 
In other words• even it one can experience the transcendent, can 
he express it in terms which have a positive meaning? One attemp 
ted answer to this problem has been the doctrine of analogy. 
Analogous Language of Transcendence 
In line with the many references of !h.omas Aquinas to the 
doctrine ot analogy his followers have sensed its importance and 
?9Paul !illich, !he Courage to Be (Bew Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1952), p.-.tm. - -
8
°Feuerbach, .!!!.!. Essence £! Christianitz, P• 15. 
81Bergson, .!!!!, f!2. Sources ,g! Moralitz sa. Religion, P• 252. 
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have given a great deal ot time to it.82 Since !homists do not 
agree as to exactly what Aquinas meant by analogy, we will otter 
a summary of our own interpretation.83 Basically, therd are 
three alternatives for language about God: ita meaning can be 
~ eauivocal (totally different as applied to God),84 univocal (tot-
ally the same), or analogous (similar). Now it it is equivocal, 
. then one is really not saying anything meaningful about God when 
he affirms, e.g., that God is good. For it the meaning of good 
is totally different when applied to God from what it means as 
applied to finite goods, then they are really ~ alike ~ !!! 
in meaning. 8~ 
Nor, on the other hand, can one's language about God be uni-
vocal in meaning for concepts are finite and limited and God is 
infinite and unlimited, and there is an infinite difference 
82!he tirst systematic treatment was made by Cardinal Caje-
tan, !he A.nalof{ £! Names (Duquesne University Press, 1953). !he 
most comprehens ve teXtUal stuc!J' is a recent one by George Xlu-
bertanz, St. Thomas on A.nalogr (Loyola University Press, 1960). 
Another s!gn1l!cant con~r!butron has come recently trom Ralph 
Mcinerny, fhe Logic ot .Analogy (Hague: Nijhoff, 1961). But Eric 
Maseal's Aiii!ogy and-'!XIstienee (Longmans, Green, 1949) is perhaps 
more well known than the others. !he most significant treatment, 
however, is that of Battista Mon.din, !he Principle of Analogy in 
Protestant ~ Catholic Theolo!l (Hagiiii lljno?f, 19'b3'· ---
83Much of this analysis is a summary of our uiJ.published mas-
ter thesis, !he Use ot Analogy in !homistie Theism, Wheaton Col-
lege, Illino!S; !9'59:- -
84Aquinas sometimes Sa)"s it is "almost equivocal," De frini· 
tate, VI, 3, reply, as translated by Armand Maurer in !he DIV'.!_.,,, 
sion and Methods of the SCiences (Toronto: The Pontifical ?nsti-
tuii,~63). - -
85see George Xlubertanz, An Introduction to the Philosop~ 
ot Beirur (New York: Appleton-oiiitury-Cro?ts, IiiC.-;-r95;}, 53-6;. 
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etween a finite and an infinite. Or to put it another way, if 
God is beyond and completely other than this world, then how can 
ter·ms applied both to him and to the world mean entirely the same 
Therefore, since language about God can be neither equivocal 
~t~ferent), nor univoeal (totally the same in meaning), 
. must be analogical (partly the same and partly difterent).86 
e justification, then, tor analogous knowledge is that it is 
only meaningful ground between the extremes of skepticism and 
· ogmatism; between not being able to say al13'thing meaningful 
bout God (on the basis of language as equivocal) and being able 
o speak perfectly about God (on the basis of language as univo-
Perhaps the other most significant factor in the defense ot 
analogy which Thomists have put forth is that analogy is based on 
causality. That is, the creature must bear some resemblance to 
the Creator simply because an e.ttect must in some way pre-exist 
in the causeo87 !o put it another way it would be eontradictol'1" 
to say that God can produce perf eotions which he does not himsel 
possess. That is, it would be contradictory to attirm that the 
creature has a perfection which its Creator doesn't have. 
!he attempts to defend analogy notwithstanding, it has not 
met with wide acceptance in the modern philosophical world for 
86"Partly" is not intended to imply parts. It means at one 
alike and different or similar. 
Summa ~~ Gentiles I, 29-30; SWmna ~-
o basic reasons: it seems to them to prove either too little or 
o prove too much. Some medieval Scholastics after Aquinas (like 
cotus) took the former position and many moderns (like Hum.e) 
upported the latter view. Let us briefly examine these charges. 
~:.Ahe basic argument Scotus advances is this: unless there is 
e .!!!! {univocal) in one's predications of God, he 
e sure he is reall7 sa7ing aDTt;hing about God at all.88 
-_- a 9 unless one• s predications are uni vocal, he cannot be 
·:"~. they are not equivocal. 89 !or it one maintains that this 
·:,_:;,tis not true, "• •• a disconcerting consequence ensues; 
·F< --
·.·· '$ly that from the proper notion of anything found in creatures 
... ~.~ /f-.. ·~.' 
itl:ling at all can be interred about God, tor the notion ot what 
~;_1t,.:_~~h is wholl7 different. n90 Basica.117, his argument comes 
.. ' '~tlte following: if' there is to be a c•rtaintT in one's know-
i ; . ., .. 
~edge 
: 
about God, then there must be univocity in his predications 
him.91 !hat is, either skepticism or univocitJ". 
Now it is preoisel7 this skeptical alternative that Hume 
88!he reason tor this is that "God cannot be known naturall7 
less being is univocal to the created and uncreated," John Duns 
otus, Philosorhical Writipgs1 trans. Allan Wolter (Hew York: !he Bobbs-Merri 1 eo., Inc., 1~64), P• 6. 
8911e adds, "Oonsequently, every inquiry regarding God is 
ased upon the supposition that the intellect has the sam.e univo-
al concept which it obtained trom creatures," Duns Scotus, Phil-
oso hical Writings, p. 28. 
90ibid. 
9l"One and the same concept cannot be both ce,rtain and dubi-
ous. !here.tore, either there is an.other concept which is cer-
tain] , or there is no concept at all, and conseq entl;r no certi-
tude about any concept," Duns Sootus, ll• !!ll•t p. 23. 
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J'undamentall7, he argued that analogy proves too much (and 
vocity, a fortiori]. Por if God is like the world then God is 
for there are imperfections in the world.92 He wrote, 
no reason, on your theof7, for ascribing perfections to 
Deity, even in his finite capacity."93 
following up Hum.e's line of thought, Kaufmann argued that 
"The whole theory of analogy, even it otherwise free of holes, 
ould still be shipwrecked on the Christian conception of hell~gq. 
is to say, if God is like everything he created, then (repug 
t as it may sound to a believer in God) he is like hell. It 
s tor a similar reason that Plotinus held that God (the One) did 
ot possess what he produced. Por God produced finite, limited, 
ultiple things, and he is none of these.95 But tor H1111e, it 
alogv (or univocity) were true, then God would be finite, p~­
ical, and evil since he has produced all of these. However, 
ost theists are not content to accept these as characteristics 
On the other hand, if nothing can be predicated of God 
in an analogous sense, then it would seem to follow that 
e must remain cognitively unknowable. 
Despite the tact that the doctrine of analogy has not been 
dely accepted outside fb.omistic circles among modern thinkers, 
ork: 9;~~~M!~:iiDa!!~5!!:.?0¥9~)!n'1:~atural Religion (New 
93 Ibid., V. 
94:raurmann, Oritigue .2! Re\igion ,eg, Pb.ilosoplq, p. 189. 
95cr. Plotinus, Enneads, VI, ?, 15. 
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t seems to us that it deserves more serious oonsideration.96 
ertainl7 Hume•s criticism is not definitive. For it can be ar-
ed that only perfections, not imperfections, are to be applied 
Imperfections are privations or lacks and no lack of 
attributed to God who by nature is said to have 
ll perfections. Furthermore, it God is held to be infinite then 
t course nothing which necessarily implies a limitation can be 
ttributed to him. At this point a theist mB.3' argue that what-
ver cannot be applied to G?d without necessarily implying limi-
ations (such as materiality) must be said at best only metaphor-
.......... ~ or symbolically. And whatever implies evil may not be 
pplied to God at all, for he is held to be absolutely good. On 
he other hand whatever perfeotions can be predicated without 
ecessarily implying limitations may be attributed to God meta-
.....,....,.. ..... ......,_._ or substantially. 
However, it it is granted that there is an intrinsic simi-
arity between God and creatures based on the connection of 
960ne ot the reasons Thomistic analogy has been rejected by 
any thinkers is that it has been wedded to Cajetan's view that 
roper proportionalit7 is the basic !homistic analogj". •or it 
seems to many that this analogy which is built only on the indir-
ect relation between two relationships (e.g., finite love is to 
he finite nature of man as infinite love is to the infinite na-
e of God, like 2/4::3/6) does not really establish~ intrin-
sic similarity at all. More recently, however, Tho:miats have 
ome to acknowledge that St. !hoaas himself based his doctrine of 
analogy on the intrinsic relation that God bears to creatures as 
the cause to its effects. See Mondin, .Qlt• iit., chapter 4. 
James F. Ross reopened the study of Thoirst c analogy in the con-
text ot analytic philosophy in a significant article, "Analogy as 
a Rule ot Meaning tor Religious Language," International Philoso-
hioal Quarterly, Vol. l, No. 3 (September, 19G1) 1 pp. 468-562. 
cause to effects, then it would seem to follow that what may be 
oroperly attributed to both God and creatures is based on a uni-
vocal meaning of the terms. For example, the term love which can 
be applied to both God and man will have to have the same meaning 
even though it is applied to the former without limits and to the 
latter with limitations. In this sense, the univocal-analogical 
debate may be solved by saying that the meaning of the terms which 
are applied properly to both God and creatures is the same but 
they are not applied in the same way. That is, the meaning is 
univocal but the predication is analogica1.9? For example, the 
word love has the same univocal meaning in and of itself but ~ 
applied or predicated of man it means finite love and ~ applied 
to God it means infinite love. In one case the same meaning of 
the word love is predicated without limitation and in the other 
case it is predicated with limitations. And since there is an in-
finite difference between a finite and an infinite, it cannot be 
said that the predications have entirely the same meaning in both 
cases. However, if there must be an intrinsic relation between 
the Source of all love (that is, Love itself) and love as it is 
found in its finite manifestations, there must be some similarity 
~etween love as it is found in God and as it is found in his 
creatures. For even if there is an infinite difference in per-
fection between God and creatures, there nevertheless need not be 
a total lack of similarity. There could in fact be an analogy. 
9?see Armand .Maurer, "St. Thomas and the Analogy of Ge-
nus," !fil! Scholasticism, Vol. 29 (April, 1955), pp. 143-144. 
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Whether in tact there is an analogy between God and crea-
es will depend, of course, on whether or not there is a God 
ho in faot did create creatures in his image. It is not our p 
ose here to decide this question. What we can contend, however, 
s that !! there were a God who is the cause of everr perfection 
the world, there would seem to be no compelling reason why one 
speak meaningfully about him even though he be intin-
And on the other hand, even it there is no such thing as a 
reality, one can still speak meaningfully about such 
supposed reality in analogous language. As long as there are 
ays to apply words which do have positive meaning beyond the 
cope 0£ their usual finite application then it will be possible 
o speak meaningfully of the transcendent. If it can be shown 
impossible to extend the positive meaning of a word 
the limits of immediate human experience, then at best one 
able to speak of the transcendent only negatively or sy:m.-
olically. In order to complete the treatment of religious lan-
now be turned to other attempts to def end 
meaningfulness of symbolic talk about the transcendent. 
Disclosure Language about the Transcendent 
Ian Ramsey seeks to elaborate a meaningful language about 
ranscendenoe by what he calls "disclosure models." Contrary to 
"picturing models" or "scale models" a "disclosure model" does 
ot attempt to describe ~hing, rather it becomes currency tor 
moment of insight. "!he great value of a model," said Ramsey, 
" 
ongue-tied." Disclosure models are the means ot the universe 
evealing itselt to man, and they are to be ~udged primarily on 
heir ability to point to mystery, not on their ability to 
icture it. Indeed, it is part ot the purpose ot a model and its 
ualifiers to leave a 181'Stery intact (e.g., God may be modeled 
s 'love• and qualified by the word 'intinite•).98 !he intention 
s to produce, from a single model, and by means of some qualiti-
r, an endless series ot variants, ••• 1n this way witnessing 
o the tact that the heart of theology is permanent mystery.99 
other examples Ramsey gave are words which have evocative 
owers like indefinite pronouns or nicknames. ~e latter is a 
"• •• word which has intrinsically the fewest possible empirical 
onnections, but is very much tilled out 'in use.••100 !hat is, 
anguage about God is not declarative; it is evocative.101 Ram-
ey holds that by the use of non-descriptive, evocative language 
ne can avoid being literalistic or purely anthropomorphic about 
d, tor he has learned that no one model has single, all-exclu-
track to IQ"Stery any more than one metaphor can do tul.l jus-
to a sunset or to human love and affection. That is to S81't 
isclosure models "• •• are not descriptive miniatures, they are 
98Ramsey, Models ~ ttz'ste£1, PP• ?i 19·20; 12-13; 71, 61. 
99Ibid., PP• 60, 65, 21. 
10
°ttam.sey, Religious La.nguase, P• 162. 
lOl":M7 suggestion is that we understand their r1.e., names 
for GodJ behaviour aright if we see them as pri.marily evocative 
of what we have called the odd discernment • • •"Ramsey, Reli-
ous La e • 
5? 
picture enlargements; in each ease they point to mystery, to 
he need for us to live as best we can with theological and soien 
itic uncertainties."102 
Is not this latter statement an admission of skepticism 
God? Is it not merely another way ot saying man does not 
ow, or that his knowledge of God 1a equivocal? To answer this 
rom Ramsey's perspective one must remember that his concern is 
ot with a descriptive knowledge ot the transcendent but, rather, 
ith meaningful disclosure language about it. 
~e least that can be said tor Ramsey's "models" is that 
hey do answer Wittgenstein's challenge to keep silent unless one 
an speak meaningtully.l03 Even it disclosure models do not 
llow one to speak descriptively about God., nevertheless they do 
ermit one to speak.104 Indeed, by virtue ot the tact 'that Ram-
sey's disclosure models are not cognitively descriptive nor em-
irioally verifiable (as are scientific models)l05 and by virtue 
l02"!he intention is to produce, b:v a single model, and by 
eans ot some qualifier, an endless series ot variants! • • • in 
his way witness1Df to ~he tact that the heart ot theo 087 is 
ermanent mystery, Ramsey, H041ls ~ rtrster.z, p. 20. 
l03"It is interesting to notice, first, that the possibili~ 
of articulation is still 1 as it always was, the basis ot a model 
setulness. The great Tl.rtue ot a model is that it enables us to 
e articulate when before we were tongue-tied. But it is evident 
hat articulation now is much more tentative than it was before, 
that is when it was developed on the basis of a scale model ••• 
In tact on the new view, the crucial question is: Bow oan we be 
eliably articulate?" Models ~ t\Y•te£Y, pp. 12-l;:-
104In a doctoral dissertation on Ian Ramsey, Jerry Gill con-
cludes that "Ian Ramsey's interpretation adequately meets the 
challenge ot Logical :&apiricism concerning the cognitivity ot 
Christian language." Ian Ramsey's Inter~tation of Christian 
La a e (University l'lrOrofl!ms, Iii'.c •• ~ Xrbor,-ilich, 196?), v. 
l05"But now we must emphasize that models in science • • • 
t the fact that they are indefinitely qualitiable, one cannot 
nly speak about God but speak endlessly. And in so speaking, 
one's language does not suffer "death by a 
housand qualifications" but rather gives "lite by a thousand 
~e question, said Ramsey, is not whether one oan speak 
escriptively about the Divine Nature; the real question is: How 
an he be reliably articulate? Models help us to reliably artio-
ate theology when two conditions hold: l) "In all oases the 
odels must chime in with the phenomena; they must arise in a 
oment of insight or disclosure," and 2) "A model in theology 
oes not stand or fall with ••• the possibility ot verifiable 
eductions. It is rather judged by its stability over the widest 
ossible range of phenomena, by its ability to incorporate the 
ost diverse phenomena not inconsistently." fhis is what Ramsey 
alls the method of "empirical fit," which has no scientific 
eductions emerging to confirm or falsity the stated theories. 
"The theological model," he said, "works more like the titting ot 
a boot or a shoe •••• nl06 In brief, religious language is em-
irically anchored (in disclosure situations)lO? and pragmatic-
ally tested by the way it enables one to piece together the 
enable us to generate verifiable deductions, and models in the-
ology ••• make possible empirical tit," Models !!!S, ftrste;z, 
p. 19. 
106 Ibid., PP• 13, 15-1? • 
.............. 




Further. even though disclosure models are not ontologically 
escriptive,108 nevertheless they do help to build "fam.ily resem-
" 
"Let us always be cautious," Ramsey warned, "of talk-
God in straightforward language. Let us never talk as 
had privileged access to the diaries of God's private lite, 
When we speak of God as "supreme love," e.g., "• •• we 
re not making an assertion in descriptive psychology ••• •" 
ather, we are using a 9ualified model ("love" is qualified by 
whose logical structure can only be understood in te 
the disclosure-oom.mitment situation in which it arose. 109 
What he calls "qualifiers" a.re "• •• words which multiply 
odels without end and with sub.tie changes." ~ey create what 
ittgenstein called "family resemblances" or a family of models! 
of qualification of one model or metaphor,111 many of 
be related in an overall meeting place between contexts. 
d it is at this juncture where the mystery resides.112 !hat 
l08"The English pb.Tsicists of the nineteenth century were 
ight in wanting some •ontological commitment," some •real exis-
ence'; they were only wrong, but badly wrong, in thinking this 
ould be given descriptively. It is this error which the contem-
orary use ot models makes evident and spotlights and is deter-
ined to avoid," Ramsey, Models~ 11tste;:z, P• 20. 
l09Ramsey, Religious Language, PP• 104, 99. 
11
°ttamsey, Models ~ lb';sten, PP• 60-61. 
111A disclosure model and a metaphor are very much alike in 
hat both "• •• enable us to be articulate and are born in in-
sight," Ramsey, Models !!ll!, rtysterz, p. 48. 
112Ibid. 61. 
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Ls, by mapping out the similarities engendered by the meeting ot 
the many metaphors, one may gain increased insight into the mys-
tery. As Max Black put it, "A memorable metaphor has the power 
to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional rela-
tion by using language directly appropriate to the one as a lens 
tor seeing the other •••• nll3 It is in this way that metaphors 
~elp to visualize the silllilarity in various situations and thus 
to begin to form a master map of family resemblances. 
Metaphors then are not just link devices between ditter-
ent contexts. fhey are ~eeessarily grounded in inspira-
tion. Generalizing, we may say that metaphorical ex-
pressions occur when two situations strike us in such a 
way as to reveal what includes them but is no mere com-
bination of them both.114 
Ramsey does not spell out what this common element is in 
which the various metaphors and models coincide, but it is at 
this point thGt he comes closest to admitting what the seholas-
tiios were getting at in their "univocal element" in analogy. In-
1eed, it bears a striking resemblance to what Sjlren Kierkegaard 
~eant by approaching a "paradox" trom many sides. He wrote, 
••• I entered into the whole £orego1ng discussion--not as 
though Abraham would thereby become more intelligible, 
but in order that the unintelligibility might become more 
desultocy. l'or, as I have said, Abraham I cannot under-
stand, I can only admire him. 
By desultory Kierkegaard meant a "• •• leaping .trom one point 
~o another so as to illuminate the subject from all sides, or in 
ll3Max Black, Models and Meta2hors, as quoted by Ramsey, 
!"Iodels ~ n,yste;cy, p. $4.-
114Ramsey, Models !!!2, n,ysteg, p. 53. 
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order that the unintelligibility might be broken down into its 
several parts."ll5 But it each one ot Ramsey's disclosure illu-
laines a common meaning, or it each one ot Kierkegaard's perspec-
tives helps one to understand the meaning of the paradox, then 
there must be a common core of meaning (a univocal element) 
which they all convey. That is, if all the models converge to 
give meaningful insights into the transcendence, then there must. 
be a common basis for the•, otherwise the divergent models are 
not really providing insights into the same thing after all. In 
this sense disclosure language is doing the same job that the 
univocal element in analogous is intended to accomplish. 
But the basic question which must be answered here is not 
whether Ramsey's "disclosure" language is really "analogous" lan-
guage or whether both are like Kierkegaard's "paradoxical" ex-
pression, but whether 8..llY of these are adequate ways or speaking 
about ultimate transcendence. However, before we are ready to 
answer this question we must first review other approaches aimed 
at discovering an adequate language tor the transcendent. 
Symbolic Language about Transcendence 
Paul Tillich suggests that the answer is to be found in 
"symbolic" language about God. "Han's ultimate concern must be 
expressed symbolically," wrote Tillich, "because symbolic lan-
ll5F.d.1tor•s note, {egr and T:rembli~, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday an o.-;-Inc., 1954 , p. 121. Kierkegaard 
admits that there is a way to understand a paradox, saying, "How-
ever, 1! I regard the problem rot God COlllDlanding Abraham to tran-
scend the moral law and kill Iiaac, as a paradox, then I under-
stand it in such a way as one can Understand a paradox," 1ear and 
Tremblinao .. 'De 84. ·· - -
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guage alone is able to express the ultimate." But a "symbol" is 
not the same as a "sign" tor Tillich. A sign is something that 
points beyond itself, but a symbol is more. "It points beyond 
itself while participating in that to which it points." For 
example, the flag is a symbol of the nation because it not only 
points beyond itself to the nation tor which it stands but in 
addition it participates in the power and dignity of that 
nation.116 
According to Tillich there are three criteria of a true sym-
bol: l} True, living symbols should be immediately understand-
able; 2) '.l'here should not be resistance to them because of anxi-
ety concerning the idolatrous use ot symbols; 3) They should be 
expressed in a contemporary stylistic torm. 117 
!he great sym.bol of faith tor Tillich is the word ''God" be-
cause somehow the word participates in all the honor and dignity 
that is attributed to God himself. However, this is not to say 
that any of the attributes of God or even the word God itself are 
really descriptive of God. "All the qualities we attribute to 
him, power, love, justice, are taken from finite experiences and 
applied symbolically to that which is beyond finitude •••• "118 
They are symbols taken from daily experience, and not information 
about what God is or what He can do. !!!hey do not form a logos 
about God but a D!:rjihos. 
116!1llich, J?.t:rtamics .2!'. Faith, pp. 41, 45. 
ll?!illich, Ultimate Concern, p. 92. 
118Tillich, pyna.m.ics .2!'. Faith, p. 4?. 
Tillich admits that symbols may lose their meaning and may 
even die, 119 but adds that they may also be revived. "Therefore, 
no symbol should be removed. It should be reinterpreted." 
"Classical, traditional Christianity," he said, "has lived in 
symbols--Creation, tall, reconciliation, salvation, Kingdom or 
God, Trinity. 'l'hese all are great symbols, and I do not wish to 
lose them." Indeed, Tillich envisioned his writings as "• •• 
directed precisely to the interpretation of religious s,-mbols in 
such a way that the secular man-and we are all secular--ean 
understand and be moved by them."120 
Tillich's concept ot symbolic language about God has not 
been without resistance by contemporary philosophers. Kau.fmann•s 
response is to the point: 
Some people think that the conception or "symbols" which 
is fashionable in our day can do the job that "analofJ7" 
has tailed to do. It is argued that religious proposi-
tions which are literally false are true when understood 
symbolically. !he first point to note here is that there 
is no nonsense whatever which may not be said to be sym-
bolically true, especially it the symbolic meaning is 
not stated. 
It, on the other hand, Kaufmann continued, the "• •• claim that 
religious propositions are symbolical means that they are richly 
ambiguous, it is true--but put very Jlialeadingly •••• 11121 
ll9Ibid., PP• 4?-49. 
120Tillieh, Ultimate Concern, PP• 9?, 96, 88-89. 
121
xaurmann, Critigue or Relifion and Philosop~, PP• 189, 
191. lurthermore, !iiu?mann-Conten s thit"'T{!iich's istinction 
between "sign" and "symbol" is both arbitrary and ridiculous, 
tor "• •• it would make •mythical thought' and the 'primitive 
mentality• of undeveloped peoples and children the norm tor all 
64 
Tillich was eventually forced to acknowledge that one's know~ 
ledge of God could not be completely symbolic by the argument, 
"• •• that in order to speak of symbolic knowledge one must de-
limit the symbolic realm by an unsymbolic statement."122 His 
reply was that the one unsymbolic, and therefore unambiguous, 
statement that can be made of' God is that he is "being itself." 
"But," Kaufmann responded, "this is surely neither a symbolic 
statement nor a nonsymbolic statement: it is no statement at all, 
it is a definition--and as it happens, a definition utterly at 
odds with the meaning ot 'God' in probably more than 95 per cent 
of our religious tradition ••• •" He continues, "Tillich's 
'being itself' is nEdther the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob nor 
the God of Jesus and Paul •••• In short, Tillich's proposi-
tions about God are through and through ambiguous."123 
However,inadequate Tillich's symbolic language of God may 
be, Kaufmann is not entirely oonsj.stent in basing a rejection ot 
it on its ambiguity. For Kaufmann himself wrote, "Propositions 
~an be multivocal without being eguivocal: to the perspective 
!they speak with many voices, signify many things, and mean a 
great deai.•124 On the other hand, to argue (as Tillich eventu-
of us •••• " tor they share alike the superstitious belief 
that a sign is somehow real or participates in the reality which 
it symbolizes, Kaufmann, rug., P• 194. 
122A criticism given by Professor Urban of Yale which Kaut-
~ann relates, Critigue gt_ Religion~ Philosoph;r, p. 195. 
123 Ibid., PP• 195, 196. 
124Ibid., P• ?2. 
-
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ally did) that all symbolic statements must have a nonsymbolic 
basis is reminiscent ot Scotua' contention that there must be a 
univocal, non-ambiguous basis for all ambiguous and non-univocal 
predications.125 
!he other alternative to arguing for a univocal basis for 
all symbolic predications of God is to say that all language 
about God is purely symbolic. Such is what Jaspers does by call-
ing religious language "cipher" language. 
Cipher Language About Transcendence 
Jaspers said, M• •• the meaning of the cipher is that 
through it I actually become aware of something that cannot be 
expressed in any other language. • II 
• • For the idea of God, 
taken seriously, excludes definite determinations, and requires 
that one go beyond all languages. !hat is, "• •• a cipher be-
comes a symbol of a reality that cannot be expressed in any other 
way-." Cipher language is a~ language about God because there 
is no content language about Him. It speaks in a mythos about 
God because there can be no logos about Him. There can be np 
clarity where there is mystery.126 
It is interesting to observe in this regard that some of 
contemporary philosophy is moving in a somewhat reverse direction 
from the early Greeks who threw oft the vast symbolic visions ot 
mythology and attempted to get a clear-headed picture ot the way 
125see discussion in above notes 89-92. 
126Jaspers, ~ ~ Christianity, PP• 87, 89; cf. 85. 
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things really were--they sought a logos in place of a !llhos.12? 
It would seem that Jaspers and others are saying that the quest 
tor the logos tor more than two millennia of Western thought has 
proved futile; we must return to myths as means of describing 
reality.128 
Be that ~s it may, Jaspers' "cipher" language is admittedly 
hical and non-objective. It is in this respect that he oppo-
ses so strongly Rudolf Bultmann's attempt to de-mythologize. 
"We should not destro7, but restore the language of myth," he 
ites. "fo speak of 'demythologization' is almost blasphemous. 
ot myth is not enlightenment, but sham en-
ightenment," he continues. "Does the splendor ot the sunrise 
ease to be a tangible, ever new and inspiring reality, a mythi-
al presence, just because we know that the earth is revolving 
round the sun ••• ?" Bultmann, he complains, tails to reoog-
that mythical language conveys an untranslatable truth. 
"The elements of truth in the myth • • • oannot be separated from 
its historical garb, once the latter has been stripped away." 
fb.e real task, therefore, is #Ot to demythologize, but 
to recover mythical thought in. its original purity ••• 
and indirectly bring us closer to the lofty, imageless 
127oorntord, l!:2!! Religion !! PhilosoPB.Y, p. 42. 
128Indeed, the later Heidegger's return to the pre-socratics 
nd interest in the poetical utterances of Holderlin would lend 
upport to this analysis, as would Altizer•s deep interest in 
lake's mystical poetry. See William Barrett, Irrational Man (!few York: Doubleday and Oo., Inc., 19.58), p. 2'5<}, and '!boiiii 
tizer and William Hamilton, Radical fb.eolo~ and the Death ot 
God (New York: The Bobbs-Merri!! Co., !nc.,~ pp:" 111 l.--
transcendence, the idea of God which29no myth can fully express for it surpasses them all.l 
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The real task, then, is not to demythologize but to "remytholo-
gize." Nevertheless, Jaspers admits there is a half truth in 
demythology, viz., that of "• •• denouncing reitication, or con-
ceiving the :m;rth as an alleged reality, opaque and tangible ... l30 
In brief, Jaspers' "ciphers," Tillich's "symbols" and Ram-
sey's "models" are all attempts to avoid two extremes: verbal 
idolatry (or identifying God with verbal images ot h1m)131 on 
the one hand and theological silence on the other hand. But do 
they succeed? 
129Jaspers, ~ ~ Qhristianit,z, PP• 85, 17, 16, 33-34, 
l30Jaspers conceives of his own task as one ot existential 
nermeneutics which depends on two critical factors: 
"First: Whereas mythical language is historical, and hence 
its truth can lay no claim to the universal validity of know-
ledge, it is precisely by Virtue ot this quality that it can lend 
the historical Existenz something ot the unconditional. The un-
conditional thua brougSt to light remains conditioned in expres-
sion, historically relative, and ob~eotively uncertain •••• 
Second: All mythical images are ambiguous. ~s idoa is 
inherent in the Biblical commandment: Thou shalt not make unto 
thee any graven image. Everything mythical is a language that 
grows faith before the transcendence of the one godhead. While 
we aee, hear. and think in the language of myth conceived as 
code, while we cannot become concretely aware ot transcendence 
without a code language, we must at the same time keep in mind 
that there are no demons, that there is no magic causality, no 
such thing as sorcery," ~~Christianity, pp. 16-17, 18-19. 
131 " ••• it we were vouchsafed with God's name, our vision 
might soon become atrophied--loving the name more than him who 
had disclosed it--we can only meet this difficulty by supposing 
that the name of God will never at any time be completely vouch-
safed to us,• Ramsey, Religious Language, p. 12'}. 
~ Adequacy £! Language .!!!, ~ Means sf 
JEcpressing Transcendence 
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!he ability to avoid successfully these two extremes will be 
part ot the criteria for the adequacy ot religious language. Por 
on the one handt surely no religious expressions about transcen-
dence can be deemed adequate it they do not point beyond the oon-
ines of limited empirical experiences to that which is ultimate. 
Andt on the other hand, certainly no talk of the beyond is ade-
quate if it is not grounded and anchored within tinite. human', 
experiences. Or. to state the criteria positively, any language 
~hich can point beyond limited, human experiences while re-
aining its basis within them has at least some adequacy tor ex-
ressing the transcendent. 
Betore deciding whether or not a given language or way ot 
speaking about transcendence is adequate, one must decide whether 
or not language itselt of its very essence rules out this possi-
ility. 
Does Language Necessarily Imply Limitations? 
It it could be determined that linguistic expressions al~s 
and necessarily imply limitations and are neither applicable to 
or evocative of anything beyond empirical limits, then the bat-
le for an adequate religious language is lost. Or, to be more 
specific, if language necessitates objectification, then there 
ill be no way to speak of a transcendent subject which -goes be-
ond all objectification. Only a careful analysis of what 
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language is can answer this question. 
There can be no doubt that language often involves objecti-
fication. Certainly scientific speaking involves objectifica-
tion, i.e., considering somQthing as an object of our study. In 
the scientific sense, said Martin Heidegger, "• •• thinking and 
speaking are objectifying, i.e., positing something given as ob-
ject in the field of scientific-technological representation 
( Vorstellen). • • • It He continues t "Outside or this field think-
ing and speaking are by no means objectifying,"132 To put it in 
Ramsey's terms, "scale-model" language is objective but "disclo-
sure-model" language is not.133 the language of pure objectivit, 
is empirically limited, but the language of subjectivity is not, 
because the former tries to picture whereas the latter points. 134 , 
As Kaufmann observed, 
The question is how we use language--to vivisect experi-
ence, killing it tor the sake of generalized knowledge, 
or to capture experience alive. The scientist does the 
form.er, the poet the latter, and the philosopher must 
often try to do both and capture the experience before 
anal7zing it.135 
What probabl7 tends to mislead many Westerners into thinkine 
that the nature of language is objective is the in.tluenoe of 
132cf. Martin Heidegger, »The Problem of a Non-Objectifying 
Thinking and Speaking in Contemporary Theology," in PhilosopH 
and Rel~ion, ~. Jerry H. Gill (Minneapolis: Burgess PUbll~ng 
ro: t 19 ) ' p. 64. 
l33see Ramsey, Models ~ !:J;rstery, pp. 19-20. 
134see Ramsey, Models &W1. J1ystecy, pp. ?, 19, 20, and !!!!!-
gious Language, PP• 56, 162. 
l35Kautmann, Critiq>J.e of Relittion an4_ PhilosoJ:>h:r, p. 88. 
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scientific type thought in their culture plus the inherent ra+.-1,__ 
alistic bend inherited from the Greeks. 136 As P. H. Cornford 
pointed out, the genius of the Greeks was to translate their 
m;ythos into a logos,137 i.e., to seek clarity where there had 
-
been ambiguity. The problem comes, however, when the logos is 
taken to be an ontos, when language is given a being or essence 
of its own. 
It is to the credit of Wittgenstein that many philosophers 
are coming to recognize that language has no essence.138 To be-
lieve that language has a nature or essence is an illusion which 
contributes to semantical confusion on empirical topics. More 
important for this study, it would imply that there are neces-
sarily implied limitations of language which render it incapable 
of speaking of anything beyond the empirical. In Greek philos-
ophy an essence is definable and circumscribable and, therefore, 
limited. Essences reter to entities and, like the platonic 
Forms after which they are patterned, they are distinctly limi-
ted. So from the recognition that language has no essence fol-
lows the conclusion that language is not necessarily limited and, 
therefore, not inapplicable to the transcendent. 
l36see A. J. Ayer, Languase, Truth and Logic (New York: 
Dover Publications, Inc., i~J, pp. 42~ 
259
• 
137cornf'ord, ~ Religion !2 Philosophl• pp. 141-142, 258-
138wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 28th ed. {New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., ·1gg9), p. 91. 
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What Is Language? 
This raises the question as to precisely what language is. 
Plato and his followers language was a revelation of the 
gos, an expression of the common wisdom which is in all men. 
ccording to Cornford's interpretation of Plato, "The Logos is 
evealed in speech. The structure of man's speech reflects the 
tructure of the world; more, it is an embodiment or representa-
ion of it ••• •" Language, like the visible world, is a mani-
old, and so halt unreal and false. 
Language, that stupendous product of the collective mind, 
is a dupiicate, a shadow-soul, ot the whole structure of 
reality • • • nothing, whether human or superhuman, is 
beyond its reach: Speech is the Logos, which stands to 
the universe in the same relation as the :myth to the 
ritual action.139 
at is, as the myth is sometimes a verbalization of the action 
ritual, so is speech a verbalization or logos ot the living 
eality of the whole world. 
Several things emerge from this analysis of language which 
significant for this study. First, if language is a kind of 
community (or cosmosA140 the question arises again as 
o whether language is not therefore limited by its very rational 
tructure as a logos and, therefore, incapable of expressing the 
limited? Of course, the answer to this will depend on what is 
l39cornford, From Religion ~ Philosopl:!l;, pp. 192, 141. 
140oorntord contends that this is the original meaning ot 
he word cosmos. "We are reminded. that the very word 2osmos was 
political term among the Dorians, betore it was borrowea'. by 
hilosphy to denote the universal order," .!£2! Religion !2, .E!!!!.-
so h , P• 53. 
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meant by a logos. A survey of the Greek usage of the term re-
veals that it had many meanings,141 most of which may be diVided 
into two broad basic categories: logos means either expression of 
or explanation for; discourse or definition; a verbalization or 
rationalization. 
Now in the former sense of the word there would be no prob-
lem in calling religious language a logos. ~or religious lan-
guage would be a word about God or the transcendent, not in the 
sense of describing it but deolaripg it; not in picturing it but 
in pointing to it; not in rationalizing it, but in revealigg 
it.142 
141!he Greek word logos may mean: l) A com~utation or reck-
oning (as to account, measuret esteem, or value); 2) relation, 
correspondence, proportion; 3J explanation (as a plea, theory, 
law, thesis, reason, formula, law); 4) inward debate of the soul (as thinking, reasoning); 5) continuous statement, narrative (as 
fable, legend, tale, speech); 6) verbal expression or utterance (as single word{ talk, report or tradition, discussion, debate, 
or deliberation;; ?) a particular utterance or S83ing (as a div-
ine oracle, proverb or maxim, assertion, express resolution, com-
mand); 8) a thing spoken ot or sub~ect matter; 9) expression, 
utterance, speech (as intelligent utterance, artistic expression, 
phrase or complex term); 10) Word or Yisdom ot God (as Christ). 
~aken from Greek-English Lexicon, PP• 105?-1059- Thayer, ea. 
142Especially would there be no objection for the Christian 
in view ot the Incarnation. Christ was called the Logos ot God 
who lived among men and manifested God's glory. Religious lan-
guage could profitably follow this paradigm for logos, tor it is 
dynamic and not static. It is not object-centered tor Obrist 
was a living subject. Neither is it abstract and impersonal but 
concrete and personal, and so on. or. John 1:1, 14. 
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However, there are grave dangers with the other meaning ot 
the Greek word logos, if not insuperable difficulties, in appl~­
ing 1 t to the transcendent. It logos must imply a limi t.ed con-
ceptualization, then there would be no way to speak or the un-
limited tor all concepts are by nature limited, involving as they 
do some kind of mental picture or image. 
Likewise, it language means logos in the sense of rational-
ization, it aeems to be virtually impossible to avoid what has 
been called "reification"143 or verbal idolatry-. 1'hat is, men 
will inevitably be led to give explanations tor God rather than 
be content with expression of God. Perhaps it is this inherent 
tendency in Western language to conceptualize and objectify whiob 
has led some to reject the view of language as a logos. 
Whatever the reasons may be, there is certainly some merit 
in viewing language as a "macromyth" or "supermyth."144 Since 
the purpose of a myth is to point beyond itself, then religious 
language as a macromyth would be suitable, could be appropriatel' 
characterized as a "macroJ1l7th," tor that is precisely what reli-
gious language intends to do. 
Further, as a myth is a kind ot "code'' or "cipher" to re-
veal transcendence, then language as a macromyth could be studie~ 
in order to decipher the transcendent which it conveys.145 And, 
143Smith, :!!.!. Meaning !!!S. !!! ,gt. Religion, pp. 10.5-108. 
144Marshall McLuhan uses the former and w. L. King the lat-
ter term. See King, Introduction !2 Religion, pp. 138-139. 
145T.b.is seems to be what Ramsey means when he says that we 
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if language like myth is a revelation, a letting-be-said (by a 
subject) as opposed to a saying-about (objects), then religious 
language as a macromyth can avoid, as Heidegger said, " •• • the 
untenability and arbitrariness of the thesis that thinking and 
speaking as such of necessity are objectifying."146 It would 
seem to follow, then, that an adequate religious language must 
be a language capable of expressing subjectivity, for it is pre-
cisely as subject that man transcends the limits of objectifica-
tion and becomes a paradigm for speaking of the transcendent. 
A Language of Subjectivity 
As Michael Novak observed, ~n one respect the difficulty of 
~inding a suitable language to speak about God is really in find-
ing a suitable language for talking about the self. ttLanguage 
oorrowed from the object world is systematically misleading when 
applied to the self or to God. " Language which is formed • • • 
for the pragmatic purposes of everyday living, he said, "• •• is 
wrenched out of familiar channels when it is used of God." And 
language that is sharpened for philosophical purposes "• •• is 
more fitted for the needs of the system of which it is a part 
than for speaking of him who • • • moves beyond every system." 
$hould constantly be on the look-out for 'odd' language as a 
'tip-off' of the Transcendent. See Religious Language, p. 54 
where he says, "• •• a useful antidote to the craze tor 
straightforward language might be found in suitable doses of 
poetry or greater familiarity with words thrown up in scientific 
theories • • • and we might even conclude in the end that the 
odder the language the more it matters to us." 
146lleidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper and Row, Pub-
lishers, 1962), P• b4. - ~ ~ 
?5 
Even though Novak admits that ordinary language in its use ot 
"I" and "you" provides hints for enquiry about God, he warns that 
it is basically a language ot objects. and is inherently idola-
trous. He concludes that "• •• if any language is even remotely 
useful for talking about God, the likelihood ia that it will be 
the language by which we speak ot intelligent subjectivity."l4? 
Novak offers the following two interpretive principles for 
a language of "intelligent subjectivity": 
ples: 
Our first assertion is that the experience on which reli-
gious language is best groundf is the experience a man 
has or himself as a subject. a Our second assertion is 
that or all the experiences 0 rntelligent sub~ectivity, 
the one most suitable as a guide to our thinking about 
God seems to be that of intelligent consciousness, in-
cluding insight and critical retlection.148 
In developing this language he offers two guiding princi-
Thus, first, we will not use any predicate about God 
that does not at least apply to ourselves as subjects. 
Secondly, we wIIl heea the warning that language bor-
rowed from the object world can mislead us into think-
ing that awareness is like sense perception, or that 
the "worldn of subjects is an imitation of the world 
of objects. 
Therefore, tor a man to state fully what he means by 'God' he 
would have to: 
••• 1) narrate many ot his eJq>eriences (at prayer, in 
worship, even in secular action), 2) describe the con-
texts in which he believes he used the word 'God' well, 
and, above all, 3) enunciate his understanding of human 
14?Novak, Belief ~Unbelief, pp. 99, 94, 69, 28. 
148Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
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understanding. For what we mean b7 'understanding' deter-
mines what we mean by •man,' and what we mean by 'man• 
guides what we mean by 'God.•149 
However, Novak admits that b7 the language o! "intelligent 
subjectivity", 
We cannot answer directly what God's mode ot lite is 
like; at best, we can single out which things in the 
world he is not like, and which things he may be more 
like. The chief virtue in taking intelligent conscious-
ness as a model tor conceiving ot God is that it does 
not require a corporeal body tor its referent. 
For example, "In moments of intellectual concentration, or again 
in moments o! artistic contemplation or communion, we !ind our-
selves •rapt,• forgetful ot the demands of our bodies, of the 
passage of time, of fatigue, of the need to eat." It is such ex-
periences as these, Novak continued, that "• •• turnish us the 
direction in which total, unlimited, unconditioned consciousness 
is the upper limit."150 
An Adequate Language About Transcendence 
And now to summarize the discussion and draw out a conclu-
sion. Does language necessarily imply limitation? !'he answer 
is negative, unless the .function o! language is misunderstood to 
be a rationalization rather than a revelation. Only if language 
is mistaken to be a definition rather than a declaration is it 
necessarily limited in its application. It is not language as 
such which is inadequate but objectifying language. Therefore, 
in order to have an adequate religious language one must avoid 
149Ibid., pp. 101, 70. 
-
l50ibid., pp. 102, 103. 
-
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objectifying the transcendent. Basically this can be done in 
two ways: (1) By devising a non-objectifying language (as Novak); 
(2) By using objective language with appropriate qualifications 
so that it is not understood objectively (as Ramsey, 11• !,!J. 
However, in either case if religious language is to be more than 
purely evocative non-cognitive insights into the transcendent, 
then there must be some common element or meaning at the basis 
of all symbolical and metaphorical predications such as is pro-
vided for in analogy. Otherwise, religious language could do no 
ore than evoke an experience with a meaningless beyond, but it 
could not provide any meaningtul understanding ot the beyond. 
Without some common basis for meaning religious language will at 
est be only metaphorical declarations but not metaphysical 
descriptions of the transcendent. It will be no more than an 
exercise in what is lip.gqisticallz ROssible about the non-empiri-
cal; it will not provide one with what is ontologioall: ~ 
about the transcendent. Without a comm.on basis ot meaning tor 
etaphors, models, and symbols the best one can have is a mean-
ingtul way that he may speak ot the transcendent, without any 
nowledge of the wa7 the transcendent really !!. (if it really 
is). 
There are certain essential features ot an adequate lan-
guage about the transcendent which emerge from this study. •irst 
as Tillich discovered, all symbolic statements must ultimately be 
grounded on what is not symbolic. Metaphysical statements are 
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some univocal meaning betweP-n things which are applied to the 
human experience and to what goes beyond it. It means too that 
if analogous language is to be meaningfully descriptive of the 
transcendent that there must be an intrinsic relationship between 
the transcendent and the immanent. There must be a univocal ele-
ment or common meaning in the analogy. 
Second, since all language taken from finite experience is 
limited in the empirical setting from which it comes, there must 
be some way to quality it before it can be appropriately applied 
to that which transcends empirical experience. Tb.is may be ac-
complished in at least two ways; by negation and by extension. 
By negation or appropriate qualifications one may rid a term ot 
what would otherwise be inapplicable to the transcendent.151 
However, since every negation rests upon some positive knowledge, 
there must be some meaning at the basis of all the negations 
which can be applied by extension trom its limited empirical cir-
cuastances to the transcendent. 
This leads to a third point. There are some terms which are 
limited and empirical in meaning by derivation but are not neces-
sarily so limited in their aPRlication. For instance, the con-
cept of "love" is limited as we know it, but it does not follow __ ......_,._ 
from this that love .!! applied !g !!!! transcendent is necessarilJ 
l51And when the language is not transparent; when it does 
not point beyond itself, then it obscures God F!r. Buber, WritinRs 
of Martin Buber, ed. Will Herberg (New York: Tlie World Publish1~n 
-eG., 1956), p. loll, stifles the religious lite (ct. Whitehead, 
Reli.rion !!! !!'!! MSking, p. 132), and leads to verbal idolatry. 
r 
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limited and empirical. Is there not something about the meaning 
of the term love itself which makes it possible to extend it 
without negating its positive content to the transcendent? And 
is this not also true of other terms such as "being" (in the 
sense of "to-be-ness")152 and "consciousness." However, there 
are many terms which cannot be extended in their positive meanin@ 
to that which transcends the empirical. The word "rock," for 
example, is not applicable to the transcendent in any more than 
a symbolic wa7. For the very concept ot a non-empirical or in-
finite rock is contradicto17. In brief, only those words whose 
positive meaning is not essentially changed by extending it be-
yond the limited, empirical circumstances from which it is de-
rived in hum.an experience can be adequate currency for expressin@ 
the transcendent. 
Swama.r;y .2! !J!! Chapter 
fhere are many ways religious men have attempted to express 
their experience of the transcendent, in symbol, in myth, in dog-
ma, etc. The present study has chosen to examine the verbal ex-
pressions as a key to understanding what men mean by religious 
experience. Upon analysis of religious language it was discov-
ered that the fundamental purpose it manifests is to express that 
which goes beyond the limitations of empirical experience. 
Since language was taken to be a significant way of expres-
152It is in this sense that the Thomistic notion of God as 
pure esse (from Exodus 3:14) was not inappropriate. 
-
80 
sing the transcendent, it was necessary to ask which kind of 
language, if any, is adequate for the purpose of expressing this 
non-empirical object of religious commitment. The answer to this 
is two-fold. Both negative and symbolic language are adequate 
ways of expressing the non-empirical aspect of the transcendent. 
~owever, in order tor there to be any cognitive content and eom-
~on meaning in religious language there must be at the basis of 
these symbols and negations some positive knowledge which can be 
extended without changing their essential meaning to that which 
transcends the empirical confines from which the term comes. 
There must be some metaphysical basis for all metaphorical predi-
cations about the transcendent. This is best found in the 
Language of analogy. 
OHAP'l'ER III 
THE CHARACTER AND DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENOE 
!he plan of this chapter is to define more precisely what 
is meant by a religious experience. Tb.is will involve two thi.?lgs: 
first, it will discover and define precisely what is characteris-
tic of a religious experience, and secondly it will examine the 
various dimensions which religious experience has taken. 
The purpose for this chapter is twofold: first, a religious 
experience will be defined and distinguished from other kinds of 
experiences such as ethical and aesthetic experiences. After re-
ligious experience is understood, then it will be evaluated. 
That is, we will determine its identity before attempting to dis-
cover tests tor its reality; we want to know what it is before 
deTising ways of determining whether or not it is real.1 Second-
ly, we will seek to elaborate the various dimensions or direc-
tions which religious experience may take so as to forstall 
1Even it it were Eossible to know whether something is with-
out knowing precisely wnat it is, it certainly would be more 
helpful to be able to define it more clearly before attempting to 
make determinations about its reality. lurthermore, it is proba-
bly impossible to know that something is without having at least 
some general notion as to ~ it is. For example, one may know 
that there are other persons without being able to define pre-
cisely what is meant by a person but probably not without some 
general idea such as they are .. speaking somethings." 
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istaking experiences which are essentially religious for non-
religious ones. In brief, this chapter is an attempt to under-
stand what the nature of a religious experience is before seeking 
to find ways to evaluate its reality basis • 
.!!!.! OoJllDlon Characteristics .2! Religious 1$Jq>erience 
There have been many attempts to define religion. Most ot 
these definitions have at least one common element--an awareness 
of the transcendent. !hat a religious experience involves the 
transcendent is held not only by theists and pantheists but by 
any atheists as well. The dilrlension and definitions or the 
differ, but a religious experience involves the 
ranscendent nonetheless. 
Religious Experience Involves an Awareness 
of the !ranscendent 
Some have denied that there is little or any cognitive con-
tent common to all religions, but few if any have denied that 
there is a transcendent dimension which goes beyond the finite 
individual and his empirical circumstances. Those who believe 
the transcendent has a reality of its own beyond the human have 
identified it with the "Universe" or "All"{SChleiermacher), the 
"Numinous" or "Holy" (otto), the "Wholly Other" (Kierkegaard), 
"Being itself" or the "Being beyond being" (Tillich), the "Trans-
cendental Ego" {Koestenbaum), and numerous other realities, per-
sonal and impersonal, pantheistic, deistic, or theistic. On the 
other hand, those who deny its objective reality often admit, 
nonetheless, that belief in the reality of the transcendent is 
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characteristic of religion. Some identify it (at least in part) 
with the individual's subconscious (James), the collective sub-
consciousness of men (Jung), the collective consciousness of the 
group (Corn.tord), the projection ot human imagination (Feuer-
bach), man's absurd project to become self-caused (Sartre), the 
illusory object of a universal neurosis (Freud), man's higher or 
ideal self (Fromm), the imaginative unity of human values (Dewey) 
and so on. But whatever the description or name for the trans-
cendent there is something transcendent (real or not) which goes 
beyond the individual in which or by which he transcends his 
finite conditions • 
.!!!!! Religious Person !! Aware ~ !!!.! Transcendent .!.! Other•-
Not only is it acknowledged that religious experience involves 
the transcendent, but it is also recognized that the transcen-
dent is essential to religious experience. Feuerbach contended 
that it is absolutely essential that the religious man believes 
God is really out there. for he would not worship it as the ulti-
mately other if he knew it to be nothing but himselr. 2 Indeed, 
it there is to be any kind of experience, there must be at least 
a (mental) distinction, if pot an (actual) difference, between 
the one which is aware and that of which it is aware. Even in 
the experience of self awareness there is a distinction between 
the "I" and the "me." It is difficult to see what the word 
.. experience" (or awareness, consciousness) could mean i! there is 
2Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence .2,! Christianity, pp. 13, 30, 
n. 1. 
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absolutely no distinction between the "I" (finite individual) and 
rthe "Thou," i.e., the transcendent. As Koestenbau.m points out, 
~eligion is an I-Thou but not an I-I relation.3 Tb.at is, there 
is no meaning left to the word "experience" it there is an abso-
lute merging of the individual and the transcendent. 4 And even 
if it is possible to ettect an ontological merging of "man" and 
"God" (though most mystics probabl7 refer to ps7chological not 
ontological merging), this state could hardly be called one ot 
awareness or consciousness (which is what we mean by experience). 
It experience by its very nature will involve an "other," 
then it follows that religious experience must also involve some-
thing beyond or transcendent. v. c. Smith sum.med it up well when 
he wrote, "• •• what they have in common lies not in the tradi-
tion that introduces them to transcendence, nor in their faith by 
~hich they personally respond, but in that to which they respond, 
the transcendence itself."5 
~ Unitz £.! Meaning !!! ~ franscendent.--The point or gen-
~ral agreement among scholars is that religions have a great di-
~ersi ty of experience and expression and little if any unity of 
~ontent. With regard to the first point Schleiermacher argued 
that multiplicity, tar from being bad for religion, is necessary 
3Peter Koestenbaum, "Religion in the Tradition of Phenomen-
~logy," .21?.• .211•• PP• 204, 205. 
4In view of this, if the attainment of Nirvana is taken to 
mean the loss of all awareness, then it would not be a religious 
experience. It would be the experience of losing all experience. 
5y. c. Smith, 1!'.!! Meaning !!!2:, ~ .2! Religion, p. 173· 
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for the complete manifestation of religion. 6 James suggests that 
plurality in religious experience is necessary to fit the plural-
ity ot human needs.? Tillich thinks that we should not pretend 
an identity where there is a very fundamental difference in the 
whole experience and attitude as between Western and Eastern re-
ligions (e.g., as to their views on history as liniar vs. hori-
zontal).8 Nor does he feel that they should be mixed, tor "A 
mixture of religions destroys in each of them the concreteness 
which gives it its dynamic power."9 
Having said this, however, is not to deny any possibility 
of identifying a common meaning to religious experience. Dewey 
was no doubt not far from the truth when he argued that there is 
little if any specifiable content of value which is common to all 
religions.10 However, this conclusion can be misleading, tor it 
discourages the effort to find and define the elements which are 
common to most if not all religious experiences. 
The analysis of William James is more profound and reveals 
a greater appreciation for the common elements of religious ex-
periences. He suggests that all religions have the following 
326, 
6Friedric Schleiermacher, .Q!!. Religion, p. 213. 
?William James, The Varieties of Religious l!;x.perience, 
368, 4??· - - - -
8Paul Tillich, Ultimate Concern, pp. 152, 153· 
pp. 
9Paul Tillich• Christianity and Encounter with the World Re-
liSions, (New York: Coiumbia Univers!ty Press, l~,-p: 9S. 
10John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1934), pp. ?=1I. 
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three characteristics in common: 
1) 'l'b.at the visible world is part ot a more spiritual 
universe from which it draws its chiet significance; 
2) That union or harmonious relation with that higher 
universe is our true end; ••• 3) That pr8.1'er or inner 
communion with the spirit there-or be that spirit 'God' 
or 'law'--is a process wherein work is reall7 done, and 
spiritual energy tlows in and produces effects, ps7ohol-
ogical or material, within the phenomenal world.ll 
And as to the basic "creed" or cognitive content of all religions 
James contended that it is two-told: l) an uneasiness or sense 
that there is something wrong about us as we naturall;r stand; 
2) an awareness that we are saved trom this wrongness b;r making 
proper connection with higher powers.12 
!o rephrase this in our own words, James held that religious 
experience involves transcendence in two wa7s: tirst, the need of 
man to self-transcend, and secondly, the awareness ot the trans-
cendent toward which this transoendence is directed. !he first 
is a ~rocess and the second is the gbaect, or sphere in which 
transcendence operates. 
!he Need tor Selt-Transcendence.--Religious experience in-
- - -
volves the need to transcend the unalterable displeasures ot lite 
In this sense Koestenbau:m was right in describing religion as 
"• •• man's ettort to do something about the desperate condition 
of his own tinitude."13 For that matter, Freud was correct in 
11J8Dles, ~ Varieties SI! Religious !!J>erience, p. 4?5. 
12Ibid., p. 498. 
-
l3xoestenbaum, "Religion in the Tradition ot PhenomenolOS7t" 
p. 182. 
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depicting religion as man's search tor a Cosmic Comforter to help 
him cope with the tearful eventualities of lite, as was Bult-
mann' a "Human longing to escape from this world by the supposed 
discovery of a sphere above this world."14 There seems to be 
little reason to dispute Kaufmann when he said, "Religion is 
rooted in man's aspiration to transcend himself •••• " 0 Man, .. 
he said, "is the ape that wants to be a god • • • • Whether he 
worships ideals or strives to perfect himself, man is the God-
intoxicated ape."15 Or as Sartre put it, man's project is to 
become God. 16 In this sense, one may say that man is the being 
who is characterized by his need tor selt-transoendence.1? 
Even among the more humanistic definitions of religion 
there is admission ot this characteristic feature. Dewey's pur-
suit ot general and enduring ideals despite threats of personal 
loss18 is definitely an aspiration tor self-transcendence. Even 
Fromm's self-labeled "humanistic religion" admits the need tor 
14see Bultmann, Xeqsa and~' Vol. I, ed. H. w. Bartsch 
(Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.--;-rg53), pp. 26 £. 
15xautmann, Oritigue .2! Religion ~ Philoso;egz, pp. 354, 
355, 359. 
16sartre, Bei~ and Nothinf5Aess (New York: Washington Square 
Press, 1966), pp. 2-;-'?sg. 
l?Tillich said, "Human potentialities are powers that drive 
toward actualization. Man is driven toward faith by his aware-
ness or the infinite to which he belongs, but which he does not 
own like a possession. This is in abstract terms what concrete-
ly appears as the 'restlessness ot the heart' within the flux ot 
life," R:z!amics 91. faith, p. 9. 
18see Dewey, A Common Faith, P• 27. 
-------
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self-transcendence. Religious experience "• •• in this kind of 
religion," he writes, "is the experience of oneness with the All, 
based on one's relatedness to the world as it is grasped with 
thought and with love."19 With this stress on self-transcending 
love,20 T1i11ch's statement agrees, "Agape is a quality of love, 
that quality which expresses the self-transcendence of the reli-
gious element in love."21 All the religions of love, then, are 
illustrative of man's attempt to transcend the conditions of 
hate and disunity found in this world. Love, said Koestenbaum, 
is an a priori category by which the religious man unities his 
world and overcomes the opposing otherness and attains selt-tul-
tillment. 22 Whether it is viewed as love or some other force, 
religious experience characteristically involves some means by 
which a man can self-transcend, or go beyond his own frustrating 
limitations. 
Religion Involves !!!!. 'fransoendent.--Not only does religious 
experience involve a process ot transcending or self-transcen-
dence but it implies a dimension or sphere which is transcendent. 
That is, it the religious aspiration to go beyond is to be real-
ized, then there must be a beyond in which or by which this can 
l9Fromm, Ps;rchoanalysis ~ Religion, p. 37. 
20see Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York: Harper and 
Row, Publishers, 1956), &pter r. 
21Tillich, Moralit~ ~ Beyond (New York: Harper and Row, 
Publishers, 1963,, p. ~ • 
22xoestenbaum, "Religion in the Tradition ot Phenomenology," 
OD. cit., PP• 210 t. 
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occur. To some this is a personal God; to others it is an imper-
sonal Force. For some it is attainable in this life; for others 
it is sought in another lite. But for every religious experience 
there is a transcendent dimension of one kind or another in whiob 
the transcending occurs. As shall be shown later, this transcen-
dence can and does take many forms including transcendence via 
other men. But in each case there is always some transcendent 
involved in religious experience. 
Many ot the definitions ot religion make this explicit. 
~Oxford Dictiona::z, e.g., calls it a "Recognition on the part 
of man of some higher unseen power •••• "2' All definitions 
which use 8.D.7 torm of the words "God" or "gods" clearly recog-
nize that there is a transcendent realm implied in religious ex-
perience. What is not obvious, however, is that those forms ot 
religion which do not have an7 such being or referent do likewise 
involve a transcendent. That is, the word transcendent is not 
to be limited to personal theistic concepts nor even to pantheis-
tic or impersonal modes of describing the ultimate object or goal 
of religious aspiration. Nor is it to be limited to what is com-
monly called the supernaturai. 24 In point of tact, by transcen-
dent we do not mean any or all of the particular conceptual W8.7S 
23o.xtord !nglish Dictionar;y, Vol. VIII, p. 410. 
24For many moderns this term implies a false bifurcation ot 
reality. John Dewey feels strongl7 that the concept or a "super-
tnatural" religion is a hindrance to the religious experience. 
See A Comm.on Faith, pp. 2?, 28. Paul Tillich said antisupernatu.l'o 
alism Is fundamental to all his thinking, Ultimate Oonoern, p. 
158. See Vol. I of his Szstematic Thtology on reason and revela-
tinn. 
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of describing God. Rather by transcendent is meant the supposed 
eality that is beyond all of the actual and even possible ways 
of speaking thereof'. It includes the Buddhistic "Nirvana," Til-
ich • s "Being beyond being," Schleiermaoher• s ''Universe" and 
"Infinite." 
Even among those who deny the reality of the transcendent 
here is still an admission that religion involves such an al-
eged reality. Sartre, e.g., uses the word "God" repeatedl725 
nd characterized man as the one whose fundamental projeot is to 
eoome God. 26 Promm is willing to retain the word God as the 
of the transcendent, providing it be recognized that he 
of the transcendent powers of man. He said, "• •• in hu-
anistic religion God is the image of man's higher self, a symbol 
of what man potentially is or ought to become •••• "27 Although 
euerbach categorically denies any reality other than human be-
ind the term God, he not only uses it but recognizes that it is 
essential to religion to believe that there is a transcendent 
God. Even though, for Fauerbach• consciousness of God is really 
only consciousness of man himself, nevertheless man is not dir-
ectly aware of this. On the contrary, he said, "• •• ignorance 
of it is fundamental to the peculiar nature or religion."28 God 
25see Jean-Paul Sartre, The \lords, trans. Bernard Jlrechtman 
d George Braziller (New Yor~l964), e.g., pp. 18, 97, 173 1 
78, 185, 188, 190, 193, 227. 
26sartre, Being ~ Nothingness, p. 776. 
27:rromm, Fslchoanalysis !B,4 Religion, P• 41. 
28Feuerbach The Essence of Ohristianit 
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is really nothing but the projection of man's own nature, but the 
religious man isn't aware of this and that is why he worships 
this as God. 29 However. the present concern is not whether God 
or the transcendent is real. Rather the concern here is with the 
tact that religious experience seems always to involve a trans-
cendent dimension. 
To sum up, a religious experience is not only one ot selt-
~ranscendence but one which involves a transcendent realm. by 
~hich or in which the transcending is done or at least toward 
~hich it is directed. That is, in order to go beyond or deeper 
there must be a beyond or depth {real or imagined) toward which 
or in which the religious experience moves • 
.§.2!! Paradigms ~ !!!!, Meaning .2! Transcendence.-Up to this 
point we have spoken ot a religious experience as an awareness of 
the transcendent, i.e., as that which goes beyond the conditions 
ot man's finite circumstances. No doubt it has occurred to the 
reader that what is meant by this be7ond 1s not entirely clear. 
In order to elucidate what is meant by this the suggestion of 
Anton7 Plew will be followed, viz., that of giving some paradigm. 
cases or examples trom experience. 
Paul van Buren focused the problem when he writes, "· •• 
the difficulty of speaking about •transcendence,• 'ground and end 
ot all things,• or some other oblique phrase substituted tor the 
29reuerbach said men come gradually to recognize that they 
have been worshipping themselves, hence, "What was at first reli-
gion becomes at a later period idolatry,"~· 
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ord 'God' ••• simply begs the empiricist's question."30 "In a 
ecular age, what would that 'more• be? It is our inability to 
ind any empirical linguistic anchorage for that •more' that has 
ed to our interpretation [that all God-language or its equiva-
is dead]. n3l 
Since van Buren has regard tor Ian Ramsey•s approach to this 
uestion,32 we will begin with illustrations Ramsey used to ex-
lain what is meant by more, beyond or transcendence. !hese are 
hat Ramsey calls discernment situations. He lists a series of 
iscernm.ent situations, which are ordinary empirical situations 
hat suddenly "come alive" when the "ice breaks, .. the "light 
awns" or that take on "depth." ~or example, when a Judge sud-
reoognizes the accused as his long lost wite, "eye meets 
or when it dawns on one that the twelve tlat lines on a 
have the "depth" of a cube, when a formal party takes on 
a "new dimension," or after someone splits his dinner 
In each case, something more is revealed than what's 
een in the empirical facts alone--the situation has a "depth of 
imension" which goes beyond the sensory. 
According to Ramsey, metaphors and verbally odd words have 
same disclosure power.33 Por examples of verbally odd words 
30Paul van Buren, la! Secular Jifeaning .2! ~ Gosl?el, p. ?9. 
31Ibid., PP• 197, 198, er. p. 84. 
32Ib1d., p. 91. 
33In fact, he goes so far as to StJ:T "What 




b.e uses nicknames which evoke personal response (et. "sweetheart" 
vis-a-vis "Elizabeth Mabel"). Ramsey also finds some tautologies 
as "I am I" or "Duty- tor duty's sake," or'!Love tor love's sake" 
to be significant and revelatory of more than they •say• linguis-
tically. In f'act he finds "I-language" and moral language to be 
~he key to "God language," in that both are verbally odd; both 
~re straightforward but strained, and both gain their meaning in 
~se.34 That is the way moralists speak of' a sense of duty, reli-
gion speaks of a sense of' the unseen. Both are literally and 
logically odd but are tar from being completely nonsensical. 
Quite the contrary, odd words and metaphors by their very simi-
larity-with-a-difference can generate insight the way two pic-
tures, rather similar but in some points significantly different, 
can lead to the apprehension or depth in a 3-D viewer.'5 
Another example is first-person subjectivity. Tb.at is, "I" 
cannot be exhausted by all that is said about ttme"; "I'' am. more 
than everything that can be objectively said about me; subjectiv-
ity transcends objectivity.36 As Novak indicates, even an empir-
icist "• •• is more of a mystery to himself than his theory al-
lows him to recognize, and every time he acts he uses the first 
awareness his theory neglects."37 
34Ian Ramsey. Religious Language, PP• 42-50. 
35aamsey, l'todels !!!2. !1lste:-z, P• 10. 
36see !ill•• P• 41. 
37Novak, Belief and Unbelief, P• 74. 
--------
Other illustrations of what is beyond the purely empirical 
experience could be developed, such as the sense in which Kant's 
oumenon or thing-in-itself is beyond the phenomena or thing-for-
e38 or the way in which the so-called transcendental ego is be-
ond the empirical ego.39 Or the beyond or more may be illustra-
ed by the way the unity of a sentence is more than the words 
hich comprise it or the way the whole is greater than its parts. 
However, these illustrations suttice only to show how there 
an be more in an empirical situation than •meets the eye'; what 
hey do not do is show why this transcendent or moreness is the 
bjeet of what the religious call worship, total commitment, or 
ltimate concern. Certainly a discernment situation which dis-
loses more than the empirical eye can see is not automatically 
n experience ot religious transcendence. That is to say, when 
he twelve lines on a paper take on the ndepth 1 " the viewer 
oesn•t commit himself to this cube. Nor when a formal dinner 
jacket splits does it thereby "disclose" God. Indeed, there 
38Kant, Oritigue of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White 
(New Yorlt: ffie !o'60s-Merr!11 do., :tiic., 1956), PP• 54-58, 
11. "• •• on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility by aP-
lying the term. noumena to things in themselves (things not re-
arded as appearances). But in so doing it at the same time sets 
limits to itself, recognising that it cannot know these noum.ena 
through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think 
them only under the title ot an unknown something," Critigue £?.!. 
...,__r_e Reason, p. 273. 
39aee Koestenbaum. 1 "Religion in the Tradition or Phenomenol-
ogy," pp. 179 t. Por a similar distinction between Atman and 
rah.man in Hinduism see Jess De Boer's article, "First Steps in 
Mysticism," in Paith and Philosopbz, ed. Alvin Platinga (Grand 
apids: William"!. Eerdaans I\ibfiihing Co., 1964), pp. ?4, 79, 
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seems to be a missing dimension ot transcendence to these illus-
trations that causes them to fall short of being religious. 
There must be something more to the meaning of more. The missing 
element is found in total commitment. 
Religious £t!perienc~ Involves ~ Total Oommitment.--A reli-
gious experience involves something beyond a mere disclosure, 
something unconditional and ultimate; something to which men are 
willing to commit themselves with utter loyalty and devotion. 
That is, it involves not only an awareness of the transcendent 
but an awareness of it !!!, ultimate and as demanding an ultimate 
commitment. 
In Ramsey's words the transcendent must be something to 
which one is willing to give a "total commitment" betore it qual-
ifies as religious. For commitment situations he said, are those 
which have a claim on a man and yet leave him in exercise of his 
free will. Acting from a sense of duty, the patriot's "my coun-
try right or wrong," and one's all absorbing devotion to his 
~avorite hobby are examples of total commitment. Combining the 
~wo sets of illustrations, Ramsey argues that a religious exper-
ience of the unseen or beyond is one that involves both discern-
ment which goes beyond the mere empirical facts of the situations 
and which evokes a total commitment to it.40 In a hobby one is 
totally committed in only Rart of the universe (say, to coin col-
lecting); in mathematics, on the other hand, one is only 
40Ramsey, Religious ~age, PP• 19 t. 
u;;.;:;;;;;..;;.......,,__. committed to the whole universe (1.e., a loose comm.it-
ent to the axioms, knowing other axioms are possible)41 which 
re applied to the whole universe; but in religion one has a 
otal commitment to the whole universe.42 A religious commitment 
because of the depth or its loyalty, and it is "unive 
"It is a commitment suited to the whole job or living 
-not one just suited to building a house, studying (etc:;! ••• 
d no more."43 
What Ramsey is getting at with his "total commitment," !11-
ich called .. ultimate concern ... 44 "The fundamental concept of 
eligion," he said, "is the state or being grasped by an ultimate 
oncern, by an infinite interest, by something one takes uncondi-
ionally seriousl7. 045 He explains this to mean "• •• taking 
omething with ultimate seriousness, unconditional seriousness" 
one would be ready to suffer or even die for.46 
4l!he commitment to a given mathematical system (say Eu-
lid' s) is only partial or loose because its relation to all the 
acts in the universe is loose. !hat is, Euclid's system doesn't 
explain the areas of inter-planetaJ.7' space or sub-atomic physics. 
Other mathematical systems fit better here, so we are only loose-
ly committed to a given system. Nevertheless, once we are com-
itted to, say, the Euclidian definition of a triangle, this is 
rue universally in Oxford, Moscow, or New York, ibid., pp. 36,37. 
-42Ibid., pp. 35-41. 
43Ib1d., P• 55. 
-44
"Concern" is in one sense a better word than "commitment'• 
ecause the latter tends to imply a more specific act presuppos-
ing a well defined conceptual framework, whereas religious exper-
ience in general (as vs. ~ special religious experience) does not 
ecessarily presuppose a specific framework or a specific deci-
sion. 
45!illich Ultimate Concern 0 46Ibid. 8. 
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Ultimate concern has both a subjective side and an objective 
side. Subjectively, it indicates that the subject or individual 
is being unconditionally serious about something; objectively, it 
refers to the object ot our ultimate concern tor which Tillich 
!reserves the name "God.'*4? 
Tillich argued that every man has an ultillate concern, be-
~ause without an ultimate concern a being has no integrating cen-
ter ot his personal life. "Such a state, however, can only be 
approached but never tull7 reached, because a human being de-
prived completely of a center would cease to be a human being. 1148 
"The ultimate concern gives depth, direction and unity to all 
other concerns and, with them, to the whole personality."49 
Of course, not every ultimate concern is about something 
~hich is really ultimate. "Perhaps the ultimate was once actu-
ally the parents, or the mother •••• Later another ultimate, 
perhaps a loved one, girl or bo7, liberates us from this."50 
But "Man's faith is inadequate it his whole existence is deter-
mined by something that is less than ultimate. Therefore, he 
~ust always try to break through the limits ot his finitude and 
reach what never can be reached, the ultimate 1tselt."5l That is 
47Ibid., P• 11. 
48Ibid., p. 106. Whether or not every man does have an ul-
tillate commitment is a moot question. See chapter 5 tor further 
discussion ot this question. 
49Tillich, ;pynam.ios .2! Faith, p. 105. 
50Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p. 183. 
5l!illich, BTAa.mies .2! Faith, P• 5?. 
to say, to rest in what is not ultimate as though it were ulti-
mate is idolatry. !his is why !rillich is forced at times to re-
ject even the term "God" or "Being" and speak of the "God beyond 
God" or the "Being beyond being," since to some the term "God" 
implies limitations. 
What Tillich called being grasped by an ultimate concern may 
also include what is commonly called worship. That is tn say, if 
the individual responds to the transcendent with an ultimate com-
~tment it is because of the ultimate worth he sees in it. This 
act is called worship, tor to worship something is really to re-
spond to its worth-ship. Hence, if worship is understood in this 
basic sense of that attitude ot admiration connected with an 
awareness of the ultimate worth or something, then it is closely 
associated with a total commitment or an ultimate concern. It, 
however, worship is taken in the more specific sense ot prayer or 
ritual, then it is not an essential ingredient or religious ex-
perience. 52 Por one may be totally committed without entering 
into the ritual of prayer and one may pray without being ulti-
mately concerned. But in the broader sense of the word worship 
(or even devotion to or love of the Divine) we are raced with 
the same fundamental awareness that characterizes a total commit-
ment or that is implied in being grasped by an ultimate concern. 
52cr. A. E. Taylor, "The Argument from Religious Experi-
ence,"~ Existence .2.! ~. pp. 158-160. 
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Schleierm.acher described this special kind ot religious 
ot the transcendent as a "feeling ot absolute depen-
By that he meant a sense of creaturehood or an aware-
one is not independent from but dependent upon the All 
It is a sense of existential contingency, a 
ite in the infinite whole.54 otto agreed but felt that the 
......---.-
of ereaturehood resulted trom the one's awareness of the 
rather than being the basis of it.55 Even J'reud concurred 
hat men have this sense of dependence, only he did not wish to 
dentify it with religious experienee.56 Nonetheless, there is 
the tact that men do have such a sense ot 
ependenee, concern, or commitment which we have called religious 
To summarize, a religious experience involves at least._,o 
damental factors: (1) an awareness ot the transcendent, and 
a total commitment to it as ultimate. There are many differ-
ways the transcendent has been conceptualized and expressed, 
these are the two basic factors in the religious experience 
lrurthermore, to say the transcendent must be viewed as 
53schleiermacher, The Obristian Faith, ed. B. R. Mackintosh 
d J. s. Stewart (Edin~orgh: ! '! oiark, 1928, 1956), pp. 12, 
9 passim; ,2!! Religion, PP• 2?5 t. 
54at. Sobleiermacber, .9l Religion, p. 39. 
55at. otto, l!!! Idea ,2! !!!!, Holz, PP• 9-11. 




ultimate does not mean that it !.!, ultimate.57 Idolatry is always 
a real possibility for the religious. However it is difficult 
to see how something can deserve the description "object of reli-
gious experience" it it is not at least viewed as ultimate by the 
devotee. Nor does the ultimate have to be static to be ultimate. 
A commitment to a Hegelian dialectic as the divine unfolding it-
self in history is an example of a dynamic ultimate. Nor is 
Dewey•s definition ot "God" as the imaginative goal of all human 
values :Ix> be excluded from the category of the ultimate. In 
other words, something does not have to be perm.anent and uncb.ange 
able to qualify as a religious ultimate. If a man is completely 
committed to the sum total of human "progress" or "achievement," 
then it is a religious ultimate for him. All that is necessary 
for a transcftndent to quality as religious ia that it be some-
thing tinal and supreme, something beyond appeal and irrevocable. 
That is, it must be something capable of evoking a complete com-
~itment, utter loyalty, or ultimate concern on the part or an 
individual. 
5?Tb.is is not to say that these are all the factors there 
ought to be in a religious experience. It does not mean that all 
that is necessary tor an adequate or effacacious religious exper-
ience is an ultimate commitment to something beyond man which he 
thinks (or feels) is ultimate. First, as we indicated earlier 
~in chapter 1), the religious man ought to be concerned with the 
reality of the transcendent, even though some appear to be con-
tent with it as an ideal or to hold it merely as if it were true. 
Secondly, it is questionable as to whether or not--an ultimate 
commitment is adequate if it is a commitment to something which 
is less than ultimate. But we are not here discussing what a re-
ligious experience ought to be in order to be satisfactory but 
what in fact it !!. in the experience of religious men. See chap-
ter 5 tor a discussion or the adequacy of religious experience. 
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Religious Experience in Contrast !2. Moral .E;xperience 
Since a religious experience is similar to a moral experi-
ence and since some thinkers tend to identity them. a few words 
ot clarification are in order. Kant's definition ot religion as 
"The recognition of all duties as divine commands" falls into 
this general category. Bishop Butler said that religion and mor-
ality "closely resemble" each other.58 Ramsey calls them "close 
logical kinsmen" with "great attinities."59 and he suggests that 
this is the reason that they have so often had the same friends 
and the same enemies in the history ot philosopbJ". R. B. Braith-
waite distinguishes them only in theory not in practice, arguing. 
"Unless religious principles are moral principles. it makes no 
sense to speak of putting them into practice.•60 "A moral be-
lief," he said, "is an intention to behave in a certain way: a 
religious belief is an intention to behave in a certain way (a 
moral belief) together with the entertainment of certain stories 
associated with the intention in the mind of the believer."61 
Fromm "• •• believes that the difference between the religious 
and the ethical is to a large extent only an epistemological one, 
58As quoted by Ian f. Ramsey, Religious Language, PP• 32, 
59aamsey, Religious Jfa.lilgU:age, pp. 34, 42. 
6~. B. Braithwaite, "Religious Statements as Ethically but 
not Factually Significant," The Existence ot God (New York: The 
Macmillan Oo., 1964) • P• 241:-- - -
61 Ibid., p. 250. 
-
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though not entirely so."62 
Even those who see a difference between religion and moral-
1 ty tend to stress their inseparability. Tillich wrote "• •• 
morality is intrinsically religious, as religion is intrinsicall' 
ethiea1.u63 Bergson contended that "Originally [.e., among the 
primitivej, the whole ot morality is custom; and as religion for-
bids any departure trom custom morality is coextensive with reli-
gion. •64 
Despite the interrelationship and seeming inseparability of 
religion and morality, they involve clearly differing experien-
ces. As Dewey observed, "The religious attitude signifies some-
thing that is bound through imagination to a general attitude. 
Tb.is comprehensive attitude, moreover, is much broader than ~ny­
thing indicated by 'moral' in its usual sense."65 William James 
summed up the difference by arguing that morality acceRts the 
yoke or the universe, but religion welcomes it; religion isn't 
a mere Stoic submission to the universe but a love or it. Moral-
ity calls tor obedience, said James, but religion calls tor vol-
62Jromm, Pszchoanalzsis and Religion, P• 93. Be does admit 
"• •• there is a ?acior common to certain kinds of religious ex-
perience (viz., the B17Stica11 which goes beyond the purel7 ethi-
cal. But it is exceedingly litfioult it not impossible to formu-
late this factor or religious experience," P• 94. 
63!illich, Morality !!A Bezond, P• 15. 
64Bergson, ~ ~ Sources £! Morality and Religion, p. 123. 
65Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 23. However, in the final anal-
ysis Dewey's detinition ol religion turns out to be one•s broad 
•oral goal, which hardly shows that there is a basic difference 
between them. 
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teers.66 Sohleiermacher offers a further distinction when he 
contends that morality is man•s duty to the universe; religion 
is man's dependence on it. 67 But even in dependence there is a 
kind of duty, only it is a more basic duty than moral duty. 
Perhaps no one has drawn the distinction between a moral 
duty and a religious duty more sharply than Kierkegaard in his 
famous panegyric on Abraham. 68 The ethical, said Kierkegaard, 
66James, !'!l!, Varieties !1.! Religious Experience, pp. 41-45. 
6?Schleiermacher, .Q!! Religion, PP• 2?5· t. 
68Buber said Kierkegaard rejected this sharp distinction in 
is latter works. •0ur rejection can be supported by Xierkegasrd' 
own teaching. Be describes 'the ethical' as 'the only means by 
hich God communicates with •man• {1853) •••• The ethical no 
longer appears here, as in Kierkegaard's earlier thought, as a 
•stage' from which a 'leap' leads to the religious, a leap by 
hich a level is reached that is quite different and has a dif-
ferent meaning; here it dwells in the religious, in faith and se 
ce. This ethical can no longer mean a morality belonging to a 
ealm ot relativity, time and again overtaken and invalidated by 
he religious; it means essential acting and suttering in rela-
ion to men, coordinated w!tli ~he essential relation to God," !!!he 
Works ot Martin Buber, p. ?8. But it this were so, it would 
ecessltate a reversal ot virtually everything Kierkegaard said 
about Abraham. which is difficult to believe. Kierkegaard otten 
closely identities the ethical and the religious particularly 
hen he is contrasting them with the aesthetic. But since he 
oes not anywhere clearly repudiate the sharp distinctions be-
ween the ethical and the religious made in Fear and Trembling, 
it seems best to interpret these other isola~stiiements tfia:t 
seem to identify the ethical and the religious in view ot the 
lear distinction he does make between them and nowhere clearly 
epudiates. See Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 78, 
here he wrote, "fhe ethical is the universal, ana as such it is 
again the divine. One has therefore a right to say that tunda-
entally every duty is a duty toward God; but it one cannot say 
ore, then one affirms at the same time that properly I have no 
duty toward God. Duty becomes duty by being reterred to God, 
ut in duty itself I do not come into relation with God. Thus it. 
is a duty to love one's neighbor. but in performing this duty I 
do not come into relation with God but with the neighbor whom I 
love." 
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expresses one's universal duty but the religious says that " • • • 
he individual as the particular is higher than the universal." 
This can also be expressed by saying that "• •• there is an ab-
solute duty toward God for in this relationship of duty the indi-
" 
as an individual stands related absolutely to the abso-
Or, to summarize Kierkegaard, an ethical experience re-
to the moral law; a religious experience responds to the 
Hi•selt. The moral law says, "Thou shalt not 
ill"; God told Abraham: sacrifice your son Isaac. In this case 
hen, either the religious is above the ethical or Abraham, tar 
rom being the great hero ot faith, is a down-right murderer. 
hus, we are "• •• wrong in not protesting loudly and clearly 
gainst the tact that Abraham. enjoys honor and glory as the 
ather ot taith, whereas he ought to be prosecuted and convicted 
t murder." In Abraham's case he had to transcend the ethical in 
the religious. 'l'bis does not mean the ethical is 
rather, it is merely dethroned b.1 it. 
necessary prerequisite to the religious; one 
unless he is first ethical. However, the 
eligious is a higher relationship of duty to God in View of 
hich even the ethical must give way. "Abraham, by a religious 
ct of faith, overstepped the e•hical entirely and possessed a 
• • • 
outside of it, in relation to which he suspended the 
In this state of absolute duty to God, "• •• the ethi-
reduced to a position ot relativity" to the point that 
Love to God may cause the knight of faith to give his love 
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to his neighbor the opposite expression to that which, ethically 
speaking, is required by duty." The religious is higher than the 
ethical as the individual is higher than the universal, or as the 
concrete is over the abstract, or as the response to the person 
or God takes precedence over response to mere propositions about 
God. Tb.at is to say, morality is man's responsibility in this 
world; religion is his response to revelation from beyond this 
world. The former calla for duty, the latter for worship.69 
JUrthermore. it may be added that religion differs trom 
~orality because the latter can point out man's weaknesses or 
sin but only the former can help him transcend them. Th.at is, 
religion is higher than ethics because a feeling ot grace is 
higher than a sense ot guilt. Morality tells a man he ought to 
do; religion can help him do it. ~e former provides the norm 
for transcending; the latter can give the motivation tor trans-
eending. 
In brief, a religious experience differs from an ethical 
experience in several ways: (l) Its commitment is broader in 
scope; (2) Its commitment is different in kind; (3) Its object 
is or a higher order; (4) Its object a.lone has the power to over-
come and unify. First. a religious commitment is broader than a 
moral one since the former is a whole commitment of the whole man 
to the whole universe. 1'hat is, it is a commitment of man as a 
whole including his non-moral aspects of being, such as thinking, 
69All ot the above quotes appear in Kierkegaard, Fear ~ 




and acting such as knowing, art, and play. Second, even it one 
defines the moral more broadly so as to include the whole man, a 
moral commitment would still ditfer from a religious commitment 
in that the former is what one should do; the latter is what one 
wants to do. Morality is a matter of duty; religion is also one 
of desire. Further, a religious experience has a higher object 
than a moral experience. For morality is man's commitment to 
~en; religion is his commitment to what goes beyond men, to the 
transcendent. Finally, only a religious experience can bring 
complete unity into one's lite. Tb.at is, morality can produce 
guilt; only religion can provide grace. The moral shortcomings 
call tor a religious overcoming. The duality within man calls 
tor a unity beyond him. 
There is no need to be long concerned with whether morality 
flows from religion or religion flows from morality, or whether 
they are separate streams.?O Their close historical and logical 
connections would seem to preclude the latter. As to the form.er 
question, Sohleiermacher's suggestion is helpful: 
Specific actions follow only from specific impulses. 
Religion is not a specific impulse, so no specific ac-
tions can follow from it. Religion produces action onl7 
as a sum of activity flows from a sum of feeling, viz., 
as that which reflects the inner unity of the spirit. 
?OTillich writes in thi.s regard: "The question of moral mo-
tivation can be answered only transmorall7. For the law demands, 
but cannot forgive; it judges, but cannot accept. Therefore, 
forgiveness and acceptance, the conditions of the fulfillment ot 
the law, must come trom something above the law, or more precise-
ly, from something in which the split between our essential bein.e 
and our existence is overcome and healing power has appeared," 
Moralit:v ~d Beyond, p. 64. 
10? 
"But," he continues, "while a man does nothing from religion, he 
should do everything with religion. Uninterruptedly, like a 
sacred music, the religious feelings should accompany his active 
life.u?l 
As Tillich indicated, "If the moral imperative were derived 
from religion in the traditional sense of the word, secular eth-
ics would have to sever any ties with religion, for it rejects 
direct dependence on any particular religion. 11 72 There is cer-
tainly a danger in tying ethics to specific religious beliefs, 
as Freud rightly noted. For if, as men are prone to do, these 
religious beliefs are rejected, then one has lost his basis for 
morality.?3 However, if one means that morality flows from the 
far more extensive, if not universal, attitude of men called re-
ligious, then Freud's objection loses its force. First one must 
determine more precisely what is meant by religion before this 
question can be answered satisfactorily. 
Religious Experience in Contrast to Aesthetic E?Cperience 
There is also a close connection between religion and art. 
Whitehead contends that religion and play have the same origin in 
ritual. "This is because ritual is the stimulus to emotion, and 
an habitual ritual may diverge into religion or into play, accor-
ding to the quality o:f the emotion excited •••• " He also 
?lsehleiermacher, .Qn. Religion, pp. 57-59· 
72Tillich, Morality ~ Beyond, p. 300 
?3Freud, ~ Future £!. 2 Illusion, pp. 62-64. 
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observed, "• •• in the modern world. a holy day and a holiday 
are kindred notions.•74 Otto noted that the sacred and the sub-
lime are similar in two ways: both are inexplicable and both have 
the dual character ot humbling yet exalting the beholder.75 In 
tact the two experiences are so similar that an aesthetic experi-
ence may be used to evoke a religious one, as otto observed.76 
Tillich noted that the religious may even appear in a painting 
which has no religious content in the traditional sense.77 
How, then, can we differentiate these two closel7 associated 
experiences? Schleieraacher put bis distinction this W87: all 
science is the existence ot things in man; art and culture is 
the existence ot man in things. But both art and science are 
dependent on the universal existence or all things in the Intin-
1te. 78 Or, to say it another way, science is speculative, art 
is practical, and religion is intuitive.79 
!he problem with this distinction is that an aesthetic ex-
perience can be intuitive too, as Plotinus points out. !hat is, 
74Whitehead, Religion !a !h! riaking 1 p. 21. 
75otto, l!l!. Idea 2! !!!!, Holz• pp. 44, 45. 
76For example darkness (as in temples) can evoke a mystical 
effect; silence can provoke a spontaneous reaction to a numinous 
presence; ana emptiness. b;r doing away with the "thia" and "here" 
~an draw attention to the "wholly other" (otto, ~ IS!! .2! ~ 
~OlY, PP• 72, 73. 
77Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p. 6. 
78Schleiermacher • .Q!! Religion, p. 39. 
79.n!S.•t PP• 275-284. 
109 
art as a practice, (e.g., man making something beautiful) is no 
doubt distinguishable from2ligion as a feeling or awareness of 
the absolute. But what ~bout one'sawareness ot absolute beauty; 
is this kind of aesthetic experience distinguishable from a reli-
gious awareness of the absolute? For example, in Plotinus there 
1s that absolute beauty (the "One" or "Good") which is experieln!C! 
as ultimate and is identified with "God." It is beyond all sen-
sible and even intellectual beauty and can be known only in a 
imYStical union with it. If by an aesthetic experience one refers 
to this kind of ultimate intuition, then it would seem that 
Schleierm.acher's distinction between aesthetics and religion 
rwould not hold. 
Kierkegaard, in a more radical distinction, views the aes-
thetic, moral, and religious dimensions as three ascending levels 
or stages of lite.80 fhe aesthetic level is that of feeling, the 
ethical one ot deciding, and the religious level is one ot exist-
ing. !he aesthetic stage represents the routines ot life; the 
ethical gives rules tor lite, and the religious gives a revela-
tion to lite. Whereas the first is self-centered, the second 
law-centered, the last is God-centered. Aesthetics represents a 
lite without choosing; morality a choosing of lite; religion is 
the choosing ot God. From the aesthetic to the moral is a leap81 
80These three levels are represented respectively by three 
of his works, Repetitions (the aesthetic), Either/Or (the ethi-
cal), and ~ear and Trembiitf (the religious,, aii'.dstfie overall in 
a work entrtrid-niages .2!l fe's ~· 
81.Eaoh stage is separated by a crisis of despair and is 
spanned only by a "leap of faith." Lower levels are not 
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trom being spectator to being participator in lite; a leap trom 
personal whims to universal norms; from mere deliberatian to de-
cision; from being controlled by lite to being in control ot 
life. The further leap from the ethical stage to the religious 
is a leap from the objective realm of abstract, universal moral 
code, to the subjective realm ot concrete, particular conduct; 
from the essential order to the existential; tram propositions 
about God to the person of God. Brietly, then, aesthetics is 
something one .!!!!.; religion is something one !!• file former is 
impersonal; the latter is personal. Aesthetics is something one 
knows; religion is something one lives. One grips the aestheti-
cal dimension ot lite, but the religious grips him. 
But even Kierkegaard's radical distinction would not do to 
differentiate what Plotinus meant by an experience of absolute 
beauty trom what Schleierm.acher meant by a religious experience. 
Both are ultimate; both are absolute. Perhaps the simplest way 
to resolve the problem is to say that tor Plotinus there is no 
distinction between a religious and an aesthetic experience ot 
"Absolute Beauty;" in tact they are identicai.82 However, there 
remains the question ot whether this is the normal and customary 
meaning of an aesthetic experience. At least on the lower level1 
destroyed, only dethroned, by higher levels, and attainment is n< 
guarantee of permanence. See Walter Lowrie, Kierke~aard (New Yark: 
Harper and Row Publishers, 1962),pp. 150-167; 230-2 O; 391-449. 
82However, there is certainly a distinction in Plotinus be-
tween an aesthetic experience on either a sensual or intellectu-
al level and this highest intuitive experience. Cf. Enneads I, 






{sensual, intellectual) of aesthetic experience there is a marked 
difference between the religious and the aesthetic experiences; 
the form.er is ultimate the latter is not. Aesthetic experience 
may lead to religious experience, but they are not identical. 
Following this line of thought Otto contends that an aes-
thetic experience can be used to evoke a religious experience, 
even though the two experiences differ in kind. For Otto an aes-
thetic experience is a sense of the sublime; a religious experi-
ence is an awareness of the sacred or holy--a numinous experiemc~ 
And even though there is a hidden relation between the sacred and 
the sublime,83 these two experiences differ in kind and not mere-
ly in degree.84 Although Otto does not clearly draw out his dis-
tinctions, he seems to imply that the difference between them is 
that between a sense ot grandeur on the one hand and a vision of 
God on the other; like the difference between Viewing the Grand 
Canyon and that ot seeing a Hol.7 God (as Isaiah's vision in the 
Old Testament).85 As A. E. Taylor put it, if William Shakespeare 
walked into the room we should stand, but it Jesus Christ walked 
into the room we should knee1.86 !he tor.mer could occasion an 
aesthetic experience; the latter could provide a religious en-
counter. Aesthetics involves a sense of wonder and amazement; 
83otto, ~ Idea 21,. !!'!! Holz, p. 65. 
84Ibid., p. 106. 
85Isaiah, chapter 6. 
86A. E. !aylor, "!'b.e Argument from Religious Experience," 
P• 159. 
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religion involves a sense or worship and adoration. 
But how can one say they differ in kind unless he can show 
what the difference is? In answer we would suggest two differ-
ences: (1) The object or an aesthetic experience, at least in the 
ordinary sensual or intellectual senses, is not ultimate whereas 
the object of a religious experience is ultimate. And in the 
Plotinian sense of an intuitive experience or absolute beauty 
one really has a religious experience described in aesthetic 
terms or in its aesthetic dimension. (2) The nature ot an aes-
thetic experience (even in the Plotinian sense of absolute beaut,. 
is different from a religious experience. Even it the object or 
both is considered to be one and the same absolute, nevertheless 
the attitude or the religious toward it differs from that or the 
artist. The latter merely has an attitude of wonder and admira-
tion toward the absolute; the former has a spirit of worship and 
adoration toward it. The artist is drawn by it, but the reli-
gious is also repelled by it. As Otto observed, there is a sense 
of tear as well as fascination. !rhat is, the religious person 
is not only devoted to but also senses his dependence on the ul-
timate. Furthermore, the artist has an attitude ot contempla-
tion; the religious has an attitude of complete commitment. 
That is, the artist as such remains detached from ultimate beautJ 
whereas the religious is aware of his dependence on the ultimate. 
Relisiou~ Experience .!!! Contrast !2, .! Purelz Secular EKI>er-
ience.--An experience need not be secular or non-religious sim-
ply because it is humanistic. Both Fromm's and Dewey's views 
:'I 
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are humanistic and yet qualify as religious. 
In Fromm's case what he calls a "humanistic" religion in 
contrast to an "authoritarian" religion qualifies (under our 
definition) as religious. For the higher human self, which he 
calls "God," does indeed transcend the individual and it is con-
sidered ultimate, i.e., he is ultimately committed to it.8? 
Likewise, Dewey's form or humanism is essentially religious. He 
said, "Any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end and against 
obstacles and in spite of threats or personal loss because or 
conviction or its general and enduring value is religious in 
quality."88 The ideal goal is transcendent and the type or con-
viction or it and commitment to it is total. 
It this be so, then one may ask just what type of humanis-
tic experience would not quality as a religious experience. 
Basically, a non-religious or purely secular experience would be 
one where either (1) no transcendent other exists beyond the in-
dividual, or (2) which if there were an other he would not be 
totally committed to it because it would not be considered ulti-
mate. The tact that such are difficult to find is testimony to 
just how incurably religious man is atter all. Even Sigmund 
Freud's god or hum.an reason. which he calls Logos, is not identi-
fied with the 1nd1vidual•s89 rational powers and thus qualifies 
8?Fromm, Psychoanal1sis ~ Religion, PP• 3?~ 49, 60. 
88
newey, ! Common Faith, P• 27• 
891.Preud, Future ot an Illusion, p. 88. 
---------
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as transcendent. Likewise, the projected human "self'" which 
Feuerbach says men consider (falsely) to be God is not the indi-
vidual human being but human nature in general, 1.e., universal 
or generic man.90 Ot course he does not consider it to be real, 
nor does Dewey hold his ideal goal to be real. Nevertheless, it 
is beyond the individual and it is considered ultimate by the 
religious person. Therefore, it qualities as an object of reli-
gious experience. 
1'b.e first way in which one may be irreligious is by a retus-
al to recognize any kind of transcendence whatsoever. '!his, said 
w. c. Smith, is what characterizes contemporary secularity.91 
That is, a completely immanent, this-worldly outlook which is un-
able (or unwilling) to transcend in any direction is essentially 
non-religious. As Martin Marty put it, "Secularism permits no 
transcendent •••• It is self-contained, self-explanatory, 
selr-enclosed."92 Or as Altizer wrote, "It there is one clear 
portal to the twentieth century, it is • • • the collapse or a117 
~eaning or reality being beyond the newly discovered radical 1•-
•anence of modern man, an immanence dissolving even the memory 
or the shadow of transcendence."93 
90Yeuerbach, The Essence ot pb.ristianity, P• 7. 
9lv. c. Smith, .T1!!. ~eanins !!!!4 ~ ,2! Religion, P• 127. 
92Kartin Marty, Varieties of Unbelief, P• 138 • ....._........, ................ _ ................ ......._. .... 
93Altizer, The Gospel ot Christian Atheism (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, I9ge;jj ~· 2~. !here are several reasons 
for this radical immanence: \1) The inability to set at the tran-
scendent because it is "dead" (,! l.! Altizer), or (2) Because our 
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But not only is there a radically immanent, irreligious 
tance by some contemporary men because of the inability to dis-
over the transcendent but also because of an unwillingness to 
ake a total commitment (or even a partial one) to it. Th.is un-
illingness is the second characteristic of a non-religious ex-
erience. There are many reasons some men would refuse to com-
it themselves to the transcendent, even if it were there: (1) 
ecause it is deemed unworthy of their devotion,94 or (2) because 
an considers himself mature enough to get along without the t 
cendent,95 or (3) because the individual desires to honor him.-
elf as ultimate.96 
In brief, a man may be irreligious or purely humanistic in 
ways. First, because he is unable to see a transcendent, or 
second, because he is unwilling to submit to!;. In either event 
is experience falls short of being religious. 
language about it is "dead" or meaningless (van Buren), or (3) 
eoause it is "eclipsed" by conceptualizations about it (as Buber 
said), or (4) Because it is "silent" or hiding. 
94Ivan in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov reflects this 
attitude, for even if God exiiied Ivan leaves tKe impression that 
e would never surrender to Him because or the injustice He has 
one to man. 
95Fromm states this well: "It mankind is able to produce 
enough to reed all men, it does not need to pray tor daily bread. 
Man can provide that by his own effort," Psychoanalzsis !!!S !!!!-
ion, p. 104. 
96Ayn Rand's philosophy of selfishness is as clear an exam-
ple of this as one can find. "By the grace of reality and the 
nature or life, man--every man--is an end in himself, he exists 
for his own sake, and the achievement of his own 4~ppiness is his 
highest moral purpose," For the New Intellectual (The New Ameri-




Various Dimensions !l!, Religious Transcendence 
Now that religious experience has been defined and distin-
guished from other experiences, it remains to discuss the various 
irections or dimensions that this transcendence may take. For 
the transcendent can be the object of religious awareness and 
aspiration in many different directions. Failure to see these 
imensions may be cause tor misunderstanding the essentially re-
ligious character of these experiences. 
The following is offered as a typology of the major dimen-
sions ot transcendence: (1) Retrospective transcendence; (2) Ver-
tical transcendence; (3) Eschatological transcendence, and (4) 
Introspective transcendence. This division suggests, respective-
ly, that men have attempted to transcend backward to origins, 
pward to the top, forward to the end, and inward to the depth of 
all things. 
The Retrospective Dimension of Transcendence 
Retrospective transcendence means that the direction in 
hich the religious man transcends toward the transcendent is a 
backward one. That is, he seeks to go back to a beginning or 
point or origin to discover the source of religious awareness. 
According to Mircea Eliade, this is the characteristic feature 
of the primitive religious experience. The discussion will begi 
with Eliade's analysis. 
Eliade's ~ £.! Ori3ins.--For Eliade the transcendent is 
11? 
the "Sacred" and this world the "profane."9? The Sacred 
opposite of the profane. Manifestations of the Sacred he 
alls a "hierophany" which is always something "Wholly Othertt 
the profane world. The "hierophany" is a fixed point (such 
temple or holy spot) where the "absolute reality" is re-
It is a kind ot "doorway" or "gateway" to God. Where 
he nsacred" manifests itself there is a "center" which serves as 
ocal point for a "cosmos. ''98 The organizing of one's life 
ound. places where the Sacred "breaks through" is called "cos-
osizing," i.e., a microoosmiccreation. It is the consecration 
f a place by the repetition of the primitive cosmogony. That 
s, to organize or cosmosize one's life is to repeat the para-
igaatic work of the gods in the beginning.99 
El.iade called the "opening" to the sacred or transcendent 
"Center of the World." A Sacred place is always a center 
round which man orders his life. The religious man resists 
haos and seeks to stay as close as possible to the center of the 
The gods created the world from its center in the begin-
ng and so this is the model after which the religious man pat-
erns his life by a repetition of their paradigmatic act. In 
short, religious man seeks to situate himself at the "center" of 
97A term he confessedly takes from Rudolf otto's analysis 
of religious experience in The Idea of the Holy. See Eliade, 
The Sacred ~ !!:.!. Profane, P. nr.- - -
9SEliade, The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 10-30. 
- --------99 Ibid., pp. 45, 52, 65. 
-
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the world where he is closest to the holy so he can experience in 
principle the mythical moment of creation.100 
Time is continuous tor the pre-literate. It is recoverable 
in ritual. Tb.at is, mythical time can be made present by repeti-
tion in ritual ot the original act ot the gods. Religious time, 
then, is cyclical and periodically present by means of rites. 
It was Christianity, however, which radically changed the nature 
of religious time by asserting that it unfolds (via the Incarna-
tion ot Christ) in history, but the pre-literate "mythical time" 
is not so. For them no time existed before the reality narrated 
in their myth and it is recoverable through the ritualistic reen-
actment of the same.101 By this ritual the participant becomes 
contemporaneous with the time of origin which is a kind of eter-
nal present. Tb.at is, "• •• the man of archaic societies is 
not only obligated to remember JSTthieal history but also to £!,-
enact a large part of it periodically."102 In this way, the re-
ligious man reveals that his desire for transcendence is really 
in the direction of the original paradise. This "JD7th of the 
eternal return," said Eliade, "did not paralyze ancient reli• 
gious man. It is not a retreat from responsibility but an assum-
ing of it in the creation or the cosmos. It is not a return to 
lOOibid., PP• 45, 52, 65. 
-101 Ibid., pp. 70, ?2. 




the dream world but a desire for the real world by a return to 
the original world. It is what we will call a "retrospective 
transcendence."103 
"The myth," said Eliade, "relates a sacred history, that is, 
a primordial event that took place at the beginning of time, .!!a 
initio."104 It is the revelation of a mystery, a recital of what 
the gods did at the beginning. The function of myth is to fix 
the paradigmatic model for all significant human activity. Liv-
ing a myth, then, implies a genuinely religious experience. The 
religiousness or this experience is due to the tact that one re-
enacts the creative deeds ot the supernaturai. 105 By repeating 
the myth man remains in the "sacred" or "real," and by- continual 
reactivation of the original gestures or the gods man sanctifies 
his world. To forget to re-enact the myth is "sin," for it is 
through ritual and myth that man is in contact with the transcen-
dent. Only by reactualizing the myth does man have hope. Th.at 
is, by eternal repetition there is eternal recovery. 106 
So the religious lite for Eliade assumes the following basic 
form: The belief that 1) there is an absolute reality which tran-
scends the world but is·manitest in the world; 2) life has a 
sacred origin and that man realizes his potential in the degree 
l03El.iade, The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 92-94. 
- ------
104Ibid., P• 95. Ct.~ !!ll!, Realit~, PP• 5, 6. 
l05Eliade, ~ ~ Reality, p. 19. 
l06Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, PP• 98, 99, 101. Cf. 
M.vth and Reality:-i)p. 144. 145'.-
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to which he participates in it; 3) that gods created the world, 
the history of which is preserved in myths; 4) by imitation of 
the gods man reactualizes sacred history and man keeps close to 
the gods. Non-religious man, on the other hand, is characterized 
by 1) his refusal ot transcendence and, 2) his acceptance of the 
relativity of reality or even doubt of its meaning. No such men, 
said Eliade, are known in archaic cultures; only in modern Wes-
tern society has "profane" man fully developed. 10? 
Eliade's view may be summed up this way: Religion is the 
paradigmatic solution for every existential crisis not only be-
cause it can be indefinitely repeated, but also because it is be-
lieved to have a transcendental origin, thus enabling man to 
transcend personal situations and, finally, gain access to the 
world of spirit. 108 Unlike the "profane" man, the symbols of 
the religious man are able to "open up" the universe to him. To 
be sure secular man has many symbols, but none of them are any 
more than private and partial :mytho~ogies which are not experi-
enced by the whole man. None of them are paradigmatic provisions 
for retrospective transcendence; they do not take the "profane" 
man back to the transcendent origin of all things.109 For the 
primitive man, the meaning of the world was gained through the 
myth o! origin or cosmogony. Its function is to reveal models 
lO?El.iade, ~ Sacred !!!2. ~ Profane, PP• 202, 203. 
l08Ibid., p. 210. 
-109 Ibid., p. 211. 
-
nd, thereby, to give meaning to the world and to human life. 
rough myth, the world can be apprehended as an intelligible 
significant cosmos. 110 
.!h! Limitations .2! Retrospective Transcendence.--What Eliade 
ascribes is certainly one form of religious transcendence, viz., 
retrospective kind. The mistake comes, however, in considering 
his the onlz way one may have a religious experience. If retro-
pective transcendence via myths of origin were the only way to 
ranscend, then few men but pre-literates have been religious. 
thermore, were transcendence possible only via a backward 
the mythical origin, then Greek philosophy would have 
pelled the end to all religion. But in fact Greek philosophy 
pened up the way tor a new dimension of transcendence, for they 
oo were interested in origins but they replaced cosmogony with 
cosmology.111 
Both are answers to the question of origins. But the latter 
is an attempt to go beyond the myth and find an arclii'or absolute 
oint of beginning by reason. Eliade said that the Greeks atte 
ed to go beyond mythology as divine history and to reach a pri-
al source, to identify the womb ot Being. "It was in seeking 
the source, the principle, the arche, that philosophical specula-
tion for a short time coincided with cosmogony; but it was no 
llOEliade, ~ ~ Reality, pp. 144, 145. 
111As El.iade points out, this type of mental attitude is not 
exclusive to archaic societies; "The desire to know the origin o 
things is also characteristic of Western culture," ibid., p. ?6 • 
.............. 
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onger the cosmogonic myth, it was an ontological problem." That 
s, "The 'essential' is reached, then, by a prodigious 'going 
accomplished by an effort of thought. In this sense it 
be said that the earliest philosophical speculations derive 
rom mythologies •••• " In this way "• •• sy-stematic thought 
to identify and understand the 'absolute beginning' of 
cosmogonies tell, to unveil the mystery of the Creation 
world, in short, the mystery of the appearance of Being." 
earliest philosophic speculations are derived from my-thol-
that the !lthos and the logos find their common source in 
attitude which is religious, viz., the desire to know the an-
to the question of origins. 
However, the Greek philosophers effected a radical change 
the religious myths they inherited. For one thing, instead of 
iewing them in an emotional or involved way, they looked on them 
detached and spec'l.lative manner. 
A representation of the world-order which had once been 
a mystery, trought, in its earlier day-a, with awful emo-
tion and serious practical consequences, is now put for-
ward as a rational theory, which anyone who can under-
stand it is free to take or leave.113 
ut the rationalization was not complete; there were not only 
emnants of religious thought in Greek thought but there was also 
breaking out in a new dimension of transcendence. This can be 
seen most clearly in the way Greek rationalism culminated in 
112 Ibid., PP• 111-112. 
-113corntord, ~ Religion ~ Philosophy, P• 50. 
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Plotinian mysticism. 
The Vertical Dimension or Transcendence 
The tendency to transcend upward by leaving the lower ~orld 
~r shadows and images and ascending to the world of pure forms 
~bove is present already in Plato. 114 However, the tendency for 
~ertieal transcendence is both more explicit and more clearly 
~eligious in Plotinus. 
Plotinus: Reachins ~~'!!I? There.'--For Plotinus all 
things proceed from the "One" and all things return to it, for 
all plurality presupposes a prior unity. 115 "Anything existing 
a.rter the First must necessarily arise trom that First ••• " 
ne wrote. 116 Since the "One" is an absolute unity, all emana-
tions that flow trom it must be something less than pure s1mplie-
1ty.117 In fact they form with the "One" a triplicity or unity 
in a descending order toward greater multiplicity. After the 
primary unity (the One) there is a secondary unity (One-Many) 
called "~" or "Intellect .. and a tertiary unity (One-and-Many) 
!Called "World Soul."118 
The tirat movement in Plotinian thought is that from unity 
to multiplicity. At the bottom of the chain of emanation is 
114see particularly Plato's famous Cave Analogy in Republic 
VII. 
115Plotinus, Enneads III, 8, 9; V, 3, 15. 
116Ibid., v, 4, 1. 
-
ll7Ibid., V, 3, 15. 
118Ibid., V, i, 8. 
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the most multiple or all. Matter is most multi-
and has the least unity. It is the place where unity takes 
last stand against chaos. Matter is the place the whole 
rocess of emanation from absolute simplicity (the One) peters 
"For as necessarily as there is Something af'ter the First, 
o necessarily there is a Last: this Last is Matter, the thing 
hich has no residue of good in it: here is the necessity of 
1." Furthermore, the farther something is trom unity the less 
eality it has, for divergence from unity involves a correspond-
divergence from reality. In other words, the farther down 
emanation extends the greater is the multiplicity and ~he 
ess is the reality. And at the very bottom one finds the evil 
of almost total multiplicity and an almost complete lack.of real-
ity, which he calls "Matter" or "Non-Being.n It is by contact 
this matter that the lower phase of the individual soul of a 
an is contaminated and, therefore, must purify itself of th.is 
roliferation and begin to ascend toward higher and higher 
ity.119 
The second great movement in Plotinian philosophy is the 
upward away trom1111ltiplicity to a higher unity. Men must 
e careful lest by continually drenching themselves in the multi-
plicity of matter, they can become irretrievably fragmented and 
absolutely evil. But fortunately as men wander in this foreign 
land of evil they have a natural homesickness for the "Fatherland" 
ll9Ibid., II, 4, 11; I, 8, ?; VI, 2, 5; I, 8, 3; I, 8, 5; 
125 
"The appetite tor the divine Intellect urges them to 
their source." That is, being unsatisfied in the mul-
iplicity of evil they are pulled together by a higher unity. 
the move from unity to multiplicity is outward and down-
ard, the move up toward greater unity again will be inward and 
pward.120 
The first step in the move upward toward higher unity is 
____ !h!, sensible 12 ~ intellectual. It begins in the realm of 
ense, where one is "busy about many things," where the soul is 
its housing. made fragmentary by corporeal exten-
Here it is in sensation that noting the flux of things it 
ows at once that from elsewhere comes that higher unity that 
loats on things below. Looking at the multiple images of sensa-
man recognizes in them a unity which as a fugitive has en-
the realm of matter. So as one beholds the unity below he 
s impelled to pursue them to their higher source. Tb.at is to 
a:y, the sign of the sensible point upward from their own multi-
to a higher unity; the roads of the many lead to the one. 
road that leads upward first leads inward. Man has an 
unity which is greater than sensation. The inner 
ty of his intellect is greater than the outward multiplicity 
vailable through his bodily senses.121 
The next step in the ascent toward greater unity moves from 
............... 
120Ibid •• I, a, 13; IV, a. 4; I. 6, 7. 
121~ •• I, 3, 4; I, 6, 2-8; VI, 9, 11; I, 3, 6. 
he intellectual !g, ~ intuitional. Since every particular 
hing has a unity of its own to which it may be traced, as one 
ounts upward from sensation, he must come first to the immediate 
ity for soul, which is found in the intellectual realm called 
upward movement one takes with him only that bet-
er (higherJ part of the Soul which alone is winged for the In-
ellectual act." To know the intellect joins in a higher unity 
identical with the known. 122 However, even 
n the intellectual realm there is this basic duality of knower 
known and the multiplicity of Forms or Ideas by which things 
known. Hence, it is necessary for the one seeking absolute 
ity to press upward, beyond intellectual knowledge to an intui-
of absolute Simplicity. 
In this final stage in one's "vertical 11 transcendence he 
inds himself alone with the Alone. For "• •• the Supreme is 
----- ---- --- -----
ot known intellectually." Hence, one wishing to contemplate 
hat transcends the Intellectual attains by putting away all that 
is of the intellect. Por 
~ •• knowledge of the One comes to us neither by science 
nor by pure thought • • • but by a presence which is 
superior to science • • • for science implies discursive 
reason and discursive reason implies manifoldness. He 
then misses the One and falls into number and multiplicity. 
o know the rtSUpreme" one must merge with the "Supremett and be-
one with it, center coinciding with center. Just as one 
become godlike and beautiful i! he cares to see "God" and 
122Ibid., v, 3, 4. 
-
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"Beauty," so one must become one with the "One" if he is to know 
The soul must put away all multiplicity, sensible and 
ntellectual so that "alone it may receive the Alone."123 It is 
this point that one's vertical transcendence is realized, when 
e has reached the top of the pyramid in which the many lives 
in an absolute simplicity. 
So in Plotinus the Greek rationalization went beyond itself, 
eyond reason, and returned to its religious roots. As Emile Bre 
ier said, the Greek yearning for philosophical unity bad ful-
illed itself in the mystical unity; mysticism had completed ra-
ionalism.124 But the religious transcendence involved in this 
ystical union is not the same as for pre-philosophical man. 
ere are no myths for Plotinus. It is not a question or origin 
ut unity; not a search for what is at the beginning but what is 
top. That is, transcendence is not retrospective but ver-
And furthermore, transcendence is no longer super-natural 
ut natural for Plotinus, a fact which the neo-platonic Christians 
ould find some difficulty in reconciling with grace. 
Reaction!£~ God "Up-There."--Some thinkers have not been 
123Ibid., VI, 7, 35; V, 5, 6; VI, 9, 4; (Katz' translation); 
VI, 9, l<J;!, 6, 9; VI, 7, 34. 
124
.Emile Brehier, The Philosopht of Plotinus, trans. Joseph 
omas (Chicago: The University of ~icago Press, 1958), p. 162. 
125Even Augustine was still sorting out the Neo-platonic in-
ompa ti bi li ties with his Christian philosophy at the end of his 
life as the many modifications and revisions of his "platonism" 
ade in his Retractions reveal. 
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~ontent with vertical transcendence since they feel that it too 
~nvolves a mythological view of the universe. Contrary to what 
the Greek philosophers did in seeking the reality of the logos 
~n the mythos they have denied any reality ,!B the mythos whatso-
ever. Rather, these contemporary thinkers have sought a reality 
oehind the myth, by stripping the myth of its historical trap-
pings to get at its ontological truth. Rudolf Bultmann is a good 
example of this reaction to vertical transcendence, to the God 
ttup there" or "out there." 
Bultmann contended, for example, "The whole conception ot 
the world which ia presupposed in the preaching of Jesus as in 
the New Testament generally is mythological ... By this he means 
the conception of the world as being structured in three stories, 
neaven, earth, and hell; the conception of the intervention of 
supernatural powers in the course of evento; and the conception 
of miracles. According to Bultmann, "These myt)lological concep-
tions of heaven a.nd hell are no longer acceptable for modern men, 
since for scientific thinking to speak of 'above' and 'below' in 
the universe has lost all meaning •••• u126 
In this mythological structure it would be necessary to 
speak of God as "up there" or "out there."12? It is in this 
sense that Bultmann's "demythology" would oppose even the con-
~ept of vertical transcendence. "To de-mythologize," said 
126Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and rtrtholog;y (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, !958), PP• 15~0. 
l2?Robinson, Honest to ~d, PP• 11 t. 
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ultmann, "is to reject not Scripture or the Christian message as 
whole, but the world-view o! Scripture. tt It is tt• •• to • • • 
eny that the message o! Scripture and ot the Church is bound to 
ancient world-view which is obsolete." "Therefore," he contin-
ed, "it is mere wishful thinking to suppose that the ancient 
orld-view of the Bible can be renewed."128 
However, de-mythologizing does not mean a rationalizing of 
Christian message, Bultmann assured us. "Not at all! On the 
de-mythologizing makes clear the true meaning of God's 
stery." It is to seek the "• •• deeper meaning which is oon-
ealed under the cover of mythology."129 He held that "!he pur-
ose of demythologization is not to make religion more acceptable 
o modern man by trimming the trad.itional Biblical texts, but to 
clearer to modern man what the Christian tai th is.•• What 
I am fighting against is just th.is fixation of God as an 
objective entity •••• Therefore my attempt to demythol-
ogize begins, true enough, by clearing away the false 
stumbling blocks created tor modern man by the tact that 
his world view is determined by science.130 
at Bultmann is against is the objectification that mythology 
plies. In this sense, modern science can be as guilty as an-
ient mythology. 131 In brief, de-mythologize means to de-objec-
128Bultaann, Jesus Christ ~ !:'!.Ythology, pp. ;5, 36, 38. 
129 Ibid., PP• 43, 18. 
-
l30Bultmann, "The Case for Demythologization,"~ and 
Christianit , ed. Karl Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann (~York: The 
oon ay ress, 1958), PP• 59, 50. 
l3l"Mythioal thinking is just as objectifying as scientific 
thinking, for instance, when the tormer represents the transcen-
,'I 
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It is in this respect somewhat the reverse of the Greek 
ationalization. 
What does one discover in de-mythologizing the biblical con-
of the_ God "up there"? According to Bultmann one discovers 
• the transcendence and hiddenness of God as acting.u132 
is is because "The invisibility of God excludes every myth 
hich tries to make God and His action visible; God withholds Him 
elf from view and observation. 133 That is to say, "Man's life 
by the search tor God because it is always moved, con-
or unconsciously, by the question about his own personal 
xistence." Of course, "The question of God and the question ot 
yself are identical," wrote Bultmann. But, "Jrom the statement 
to speak of God is to speak of myself, it by no means tollo 
God is not outside the believer," he reminds us. "Thus, the 
that God cannot be seen or apprehended apart from faith does 
ot mean that He does not exist apart from faith." What this 
show, said Bultmann, is that God cannot be objectitied.134 
Jrom this it is clear that Bultmann's de!D.J'thologization of 
ertical transcendence, of the God "up there" is by no means to 
e construed as a negation of all transcendence. To be sure, 
ence Of God in terms Of remoteness in space rway "up there"] .:. • 
•• " "For all human world-views objectivize lhe world and ignore 
r eliminate the signifieanee of the encounters in our personal 
xistence, 11 Bultmann, Jesus Christ~ MY;thology;, p. 61, n. l; 
• 83, er. p. 62. 
l32Ib1d., p. 83. 
-
l33rb1d., PP• 83-84. 
-134Ibid., pp. 53, 70 72. 
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"· •• for scientific thinking to speak of 'above' and 'below' in 
he universe has lost all meaning, but the idea of the transcen-
ence of God ••• is still significant,"l35 he wrote. There is 
"God" or "transcendent." He is active in man's personal, exis-
experience. He does in some sense exist apart from man, 
He doesn't exist "up there." 
If God doesn't exist "up there," then where is he to be 
In which direction does man transcend in a religious ex-
erience for Bultmann1 In brief, the answers are respectively 
and "forward." Bultmann, as a Christian, believes 
revealed in Christ and that "• •• it has become more 
clear that the esehatological expectation and hope is 
of the New Testament preaching throughout." "Today," 
"nobody doubts that Jesus' conception ot the Kingdom of 
d is an eschatologieal one--at least in European theology and, 
as I can see, also among American New 'l'estament scholars." 
at Bultmann finds, then, in New Testament eschatology "• •• is 
ot simply the idea of transcendence as such, but of the impor-
ance of the transcendence of God, of God who is never present 
s a familiar phenomenon but who is always the coming God, who is 
eiled by the unknown future." In brief, "This, then, is the 
eeper meaning of the mythological preaching of Jesus--to be open 
o God's future which is really imminent for every one of us • • 
•• ; to be prepared, because this future will be a judgment on 
135 Ibid., p. 20. 
-
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all men who have bound themselves to this world and are not tree, 
ot open to God's tuture."136 
J'rom Bultmann's de-mythological rejection ot vertical trans-
endence, then, one is led naturally to consider more seriously 
he view of eschatological transcendence. As the Greek rational-
zation made retrospective transcendence obsol:!te, so also demyth-
logization makes vertical transcendence untenable tor some 
odern men. Hence, there is a turn in a new direction, that ot 
schatological transcendence. 
Eschatological Dimension ot Transcendence 
Only on the view that history is going somewhere is the po-
escha tological transcendence possible. It there is no 
orizontal history with an end or goal, then man cannot trans-
end in that direction. Such a linear view ot history is un-
own to ancient and Eastern ways of thinking. For the archaic 
pointed out, time is mythical and not histori-
However, with the Hebrew prophets appears the first 
lear indication that there is an end or goal tor time, 1.e., a 
ulmination or climax towards which human events are moving. 138 
l3Gibid., PP• 13, 22-23, 31-32. 
l3?El.1ade, The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 72, 112. 
- --
l38A recent historian wrote, "'!he Hebrews broke sharply with 
11 these prevailing conceptions ot time and history. Instead ot 
eeurring events, they saw a series of distinct episodes, each 
nvolving a unique intervention by Yahweh, unrepeatable and irre-
ersible. Instead ot circular patterns, they saw history moving 
n a straight line toward the fulfillment ot divine purpose," 
Trygve R. Tholtsen, Historical Thinking (New York: Harper and Row 
blishers inc. 1 • 
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ren more decidedly clear is this point in the New Testament. As 
iade observed, Christianity radically changed the nature of 
ime by sanctifying it through the Incarnation of Christ. 139 
!!.29. !!!, ~---Hegel wrote that God is dead140 and Nietzsche 
seriously. 141 And Altizer drew out the religious impli-
for this in a kind of eschatological transcendence. In 
act Altizer contends that Nietzsche was the first radical Chris-
ian.142 
When Altizer says God is dead he does not mean that God has 
always been dead (i.e •• that there never was a living God) or 
hat the idea or word "God" has ceased to be effective today (as 
an Buren said), 143 or that God is merely hidden from man's view 
(as Buber held). For "• •• every man today," Altizer wrote, 
"who is open to experience knows that God is absent, but only the 
ristian knows that God is dead, that the death of God is a 
l39:El.iade, ~ Sacred ~ :5h! _Pr_o.._f_a .... n ...,e, pp. ?2, 112. 
14-0itegel, The Phenomenolo~ of Spirit, near the beginning of 
he section on "'levea!ed Rel!gCin,,...wrote, unhappy consciousness 
"• •• is the bitter pain which finds expression in the cruel 
ords, 'God is dead,'"~ Philosop!tr £!.Hegel, p. 506. 
141Henry D. Aiken wrote, "Hegel said but Nietzsche believed 
hat 'God is dead,'" The~ of Idealog;r ~New York: A Mentor Book 
956), p. 206. Nietzsche s famous passage comes from his ~ 
Science, No. 125, where the Madman cries out, "Do we not hear the 
o se or the grave-diggers who are burying God? Do we not smell 
he divine putretaction?--for even gods putrefy! God is dead! 
God remains dead! And we have killed him!" 
142Thomas Altizer, ~ Gospel S!!. Christian Atheism, p. 25. 
143Altizer lists ten different senses of 'God is dead' on 




inal and irrevocable event. • • • He feels that too many 
hinkers have been attracted by Martin Buber's idea or the 
"eclipse" of God. "God is not simply hidden from view, nor is he 
urking in the depths of our unconscious or on the boundaries of 
ur infinite space •••• 11145 We must confess, he adds, that 
"• •• the death or God is so to speak an actual and real event, 
ot perhaps an event oacuring in a single moment or time or his-
ory, but notwithstanding this reservation an event that has ac-
ually happened both in a cosmic and in a historical sense."146 
When did God die? God died in the Incarnation or Christ. 
"To know that God is Jesus," Altizer remarked, "is to know that 
-
himself has become flesh: no longer does God exist as trans-
d t S 1 it i Lord ul4? en en p r or sovere gn • • • • Why? Because as 
pirit becomes the word this empties the speaker of himself and 
he whole reality of spirit becomes incarnate in its opposite. 
is, "If Spirit truly empties itself in entering the world, 
its own essential or original Being must be left behind in 
n empty and lifeless form." Or, to put it another way, if 
1st is identical with God, then heaven was emptied of its God 
Christ came to eartb. 148 
144Altizer, ~ Gospel .2! Christia...~ Atheism, p. 111. 
145Altizer, Radical Theology-, pp. 125-126. 
146Altizer, ~ Gospel ,2! Christian Atheism, p. 103. 
14? Ibid., pp. 67, 68. Altizer admits to a Hegelian inter-
retatio'ii""liire. See pp. 62-69, 80. 
148 Ibid., PP• 69, 92. 
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J'urther, God not only died in a general sense by becoming 
Incarnate, i.e., by entering the realm or flesh (and t!1us leaving 
the realm of Spirit), but God also died in a specific sense when 
Christ died on the cross. "Yes, God dies in the Crucifixion: 
therein he fulfills the movement of the Incarnation by totally 
emptying himself' of his primordial sacrality." In fact, "Only in 
the Crucifixion, in the death of the word on the Cross, does the 
Word actually and wholly become flesh." And, "linally, the In-
carnation is only truly actually real if it effects the death of 
the original sa.cred, the death of God himself. "l49 
How does the Incarnation effect the "death" of God? !re 
!Understand this, said Altizer, one must speak or God as a dialec-
ltical process rather than a.s an existent Being. That is, "Pro-
gressively but decisively God abandons or negates his original 
passivity ••• becoming incarnate both !!! and !.! the actuality 
of world and history." In fact, to the extent that the Christian 
Word fails to negate its original form it cannot be a forward 
moving process or a progressive descent into the concrete. That 
is to say, "Only a sacred that negates its own unfallen or prim-
ordial form can become incarnate in the reality of the profane." 
To cling to a. transcendent and wholly other God is a denial of 
the historical reality of the Incarnation. J'or "Dialectically, 
everything depends upon recognizing the meaning of God's total 
identification with Jesus and of the understanding that it is 
149 Ibid., pp. 113, 54. 
-
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God who becomes Jesus and not Jesus who becomes God."l50 In 
rie! then, God must die in the Incarnation tor God is a histori-
al and dialectical process which can come to realization only by 
egation. 
Is transcendence totally lost, then, in the immanence of the 
Incarnation and death or God? Certainly what we have called 
etrospeciive and vertical transcendence are eliminated by Alti-
er. For "• •• as a result of a total movement from transcen-
ence to immanence, we must be freed from every attachment to 
ranscendence, and detached from all yearning tor a primordial 
That is, "• •• the Crucifixion embodies and makes 
inally real a divine movement from transcendence to immanence 
" So then "• •• the Christian who wagers upon a totally 
Christ must negate every form and image ot transcen-
ence, regardless ot what area ot consciousness or experience in 
hich it may appear." In !act, it is suicidal tor the contempor-
ry Christian to cling to transcendence tor both guilt and re-
ression result from clinging to a transcendent God. Above all, 
aid Altizer, theology must abandon a religious form, wholl7 and 
onsistently repudiating the religious quest tor the primordial 
for unless it does theology will remain bound to a pri-
or transcendent Word and thereby it will remain closed 
o the present and human actuality of history. In brief, "'l'he 
eath or God abolishes transcendence, theology making possible a 
150 Ibid., PP• 90t 86, 153, 149, 82, 83 • 
............... 
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ew and absolute immanence, an immanence treed of every sign of 
ranscendence."l5l 
Regardless of the very categorical sound of Altizer's state-
ents, he does not eliminate !!!, dimensions of religious trans-
endence. He does repudiate retrospective and vertical trans-
endence but he does not eliminate eschatological transcendence; 
n fact his own view involves a kind of eschatological transcen-
ence. Be wrote, "An incarnate Word embodying a real transfigur-
tion of Spirit into flesh cannot be sought in a heavenly beyond, 
or can it be reached by a backward movement to primordial time; 
•t is only in the actual and contingent processes of history that 
pirit becomes flesh. 152 What Altizer is saying is that man can-
ot transcend backward or upward; he must transcend in the for-
ard movement of history- • 
Like Bultmann, Altizer argued that the New Testament concept 
of the "Kingdom of God" is decidedly eschatological, that the 
eliever must remain open to the future. Said Altizer, "• •• 
adical faith is a total response to the actual presence and the 
orward movement ot God in history." As a distinctively Chris-
ian form or faith it ft • • • must ever be open to new epiphanies 
or Spirit or God, epiphanies that will not simply be 
epetitions of the original manifestation of God • • • truly new 
epiphanies whose very occurenee either effects or records a new 
l5l~., PP• 136, 139, 143, 145, 77, 154. 
l52Ibid., pp. 45, 46, 156. See also his Radical Theology, 
p. 150. - -
138 
ctualization or movement of the divine process."153 It is this 
orward movement of Christianity whioh distinguishes it from 
ther movements of transcendence. "Yet such a forward movement 
annot culminate in an abolition of the opposites by returning to 
primordial Beginning. Like its analogue in the prophetic faith 
Old Testament, it must be grounded in an eschatological 
d •• If That is, man "• •• must move forward beyond the • • 
a primordial or original sacred to an eschatological 
oincidentia oppositorum that reconciles and unites the sacred 
d the profane." So any authentically kenotic movement of in-
arnation must be a continual process of Spirit becoming flesh, 
f eternity becoming time, or of the sacred becoming profane. 
owever, this does not mean that the sacred becomes and remains 
the profane, thus ending the forward transcendence. For the move 
ent of the sacred into the profane is inseparable from a paral-
el movement or the profane into the sacred. "Consequently, a 
onsistently Christian dialectical understanding of the sacred 
ust finally look forward to the resurrection of the profane in 
transfigured and thus finally sacred form. ,,l54 Just what this 
"transfigured" form or "new epiphany" will be is not known nor 
is it important for present purposes. What is significant is to 
observe that the radical Christian has an eschatological hope; 
l53Altizer, ~ Gospel ,2! Christian Atheism, pp. 105, 84. 
l54Altizer, Radical Theola~, PP• 150, 151, 152, 155. Of 
ourse this does not mean that ~e whole Christian life is mere-
ly anticipat~~. While h$ is waiting for the new epiphany, the 






that when the transcendent could no longer be discovered in the 
realm up there but rather came down here in human history, it 
keeps moving forward. In brief, transcendence is not dead tor 
Altizer, only the traditional backward and upward forms of it 
are dead. 
!!'!!, Secularization £.! Religion.--While contemporary man 
awaits the future epiphany of transcendence, he must live within 
a secularized world. And even granting that radical atheism of 
Altizer with its Hegelian dialectic anddemise ot God is not the 
only form of esohatological transcendence, one must nevertheless 
come to grips with the problem of relating transcendence (of what-
ever dimension) to an immanent-oriented world. That is, there 
are semantical problems with transcendence even if there were no 
dialectical problems with it. !his is the issue that van Buren 
addresses in ~ Secular Meaning £.! lh,! Gospel. 
Van Buren stated his position as over against Bultmann, Og-
den and the demythologization school which, while rejecting myth-
ological expressions or transcendence, nevertheless maintain 
there is some meaningful usages or words like "transcendent." 
He argued that the demythological position "• •• does not do 
justice to the thinking of modern man when it speaks of •experi-
enced nonobjective reality'; it does not see that modern man can-
not even speak analogically about 'God.t"l55 Van Buren offers 
the following reasons tor his position: 156 First, the expres-
l55van Buren, l!!! Secular Meanins £.! !!!,! Gospel, p. 64. 








sions like "nonobjective reality" and "transcendence" are meaning 
less because they are not verifiable in experience; that is, 
there are no conceivable experiences that could count either for 
or against something being ultimately transcendent. Second, 
analogous language about transcendence or God is no more useful 
to modern, empirically oriented man than is objectifying language 
of mythology or science. That is, nThe empiricist in us finds 
the heart of the difficulty not in what is said about God, but 
in the very talking about God at all. We do not know 'what• 
God is, and we cannot understand how the word 'God' is being 
~sed. • " • • That is, the demythologizers reject any ~ective 
meaning tor the word God and the nonobjective or symbolic meaning 
allows for no verification and, therefore, has no meaning at all. 
Today, wrote van Buren, "we cannot even understand the Nietzsohi-
an cry that 'God is dead!' tor it it were so, how could we know? 
No, the problem now is that the word 'God' is dead.nl5? 
Van Buren admitted that "• •• the heart or the method o.f' 
~inguistic analysis [which he uses) lies in the use of the veri-
fication principle--that the meaning of a word is its use in its 
icontext.n That is, the meaning of a statement is to be found in, 
and is identical with, the function or use of that statement.158 
apeaking ot transcendence but apply to the historicity of the New 
i'estament ke£YS!a about Christ, ibid., pp. 68-?3. 
15? Ibid., PP• 64-68, 84, 83, 103. 
-
l58Ibid., P• 104. 
-
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is is, ot course, a more flexible variation of the principle 
its earlier form as empirical veritication.159 That is to 
"There are a variety or 'language-games• activities with 
heir appropriate language, and a modified verification principle 
s now used to ask what sort of things would count for an asser-
and what sort of things would count against it."l60 
As a result ot the need to verity these statements about 
ranscendence somewhere in human experience, van Buren argues 
hat all God~statements must be translated into man-statements;61 
this way he !eels that the apparently transempirical aspects 
religious language oan be understood in terms with an empiri-
al tooting. For example, "Whatever can be known concerning 
'God' bas been answered by the knowledge of Jesus •••• "162 
himself said 1 "He who has seen me has seen the Father!i3 
statements about transcendence must be translated or 
derstood in terms of immanence; statements about God must be 
ranslated into statements about man. In this way religion can 
e secularized by being humanized, i.e., by being understood in 
But if one is limited to the human tor an 
derstanding of the transcendent, it is only natural that men 
l59For a statement or the earlier principle see A. J. Ayer's 
rinciple of empirical verification in ~angyage, Truth ~ Logic, 
hapter 1. 
160van Buren, 1!!!, Secular Meaning £.! !!!!. Gospel, p. 15. 
161Ibid., P• 103 • 
............... 
162Ibid., PP• 196, 14?. 
163Accordin to the Gos el of John 14: • 
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ould explore the depth of human experience. In fact it is this 
epth which becomes a new way to transcend--an introspective kind 
of transcendence, a transcending inwardly. 
Introspective Dimension of Transcendence 
If, as has been contended, religious experience always in-
olves transcendence, then it is only natural that different ways 
o transcend will be discovered when traditional ways are shut 
In fact, inward or introspective transcendence is by no 
new. The mystics have long sought the Divine in the "dept~ 
However, there is a definite connection be-
this modern transcendence in depth and the rejection or the 
dimensions of transcendence just discussed. 
Robinson's God "Vithin."--Various influences in the contem-
_........,_..____ ---
orary world have converged to direct the religious man inward 
n search for the transcendent. First, the stress on immanence 
bvious in all the secular theologians. Then, the inapplieabil-
ty of objective or empirical language about God leads naturally 
search for a more subjective approach. Also, the very tact 
the two traditional forms of transcendence (retrospective 
d vertical) have been so emphatically rejected, there has been 
1ttle option for those not connected with a distinctly Christian 
r eschatological transcendence. In brief, the religious man 
transcend, and it he cannot transcend backward or upward, 
he may try transcending in an inward direction. 
Bishop Robinson led a reluctant revolution in the direction 
of what has been called introspective transcendence. Eehoi 
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Bultmann he argued that God can no longer be conceived as being 
"up-there" at the top of a three-story universe. He can no long-
er be thought of as the "Most High" who on occasion ncomes down" 
to man or the one to whom some men are "caught up." Robinson 
said men must drop the primitive conoept of a "Sky god" or "High 
god" as well as the equally false mental image many moderns have 
of "an Old Man in the sky."164 Nor can the out-moded, pre-scien-
tific conception of a God "up there'' be replaced with the Ek}Ually 
unacceptable one of a God "out there." That is, God is not be-
yond outer space. Such a crude projection of God has been des-
troyed with the coming of the space age, Robinson argues. Hence, 
this spatial way of picturing God is more of a stumbling block 
than an aid to belief in God today, wrote Robinson~ 165 
However, Robinson makes it clear that his intent is not to 
~eplace a transcendent God with a pantheistic and immanent one. 
"On the contrary, the task is to validate the idea of transcen-
kl.ence for modern man." What Robinson proposes, following Til-
lich, is to reverse the symbolism from a God of "height" to one 
of "depth" in order to make religious language more relevant. 
For the word "deep" means more than the opposite of ''highn; it 
•' 
also means the opposite or shallow. This is why "height" so of-
ten signifies unconcern while "depth" denotes concern, for a 
remote God cannot really be involved. It should be further noted 
164Robinson, Honest to God, PP• 11-13 • ......................... __ 
165 Ibid., PP• 13-17. 
-
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that "This is not just the old system in reverse, with a God 
'down under' for a God •up there.'" God is not another being but 
is the "depth and ground of all being" (as Tillich said). Or, to 
borrow Dietrich Bonhoeffer's words, God is the "'beyond' in the 
midst of our life," a depth of reality reached not on the borders 
of lite but at its 'center.• Likewise, wrote Robinson, Buber was 
right when he said that whoever "• •• gives his whole being to 
addressing the Thou of his lite, as a ~ that cannot be limited 
by another, he addresses God."166 
So then, "• •• theological statements are not a description 
of 'the highest Being' but an analysis of the depths of personal 
relationships • • • it is saying that ~. the final truth and 
reality 'deep down things,• is love." And furthermore, Robinson 
-
rwrote, "It statements about God are statements about 'ultimacy' 
of personal relationships, then we must agree that in a real 
~ense Peuerbach was right in wanting to translate 'theology' into 
'anthropology.'" This does not mean, ot course, that God is 
nothing but man, as reuerbach would have it, for this would lead 
to the deification ot man. But rather, as Buber said, "Every 
particular~ is a glimpse through to the eternal !hS!J!•" !'hat 
is, it is between man and man that we meet God, but not as Feuer-
bach said that man is God. 16? 
For Robinson the necessity ot the Transcendent within human 
166Ibid., pp. 44, 54, 130, 45-48. 




experience "• •• lies in the tact that our being has depths 
~hich naturalism, whether evolutionary, mechanistic, dialectical 
or humanistic, cannot or will not recognize." That is, "The man 
who acknowledges the transcendence of God is the man who in the 
-
conditioned relationships of life recognizes the unconditional 
and responds to it in unconditional personal relationship." In 
other words, "God, the unconditional, is to be found only in, 
~ith and under the conditioned relationships ot lite: tor he is 
-
their depth and ultimate signiticanoe."168 And as Tillich ob-
served, to speak ot the transcendent in this sense means that 
~ithin itself the finite world points beyond itselt.169 
In brief, Robinson is suggesting that in view of the obso-
lescence of a transcendence in "height" that men may profitably 
speak of a transcendence in "depth.'' That is, if it is not pos-
sible to speak of the transcendent "up there" men may speak of 
the transcendent "in here"; we may speak of an introspective 
transcendence where •vertical' transcendence is not possible. 
~ !!!£ ~ Subconscious.--Speaking of the God within the 
"depth"ot human experience is neither new nor without problems. 
It was a natural way to describe God even before the Freudian 
elaboration of a subconscious 'depth' to human experience. How-
ever, Since Freud, there has been the temptation to consider the 
subconscious either identical with or closely associated with the 
168 Ibid., pp. 54, 55 1 60. 
-169Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II (195?), p. 8 • 
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transcendent because it is beyond, mysterious, and a realm over 
which men have no conscious control. Rather. in some way it con-
trols them. 
Eliade, for example, said that the unconscious displays the 
structure of a private mythology. He goes even further and con-
tends 
••• not only that the unconscious is "mythological" 
but also that some of its contents carry cosmic values 
•••• It can even be said that Modern man's only real 
contact with cosmic sacrality is effected by the uncon-
scious, whether in his dreams and his imaginative life170 or in the creations that arise out of the unconscious. 
James also closely associates the sublimal and the supreme. 
He contends that the spontaneous source of religious conversation 
is the subconscious. For James it is not the source or root of 
a religious experience that is im.portant; "If the fruits !2£ llli 
ot the state of conversion are good, we ought to idealize and 
!Venerate it, even though it be a piece of natural psychology." 
James does not say that the source of conversions is Rurelz natur-
al, that the subconscious is God. He admits that "• •• the ref-
-
erence of a phenomenon to a sublimal self does not exclude the 
notion of the Deity altogether," for " • • • it is logically con-
ceivable that !! there }?! higher spiritual agencies that can 
directly touch us, the psychological condition of their doing so 
mi~ht }?! our possession of a subconscious region which alone 
should yield access to them." That is, James does not deny that 
there is more than the subconseious to what is meant by God; what 
l?OEliade, ~ ~ Reality, p. ??. 
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ne did say is that the transcendent is ~least "• •• the sub-
conscious continuation of our conscious life. 11171 
But it is precisely this cloae aosociation of the transcen-
ient with man•s subconsciousness that raises anew the question of 
the reality basis for religious transcendence. For it one admits 
~lth James that sudden religious conversions can be explained on 
~ purely natural basis and that there are no unmistakably unique 
characteristics of so-called supernatural conversions; it one ad-
~its that there is in the subconscious a transcendent realm of 
spontaneous power capable of transforming lives,172 then one can-
not help but wonder whether or not the subconscious is all that 
............ 
is meant by the transcendent. Indeed. this is precisely the po-
sition taken by Carl Jung who identifies God with the collective 
subconscious of men. And even those who do not make this identi-
rication are sometimes haunted with the possibility that there 
might be no more to the transcendent than what transcends the eon~ 
sciousnesa of individual men, viz., in the subconsciousness of 
~he race. But since we have taken tor the meaning ot reality 
pnly that which is more than and independent of the subconscious-
ness of men, whether individual or collective, this raises afresh 
the question of how to teat the reality of the transcendent. 
~32, 
Summary and Conclusion of the Chapter 
The purpose of this chapter has been to discover the essen-
l7lwilliam James, The Varieties ~ Religious £t!Perience, pp. 
237, ct. 265, 508.---
1?2 Ibid., pp. 233-237· 
............... 
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tial character and basic dimensions of religious experience. 
irsli, it was discovered that a religious experience always in-
olves a transcendent dimension, i.e., soraething which goes be-
ond and is more than the empirical conditions ot fini·te man. 
Secondly, the transcendent must be considered as ultimate, i.e., 
something about which one is ultimately concerned or to which he 
ives a total commitment. 
After distinguishing religious experience from moral, aes-
thetic, and secular experiences the various dimensiom of trans-
endence were explored. These were found to be four: 1?3 1) re 
apective transcendence to the origin, 2) vertical transcendence 
to the top, 3) eschatological transcendence to the end, and 4) 
introspective transcendence to the depth of all things. From 
this we conclude that there are many directions or dimensions of 
the transcendent, but religious experience always involves an 
ltimate commitment to the transcendent,174 of one dimension or 
another. 
l?3There may be other directions or ways to transcend. 
Teilehard De Chardin suggests transcending toward a divine "Cen-
er" in his work~ The Divine Milieu (New York: Harper and Row, 
Publishers, 1957;.---
1?4No attempt has been made here to analyze Ea.stern reli-
gions but there is no reason why these types of transcendence 




THE ROLE OF PROOFS IN DETERMINING 
THE REALITY OF THE TRANSCENDENT 
It has been argued to this point that a religious experience 
is a total commitment to the tran.scendent, 1. e., to that which 
one feels to be beyond himself. This transcendent dimension is 
conceived in different directions (backward, upward, forward, 
and inward), but religious experience always involves transcen-
dence in one direction or another. That is, it always involves 
a commitment to a beyond which it considers to be ultimate. The 
question is this: is there any way to determine whether or not 
the transcendent is really beyond the persons who are experi-
encing it? Is the beyond really beyond religious experience 
with an independent reality of its own? 
This raises the question of proving or disproving the exis-
tence or reality of the transcendent. Traditionally, religious 
thinkers have offered several arguments or 'proofs' in defense 
of the reality of the transcendent or "God." We will only at-
tempt to sketch them here because they are well known to most 
readers. 
Attempts ;!!2 Prove !!!.! Existence £! ~ 
Since the theistic arguments have assumed many forms and 
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have been classified in different ways we will simply organize 
and restate them in what seems to us their basic logical struc-
ture. Talting them topically they are the Cosmological, Teleolog· 
ical, Ontological, and Moral pra:ts tor the existence of God. 
i'he Cosmological Argument1 
Basically this is the argument from ettect to cause or from 
contingency to necenaity or from creation to Creator. The logic 
ot the argument may be stated something like this. The being or 
existence of the world must be either uncaused, self-caused, or 
caused by aDother tor there a.re no other alternatives. But the 
existence ot the world can not be uncaused tor it's existence is 
contingent, i.e., the world exists but need not exist; it does 
not account for its own existence; the world doesn't explain why 
it is when it need not be. Nor on the other hand can the world 
- -
be salt-caused. For to ha.ve its existence caused the world woulc 
first have to be non-existent, and. to cause existence it would 
have to be existent. Theretore, to cause its own existence the 
world would have to be non-existent and existent at the same tim4 
and in the same sense which is impossible. But if the world is 
1A good list or readings on the Cosmological argument may be 
found in Part I of The Coamolo~ical Argp.ments! ed. Donald R. Bur· 
rill (New York: Dou'6!iday anct o., Inc., 1~ J, A very good sum· 
mary or the essence ot the Cosmological argument, not in the a-
bove, is Francis H. Parker's article, "The Realistic Position in 
Religion" found in Reli~ion in Philosoihioal and Cultural Per-
SRective, PP• ?8-113.ore comprenens ve treatments ol the-irgu-
ment are given by E. L. Mascall in He Who Is (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1943). Austin FarrerTS '3jiti and Infinite and R. 
Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence an !tls-witlire (St. Louis: 
Herder Book Co., 2 VOI's.-;-!934 end 193'gj'; ---
r 
150 
neither uncaused nor self-caused, then it must be caused by 
another cause. 
Now this cause of the world cannot be caused by another 
cause which is caused by another cause and so on infinitely, 
since an infinite series of exiatentially dependent causes is 
impossible. For in every infinite series of causes where one 
depends on another for its existence at least one cause must 12,!. 
causing, otherwise there would be no causality in the series. 
But in an infinite series of causes every causes is being caused, 
for that is what is meant by saying that it is an infinite seriei • 
But if every cause is being caused and at least one cause is 
causing, then at least one cause must be both causing its own 
existence and having its existence caused at the same time and 
in the same sense which is a contradiction. Therefore, if there 
cannot be an infinite series of existentially dependent causes 
for the world, then there must be a First, Uncaused Cause of the 
existence of the world. 
The Teleological Argument2 
This is basically the argument from design to Designer or 
from purpose to a Purposer, that is, the argument from final 
causality. Its logical structure is simply this: every design 
2Read1ngs on the Teleological argument may be found in Part 
II of Donald R. Burrill, .Q.12• cit. Complete works on it are not 
so plentiful but A. E. TaYiori-s-Does God Exist? (Toronto: Mac-
millan Company, 1945) contains a goodC!etense of it as does the 
more recent work by Robert E. D. Clark, The Universe: Plan or 
Accident? (Philadelphia: Muhlenburg Press;-1961). ---- --
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has a designer; the world has great design; therefore, the world 
has a Great Designer. That the world is a great design is re-
vealed in Nature where one can see a delicate balance or plant 
and animal life; in the organs of the human body such as the eye 
and ear which are clearly structured for the purpose of seeing 
and hearing; in the very division of the sexes into male and fe-
male which is for the obvious purpose of propagating, etc. In 
brief, the ordered relation and adaptation ot means to ends re-
veals clearly that there must be an Orderer or Adaptor; their 
design shows that there must be a Designer. And since the de-
sign and order of nature goes tar beyond anything the intelli-
gence ot man has contrived, then nature's Designer must be an 
intelligence far beyond man's. 
or course the more sophisticated forms of the Teleological 
argument must handle the possibility that what appears to be a 
great design might be no more than a 'happy accident.• That is, 
the so-called order of nature could be no more than a chance com-
bination of the parts with which it is composed. In view of 
this possibility the Teleological argument takes the following 
logical form. Either the world with all its adaptation of means 
to ends, etc. is the result of design or else it happened by 
chance. It is highly improbable that the world happened by 
chance. Therefore, it is highly probable that the world was de-
signed by an Intelligent Mind. The reason that it is highly un-
likely that the world results from a fortuitous combination of 
events is that the known number of narts at the known rate of 
r 
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development occasions a possibility so remote that believing the 
world happened by pure chance would be like believing that Web-
ater' s unabridged dictionary resulted from an explosion in a 
printing shop. It is possible but highly improbable. 
~he Ontological Argu:ment3 
This is the argument for the necessity of being (or ontos). 
It argues that if a Necessary Being is conceivable then it must 
exist. That is, a Necessary Being must necessarily J!!. (i.e., 
exist), for if it doesn't have to exist necessarily then it is 
not (a) necessapY Being but only a conting~nt being, i.e., one 
that exists but need not exist. 
The classical .formulation of the Ontological argument took 
the following shape. God by definition is that than which no-
thing greater can be conceived, for if one could conceive a grea 
ter then it by definition would be God. But it is greater to 
exist than not to exist, for existence is a better state than 
non-existence. Therefore, God (or that than which nothing grea-
ter can be conceived) must exist, for if be did not exist then 
we could conceive of one greater, viz., one that did exist. But 
God is by definition that than which there is no greater. There·• 
fore, he must exist or else he is not really that than which 
3Readings on the Ontological argumentma.y be found in The 
Ontological Ar~ument, ed. Alvin Platinga (?few York: Doublea:ay 
liichor Books, 96;), or in John Hick's The Mant-~aeed Argument (New York: Macmillan Company, 196?). ~comp e~e statement of 
the ontological argument by Anselm including his dialogue with 
Guanilo may be found in St. Anselm: Basic Writings, trans. S. N. 
Deane (Open Court Pub. CO., !96:2 J. 
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nothing greater can be conceived. 
Although it is not obvious in this classical way of stating 
the argument that there is a hidden implication in the minor 
premise, nevertheless this can be made clear by restating the 
argument as follows. God by definition must possess all perfec-
tions. Existence is a perfection. Therefore, God by definition 
must exist. That is to say, if God can be defined as a being 
which must possess all perfections then he must exist for if he 
didn-' t then he would lack one perfection, viz., existence and 
therefore he would not qualify under the definition to be God. 
The problem with the argument in this form is in showing that 
existence is a perfection. That is, is existence a characteris-
tic or ~eature which some things may or may not have? Is exis-
tence a predicate or attribute which can be attributed to some-
thing the way other characteristics can such as "red" or "tall" 
can be said of things? 
In order to answer this question the Ontological argument 
must contend that if existence is not a perfection at least 
necessary existence is a perfection of a Necessary Being. For 
if a Necessary Being doesn't have to necessarily exist, then it 
is not a Necessary Being. In other words, a Necessary Being 
must necessarily have being; it couldn't just happen to be, 
for then it would not be a Necess!bf Being. 
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The Moral Argument4 
This is the argument from a moral law to a Moral Law-Giver. 
Originally it was not conceived as a proof which was rationally 
necessary but only as a postulate which was morally or practi-
~ally necessary. Eventually, however, it came to have the form 
of a rational argument which goes something like this. Every 
~oral law has a moral law-giver (or legislator). There is a 
~oral law which is independent of men. Therefore. there is a 
Moral Law-Giver who is independent of me~. The first premise is 
taken to be self-evident, for how could something be legislated 
without a legislator? How could it be ruled without a ruler? 
How can there be prescriptions without a prescriber? It is the 
minor premise that needs more explanation. 
How is it known that there is an objective moral law, inde-
pendent of individual men and of the race in general? It must 
be independent of individual men. it is argued, otherwise there 
would be no standard to judge between them. Indeed, there could 
not ever be any real discussion or difference between them on 
moral questions unless there were a moral law beyond them to 
which they could make common appeal. Furthermore, individual 
men feel themselves under the compulsion to do what is right 
4on the Moral argument one can trace the essence of its de-
velopment in the following articles: Immanuel Kant, "God as a 
Postulate of Practical Reason" in The Existence of God, ed. John 
Hick (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964); Hastings Rashdall, 
"The Moral Argument, tt The Existence of God; w. R. Sorley, !'The 
Moral Ar~ent" in Phi!oso~~ ot Rel'Iiii'Oil; ed. George L. Aberne-
thy; C. o. Lewis, MUre Ch; 13.lri u.v, ..: " I, chapters 1-5, and 
Elton Trueblood, PliI!Osonhv or Rel~aion, chapter 8. 
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~ven though this urging from beyond them is sometimes contrary 
to their wishes and instincts. Now unless they are totally de-
ceived at the most serious level of what they consider to be 
their duty (even to the point of paying the supreme sacrifice), 
then there must be beyond thP.m a moral law which is in some sense 
binding on them. And what is true of the individual ls true of 
the race as a. whole. That is, not only individuals but the race 
as a whole experiences a moral prescription from beyond them to 
which standard their desires and. conduct does r.ot always eon.form. 
Indeed, there could be no such thing as progress of the race ~s 
a whole unless there were an objective moral law which is beyond 
the race as a whole aud by which the race could be judged to be 
d.oing "better" or "worse." But if there is an objective moral 
law beyond all men, then there must be a ~oral Law-Giver beyond 
mankind. 
Of course not all theists hold to the validity of all of 
these arguments nor do they all feel that the arguments really 
logically and demonstrably prove the existence of God. Some the-
ists, however, have held that at lea-st one or more of these argu-
ments do indeed prove the existence of God, and most theists 
Bive at lea.st some weight to the arguments. But in any event thE 
modern response to theistic proofs has been less optimistic and 
less enthusiastic. It will be necessary to examine the reactions 
to proofs for the reality of any kind of transcendent object of 
religious experience and even some attempted disproofs of the 
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same before we can properly address the question as to whether or 
1not there :Ls any wo,..7 to test the alleged reality of the object of 
~eligious experience. 
r1odern Attitude !.2!!~ Proofs !2£ Religious Realit;y 
The prevailing modern attitude toward proving the existence 
of God or the transcendent has been uniformly sc&ptical if not 
negative. There are a number of reasons for thi~. Peter Koes-
tenbaum succinctly SUllllllarized some of the basic reasons when he 
wrote, 11 ••• the arguments &.re logically invalid, epistemologi-
cally defective, and axiologically niisplaced."5 To these we may 
add a few more reactions that have come from modern thought in 
response to proofs for God. 
Proof a are Psychologically Unconvincing 
Rational proofs for God or the transcendent are generally 
unpersuasive to outsiders. As Martin Marty noted, "Apologists 
know ·that proof is convincing only when people are already pre-
disposed to believe."6 Novak points out that the most persua-
sive force for religion "• • • is not rational theology but mys-
tical theology, not the principle of objectivity but of subjec-
tivity, not the clear ••• arguments of Aquinas but the record 
of the tormEmted inner experience of Augustine, Pascal, Kierke-
gaard, which a.re found most appea.ling."7 'file reason for this, 
5Peter Koestenbau.m, "Religion in the Tradition of Phenomen-
ologyn in Religion ,!E; Philosophical 3!llii Cultural Perspee~, 178 
6ttartin Harty, Varieties E.!_ Unbelief, p. 209. 
?Michael Novak, Belief !!!'!!!Unbelief, p. 105. 
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William James suggested, is that human needs go deeper than the 
rational. In tact, the rational nature or man is impressed with 
arguments only arter his feelings have been impressed. That is, 
experience is more convincing than logic because the rational 
nature of man is at best secondary as compared to his private, 
inner lite.8 In other words, a man often finds reasons for some· 
thing because he already believed it; he doesn't usually believe 
it because he already has reasons for it. Psychological persua-
sion precedes rational demonstration. 
One of the reasons proofs are psychologically unconvincing 
is that they tend to be academic and formal; they often do not 
touch men where they live. As John Dewey observed, "The cause 
of the dissatisfaction is • • • that they are too formal to ot-
ter any support to religion in action."9 Tb.at is, a rational 
proof does not meet man's existential needs. Rational proofs 
like the mathematic proofs are •cold' and do not call for a com-
mitment of the whole man. As !an Ramsey pointed out "There are 
no placard-bearers in mathematical departments with legends like 
'There'll always be a Euclid,' or 'Prepare to meet they Riemann 
today.'"lO Likewise, there is little tendency tor most moderns 
to join the cause to an "Uncaused Cause" or to be deeply moved 
by an "Unmoved Mover." In brief, even it rational ttproots" tor 
8william James. la! Varieties g!_ Religious Experience, pp. 
?2, ?3. 
9John Dewey, ! Common Faith, p. 11. 
101an Ramsey, Religious Language, P• 37. 
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the transcendent were valid, they seem not to be vital; they 
seem too speculative to mean much for man's practical life. And 
to contend that theistic arguments can prove God but not per-
suade men of it does not seem to impress many moderns. For what 
value is it to have been rationally driven to the theistic water 
from which one does not desire to drink? 
Proots are Logically Invalid 
But not only are theistic proof a psychologically unpersua-
sive to the modern mind, they are also widely considered to be 
logically invalid. As Kaufmann argued, "Can we prove God's ex-
istence with a valid argument in which God does not appear in 
any of the premises?" For "Clearly, it God does not appear in 
any of the premises, he will not appear in the conclusion either 
if he did, the argument would have to be invalid."11 That is, 
logically, the conclusion can be no broader than the premises. 
If one begins with God in the premises, he has already begged 
the question. And if one does not begin with God in the pre-
mises, there is no logically valid way to come up with God in 
the conclusion, Kaufmann urges. 
Tb.is same objection may be put in another way. It is some-
times argued that: Every finite thing is caused; The world is 
finite; Therefore, the world has a oause.12 But in this form ot 
11walter Kaufmann, Critique g! Religion ~ ~losoph;y, p. 
169. 
12Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function 
in the Metaphysics of Dun-S-Scotus (New !ork:-pr'ano!scan Insti-
tute--gt. Boniventure; !9~~), p. 44. 
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the argument the word 0 cause" in the conclusion seems to have a 
different (broader) meaning than it has in the premise. For in 
the premise it means finite cause and in the conclusion it is 
supposed to mean an infinite Cause (viz., God). From a logical 
standpoint this seems to be a "Four-term" fallacy. 
Another way o! saying that the arguments for God are invalid 
is to follow David Hume who contended that "Whatever we conceive 
as existent, we can also conceive as nonexistent. There is no 
being, therefore, whose nonexistence implies a contradiction. 
"l' Consequently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable. ·~ 
That is, to conclude the existence of God is not rationally ines-
~apable since it is also logically possible to posit theq>posite 
~f whatever is said to exist. This argument is directed particu-
larly at the Ontological argument which Kant found to be at the 
basis of all the other proofs for God. 
For no argument, Kant argued, can conclude that God neces-
~arily exists, unless it demonstrates that God is a Necessary 
~eing. "But experience oan only show us that one state of things 
often or at most commonly follows another, and therefore affords 
neither universality nor neoeasity.n14 So the only non-experien-
tial argument which could possibly show that the existence of God 
is necessary is the argument for a Necessary Being, i.e., the 
The 
l3David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, part 
14Kant, Prolegomena to !BZ Future Metaphzsics (New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill o., !nC:, 1950), p. 62. 
IX. 
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tological argument. This argument, however, is not rationally 
since it is not contradictory to reject it. For, as 
t stated itt "fo posit a triangle, and to reject its three 
ngles. is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in 
ejecting the triangle together with its three angles. 015 
Proofs are Epistemologically Defective 
Closely associated with the criticism that the proofs for 
are logically invalid is another criticism which has been 
idely echoed since Kant's time. It is the charge that the prcof's 
re epistemologically detective. In Kant's words, "Through con-
epts alone, it is quite impossible to advance to the discovery 
t new objects and supernatural beings [as in the ontological 
rgum.entJ; and it is useless to appeal to experience, which in 
11 cases yields only appearanoes. 1116 That is, all that one can 
ow is the Rhenomena (thing-for-me) and not the noumenon (thing-
Kant did not deny that there is a reality behind 
ppearanee but he is saying that "• •• we know not this thing 
in itself but only know its appearances, namely, the way 
our senses are affected by this unknown something."l? 
e of the arguments Kant used to support this position is that 
the objects of the world of sense are taken for things in 
hemselves • • • contradiction would be unavoidable. 018 
15Ka.nt, ~ Critigue .2! E.!!!! Reason, p. 502. 
16 Ibid., p. 530. 
-
l?Kant, Prolegomena, pp. 60, 62. 
18 Ibid., P• 91. 
!hat is, 
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~n the assumption that we know the noumenon and not merely the 
'henomena the human reason eventuates in inexorable contradic-
~ions or antinomies. 19 
There are other very basic reasons why Kant concludes that 
~ur knowledge is limited to appearances which may be summarized 
~a follows: all knowledge be5ins with experience but does not 
arise from experience. There are certain necessary a priori eon-
ai tions for experience which make experience possible. These 
•:rorms"of sensation (like Time and Space) and "categories" of un-
lerstanding (like Unity, Causality, Necessity) provide the struc-
~re of sensation and knowledge while experience provides the 
~ontent or "stuff"; experience provides the data and the mind the 
letermination of our knowledge. Therefore, all that one knows 
Ls what the thing is to him (phenomena) as the mind has formed 
pr determined it and not what it is in itself (noumenon) indepen-
iently of this. 20 
In brief, Kant is arguing that knowledge is constructive of 
reality and not intuitive. 21 He is saying that one can not know 
~he way things really are but only the way the mind constructs 
~hem. If this be the case, then all attempts to prove the exis-
tence of God would find themselves incapable of building any 
~ational bridge across the chasm that separates the way things 
l9see Kant, 1!1£ Critigue .2! ~ Reason, pp. 396 f. 
20
see ~·•pp. 65, 175, and Prolegomena, PP• 42-?4. 
210n this point see F. II. Parker, "Traditional Rea.son and 
~odern Reason" in Paith ~ Philosopgy, pp. 40, 41. 
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ppear and the way they really are. 
Proofs Are Axiologically Misplaced 
Even though Kant gave up any rational proof a for the exis-
ot God he did say that it is morally necessary to posit 
This shift from what is rationally necessary to what is 
....,...-.-........ required signals another shift in the modern attitude 
rational proofs for the existence of God. Kant argued, 
.g., that moral duty demands that men seek the highest good (the 
ummum bonum) which is the union of virtue and happiness. But 
his is not possible in this life since doing one's duty does not 
lways bring him the maximum or happiness. "Thus God and a fut 
are two postulates which, according to the principles of 
reason, are inseparable from the obligations which that same 
imposes upon us."22 Kant felt that by connecting God 
man's concrete moral values rather than his abstract rea-
on that a man would have a more valuable orientation for his 
eligious convictions. This is why Kant could say, "I inevitably 
the existence of God and I am certain that nothing can 
belief, since my moral principles would thereby be 
hemselves overthrown, and I cannot disclaim them without becom-
abhorent in my own eyes."23 
Not all modern religious thinkers agree with Kant about the 
to posit God in order to secure the fulfillment of man's 
22Kant, ~ Critigue £!. ~ Reason, p. 639. 
23 Ibid., p. 650. 
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~oral duty. However many have followed Kant's basic axiological 
~rientation by relating their religion to man's basic moral val-
ues. And in view of this the value of rational proofs is seen to 
be secondary at best. James, e.g., contended that modern man 
wants to know what will be the "cash value" of religion in their 
lives and world. 24 s;ren Kierkegaard took a more radical posi-
tion arguing that it is folly even to attempt to prove the exis-
tence of God. 25 Michael Novak's view is not quite so extreme but 
Lt too reflects this same axiological reorientation toward proofs. 
"A .formal argument for the existence of God is not of much use 
Ln the life of one who is trying to decide between belief and un-
oelief." For "• •• there are many layers ot point of view, in-
~uiry, and new horizons to come through before one can under-
stand the formal argument. 1126 That is, there may be a secondary 
~or tertiary) role or value for a formal rationalization o! one's 
experience of God. But to consider a rational proof to be the 
prime basis for one's religious experience is a misplacement of 
!Values. 
Proofs Are Ontologically Inadequate 
There is another more sophisticated critique of theistic 
proofs which grows out of most of the previous criticisms. It 
argues that even if one could devise a rational proof tor God it 
24James, 1h! Varieties 21. Religious Experience, pp. 433,435. 
25x:1erkegaard, Philosophical Fra~ents, trans. David F. 
Swenson (Princeton: Princeton Unlvers y Press, 1936), p. 31. 
26Novak, Belief and Unbelief, p. 130. 
-
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would not necessarily follow that he really existed. It argues 
that even if it were rationally necessary to conclude that there 
is a God it does not follow from this that God really exists. 
For there is always the possibility that the rationally inescap-
able is not real. Perhaps the way men must think is not in the 
final analysis the way things really .!!!:!• 
The basis 0£ this reaction to theistic proofs is traceable 
to Kant's contention that men must act and think as if there is 
--
a God. On one interpretation of thia it could be argued that Goe 
does not really exist but it is necessary to think that he does 
in order to have unity in one's thoughts. 27 Whether or not 
Kant actually took this position is not our purpose to determine 
here. It ia at least a Rrima facie possibility that a theistic 
proof could be logically valid even if there were no God. Norman 
Malcolm offered an Ontological proof' for God but said, "I can 
imagine an atheist going through the argument becoming convinced 
of its validity, acutely defending it against objections, yet re-
maining an atheist. • • • 
But just how can something be rationally inescapable without 
27Kant never denied that there was a noumenal reality; he 
denied only that one coul<r1.0iow what it was, Critigue 0£ Pure 
Reason, pp. 264-275. He even asserted that "'11'.e categoriear-im-
peratlve leads directly to God, yes, serves as a pledge of His 
reality," from Kant's~ Postwnum quoted by'?. M. Greene in 
"Introduction" to Religion '\J'ithin the Limits of Reason Alone, 
trans. Theodore Greene and Hoyt H.-iriidson (NeW-York: Harper and 
Row, Publishers, 1934), p. lxvi. 
28Norman Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Argument•• in ~ 
Existence of God, p. 6?. 
--
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being ontologically so, one may ask. Those who object that the 
theistic arguments do not really prove God exists could argue in 
the following way. In order to defend that the rationally ines-
capable is real the theist would have to :prove that the principle 
of non-contradiction, which is at the basis ot all rational argu-
~ents, is necessarily true of reality. But the traditional de-
fense of this principle is that it cannot be denied without af-
firming it, therefore, it must be so. 29 For one must assume that 
the very statement (or thought) by which he denies the principle 
of non-contradiction is itself non-contradictory, otherwise the 
very denial is meaningless. But all this really proves is that 
the principle of non-contradiction is inescapable; it does not 
prove that it is true of reality. That is, for one to say that 
it is unavoidable is not the same as affirming that it is ontolo-
gically so. For even though one cannot affirm it to be false, 
he can believe it to be false. Furthermore, the argument goes, 
even though it cannot be demonstrated to be false, it might still 
be false.30 
Arguing in this same vein, a. I. Lewis suggests "• •• if 
we should be forced to realize that nothing in our experience 
possesses any stability ••• that denouncement would rock our 
world to its foundations," and "• • • yet such a world-shaking 
29see Aristotle, Metap11ysics IV, c. 4, 1006a, Basic Works £1, 
Aristotle, ed. Richard Mckeon (New Yori: Random House, 1941). 
30F. H. Parker, "The Realistic Postion in Religion" in !!!!!-
gion !a Philosophical ~ Cultural Perspective, pp. 86 t. 
-----------------------~---~---
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event is still quite possible • • • simply because, on this view, 
not even the law of non-contradiction is necessarily true of the 
real world."3l 
Now in like manner one could argue that a proof for God 
could be rationally inescapable without necessitating the con-
clusion that God truly exists. That is, one could contend that 
all that the proof does at best is to show that one can not thinl! 
consistently without logically implying that there is a God, but 
it does not follow from this that God really exists. All that 
would follow necessarily is that one can not think in an;y ration-
al way which would not logically imply positing God. That is, 
one must think as if there were a God because there is no other 
--
consistent way to think, but this does not mean that there really 
is a God. 
-
Attempts !2 Disprove ~ Realitz .2f ~ 
However, not all modern reactions to religious proofs are 
content to point out the inadequacies of these proofs, some have 
gone so far as to suggest that they can disprove the reality of 
God or the transcendent. If they can establish their case then 
it will be unnecessary to ~o any further in an attempt to discov-
er criteria for testing the alleged reality of the transcendent. 
Hence, it is necessary to examine these disproofs first. 
3lc. I. Lawis, Mind and the World Order (New York: Charles 
Scribner's, 1929), p:-;t}6;-- ---
l 
The Difference between 'Disbelief' and Disproof 
Actually there have not been many disproofs for the exis-
God offered in the history of thought. Most serious 
have been content to disbelieve (on probability grounds) 
ather than attempting to disprove (•'on logfo&lly c ertaHt bases) tha 
God. Bertrand Russell, for example, said, 0 I'm not 
ontending in a dogmatic way that there is not a God. What I'm 
ontending is that we don't k.ilow that there is.u32 Likewise Sig-
Freud's Future .2! !!! Illusion is not an attempt to disprove 
d, however much doubt he succeeds in casting on God's existence 
eud clearly admits that there may be a God and that his posi-
ion against religion may be wrong.33 And even those who tend to 
isbelieve in God because of the problem of evil do not usually 
ormulate it as a disproof of God's existence but of his infinite 
ower or love.34 
Several Disproofs Discussed. 
However, those who wish to contend seriously on behalf of 
reality of God can take little consolation in the fact that 
any unbelievers don't try to disprove God until they have first 
the other unbelievers who ll!!! attempted to demonstrate 
no God. 
32Bertrand Russell, "A Debate on the Existence of God,"~ 
istenoe of God, p. 180. 
--
33:rreud, The Future of an Illusion, P• 87. 
--- -- --- ----~~ 
34 John Stuart Mill, "The Problem of Evil,"~ Existence ,2! 
pp. 119-120. 
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Feuerbach's Epistemological Disproof .2f ~.--Ludwig Feuer-
bach is an example of someone who seems to attempt a disproof of 
God. For him God was "nothing but" a projection of human imagin-
ation. The reason God can be "nothing morett than man, said 
Fauerbach, is that a man's understanding can go no farther than 
his nature. If man understands the infinite then he must be in-
finite. In Feuerbach's own words, "• •• in the consciousness 
of the infinite, the conscious subject has tor his object the 
infinity of his own nature." A man's understanding is limited to 
is nature, for "• •• so far as thy nature extends, so far rea-
hes thy unlimited self-consciousness, so far art thou God." 
or example~ if a man can feel the infinite, then he must be in-
ini te, for ''How coulds • t thou perceive the di vine by feeling, if 
eeling were not divine in its nature?" And if a man can think 
he infinite, his thought must be infinite, for "The object of 
intellect is the intellect objective to itself." In brief, 
reason there is no God beyond man is that "Man cannot get be-
ond his true nature"; he can never get loose from his own spe-
lt "The object of any subject is nothing else than the 
ubject's own nature taken objectively,'' then it would follow 
there is no reality beyond man.35 
35Jeuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, PP• 3, 8, 9, 11, 
Feuerbach app!iis £fie same-logic to every other faculty of 
an saying, "But feeling has here been adduced only as an example 
t is the same with every other power, faculty, potentiality, 
eality, activity--the name is indifferent--which is defined as 
he essential organ of any object. Whatever is a subjective ex-
ression of a nature is simultaneously also its objective expres-
ion," Ibid., p. 11. 
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The crux of Feuerbach's argument seems to rest on the follow-
ing affirmation: 11 ! cannot know whether God is something else in 
himself or for himself than he is tor me; what he is to me is 
to me all that he is." Man cannot take "• • • a point of view 
above himself, i.e., above his nature, the absolute measure of 
his being." For "I can make the distinction between the object 
as it is in itself, and the object aa it is for me, only where 
an object can really appear otherwise to me •••• " That is, 
"The measure of the species is the absolute measure, law, and cri-
terion of man."36 
Now whatever this argument does it certainly does not prove 
that there cannot be a God beyond man but only (at best) that 
-
one cannot get at any thing apart from his thoughts about it. 
But it; certainly is not an unintelligible position to hold as 
Kant did that there really was a noumenal "thing-in-itself" even 
if one could only think the phenomenal "thing-for-me. 0 3? That 
is, all Feuerbach's argument shows (at best) is that one can't 
think about God apart from his thoughts; it does not show that 
God cam1ot exist apart from one's thoughts. 
Furthermore, Feuerbach's disproof of God rests on the prem-
ise that one cannot !!12:! an infinito without being an infinite, 
etc. But surely he does not prove this point. That is, he does 
not show that it is absolutely impossible that a finite could 
36Feuerbach, Essence £! Christianitl, p. 16. 
3?Kant, Critigue .2! ~ Reason, PP• 265-2?0. 
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know the infinite. Indeed, he admits a distinction between the 
finite individual man and his infinite species, holding only the 
latter to be God.38 And if there is a difference between man in 
particular and man in general (i.e., mankind), then there is no 
reason why one could not make a similar distinction between fin-
ite man and an infinite God. And if individual man can know man 
in general (i.e., mankind) which goes beyond his individual, 
finite limits, then there seems to be no reason why a finite man 
can't know an infinite God which goes beyond the limits of the 
individual finite man. But in any event, it does not follow to 
argue that all that God is 1£ me is all that God really .!.:!• 
There is also the possibility that God exists beyond my thoughts; 
he could~ even apart from being thought by men. In brief, this 
is to say, the possibility exists that there can ~ a God beyond 
his being thought by us, even if we could not think of him apart 
from our thought. 
!a Attempted Ontological .Q!sproof £1, ~.--Now when the 
problem is stated in this form, it becomes clear that the attempt 
to disprove God, as Kant said of the attempt to prove God, has an 
ontological premise in it. It is a kind of ontological disproof 
of God. 
J. N. Findlay attempted to defend such an ontological dis-
proof of God. He argued, e.g., that (1) "• •• the Divine :Exis-
tence can only be conceived, in a religiously satisfactory manner 
38Feuerbach, Essence of Christianity, p. 7. 
l?O 
if we also conceive it as something inescapable and necessary, 
whether for thought or reality. 0 And (2) from this "• •• it 
follows that our modern denial of necessity or rational evidence 
for such an existence amounts to a demonstration that there can-
not be a God."39 That is to say, if God must be a Necessary 
Existence and if no necessity is possible with regard to exis-
tence, then it would follow that God cannot exist at all. For 
God cannot exist in a non-necessary (i.e., contingent) way and 
still be God. And nothing can have a necessary existence, for 
no existential propositions are necessary. 
In support of the first premise he argues that "The true ob-
ject of religious reverence must not be, merely, that to which 
no actual independent realities stand opposed: it must be one to 
which such opposition is totally inconceivable." Furthermore, 
"• •• not only must the existence of other things be unthinkable 
~ithout him, but his own non-existence must be wholly unthinkable 
in any circumstances.ti It is not possible to view God as one who 
just happened to exist (but not necessarily) or to be wise, power~ 
f'ul, etc. "An object of this sort would doubtless deserve re-
spect and admiration, and other quasi-religious attitudes, but 
it would not deserve the utter self-abandonment peculiar to the 
religious frame of mind." That is to say, such a being would de-
serve a quasi-religious respect but not full religious reverence. 
39J. N. Findlay, "Can God's Existence be Disproved'!" New Es-
says in Philosophical Theolof!', ed. Antony Plew and Alasdatr'9Mac-
intyre-(tonaon: scM Press L~ ., 1955), p. 48. 
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In fact, said Findlay, "• •• it would be idolatrous to worship 
it ... 40 
Now in support of the second premise Findlay argues "Plainly. 
(for all who share a contemporary outlook) they entail not only 
that there isn't a God, but that the Divine Existence is either 
senseless or impossible." This is so, he argues, because on a 
"• •• modern view ot the matter, necessity in propositions mere-
ly reflects our use of words, the arbitrary convention of lan-
guage." On such a view, ". • • the Divine Existence could only 
be a necessary matter if we had made up our minds to speak theis-
tically whatever ~ empirical circumstances might ~ .2!!! !2, 
~. 1141 But this would be no more than a predisposition to view 
things in a given way or what R. M. Hare called a "blik. 1142 Tb.is 
~ be sufficient for a purely theoretical view of God, "But it 
wouldn't suffice for the full-blooded worshiper ••• " who de-
sires the Divine Existence both to have that inescapable charac-
ter which can, on modern views, "• •• only be found where truth 
reflects an arbitrary convention, and also the character of "mak-
ing a real difference' which is only possible where truth doesn't 
have this merely linguistic basis."43 But if God must be con-
40 ~·• PP• 52-53. 
"-
1 Ibid •• pp. 48, 52, 53, 54. 
42a. M.Hare, "i'b.eology and Falsi.f'ication," New Essys, pp. 
99-102. A 'blik' is an unverifiable, pre-cognitive disposition 
to view things from a certain chosen perspective. 
43.rindlay, "Can God's Existence be Disproved?" PP• 54, 55. 
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ceived us necessarily existing and if necessary existence is im-
possible, then God cannot exist, for the only way he can exist is 
necessarily. And on a contemporary view of language no statement~ 
which have to do with existence can be necessary. 
Now as Malcolm pointed out, this ontological disproof of 
God seems to stand or fall on the premise that every existential 
proposition must be contingent. But, replied Malcolm, "••• the 
view that logical necessity merely reflects the use of words can-
not possibly have the implication that every existential propo-
sition must be contingent ... All that view requires of us is 
"• •• to !.2.2k ,!1 the use of words and not manufacture a priori 
theses about them."44 Tb.at is, we must not legislate the mean-
ing of language but listen to it; we must not dictate what all 
propositions ~ mean but try to discover what they ~ mean. 
As Wittgenstein said, "This language game!! playedtu45 In fact, 
it seems possible to offer an example of necessary existential 
propositions. "I am I" is both necessarily and existentially 
true, argued Ramsey.46 
But even if no necessary existential propositions could be 
produced from the level of contingent beings it does not follow 
that this also applies to a Necessary Being. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely the point ot the Ontological argument that a Necessary 
44Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Argument," PP• 61, 62. 
45wittgenstein, Philosophical Investi5ations, sect. 654. 
46Ramsey, Religious Langqage, p. 46. 
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Being iR a special case or even the unique case where existence 
mu.qt be attributed to it necessarily, otherwise it would not be 
a Necessary Being. 
Or to put it another way, is one able to deny absolutely the 
pqssibility of Necessary Existence without making an existential-
ly necessary assertion? For it would seem that the proposition 
"It is impossible that ~ Necessary Being exists" is meant to be 
more than an arbitrary use of. symbols; it is meant reallz (not 
just arbitrarily or symbolical1.y) to deny the existence of God. 
If it is meant as an actual demonstrative denial of God's exis-
tence, then it would have to be both necessary and existential 
itself. But if it is an existentially necessary proposition it-
self, then can it be used to prove that there are no existential-
ly necessary propositions? And if it is not meant to be either 
an existential or a necessary proposition, then it either doesn't 
actually deny the possibility of God's existence or it doesn't 
really prove its position demonstratively. In brief, the onto-
logical disproof is subject to the same criticisms to which the 
ontological proof is subject. If one can't move from thought to 
existence to demonstrate God, then neither can one do it to deny 
God. 
Sartre's Existential Disproofs .2!. Q2g.--There are two basic 
grounds on which Sartre rejects the reality of God: 4? One, that 
religious phenomena can be explained non-supernaturally the way 
4?see Hazel E. Barnes in "Translator's Introduction" to 
Sartre's Being !B!! Nothingness, p. x:xxv. 
1?4 
Freud does, and, two, that there are absurdities involved in be-
lieving in God. 48 We are concerned here with the latter because 
only these wo~ld amount to a disproof of God if valid. Sartre's 
latter arguments against God focus on three areas: 1) the idea 
ot God as self-caused is contradictory; 2) The idea of God as 
creator is incompatible with human freedom; 3) God can't trans-
cend the totality of things. 49 
(1) Let us begin with the idea of God as contradictory. Why 
is the concept of God as causa .fil!!. (self-caused) absurd? Because 
tor God to cause himself he would have to stand at a distance 
from himself. But if God can do this, then his existence is con-
tingent or dependent. But if he is contingent or dependent, he 
cannot be God. Therefore, there is no God. Or to put the argu-
ment in classical terminology, God can't be self-caused, for to 
cause being one must be, and to be caused one must not be. 
Therefore, a self-caused being would both be and not be at the 
same time and in the same sense which is contradictory. So God 
as ens causa sui is impossible.50 
- -
In reply to this alleged disproof of God it should be poin-
ted out that God as a self-caused Being is contradictory, but God 
- -
as an un-caused Being is not. That is, there is another Dossibil~ 
-




50sartre, Being !!!.9. Nothingness, pp. 694, ?54, ?62, ?66. 
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be caused or else it would not be absolutely necessary. And a 
Iiecessal."'y Being can not be self-ca.used for thi;:; is a cor..tradie-
tion. But Sartre does not consider the possibility that a Neces-
sary Being may be ,Y!lCaused. Indeed had he borrowed a premise 
from one of his own objections to the Cosmological argument he 
could have seen that the notion of an uncaused being is not con-
tradictory. For Sartre argued that finite being does not need an 
explanation; it is "given" or "gratuitous." finite being is just 
"there" and, hence, it does not need God to explain why it is 
there. He wrote, "Being is without reason, without cause, and 
without necei:;sity." And he admitted that "This is equivalent to 
saying that being is uncreated ... 51 
Now if bAing can just be there without any explanation, then 
this amounts to saying that it is uncaused. And if it is not im-
possible for finite being to be uncaused, then surely there is no 
reason why an infinite Being can not be uncaused. At least 
Sartre has not given here any demonstrable proof that God can not 
be conceived without contradiction to be an uncaused being. At 
best, Sartre• s argument would. eliminate the pos3ibility of God 
being a self-caused being.52 
-
5l!bid., p. 758· Barnes, "'l'ranslator•s Introduction," Beipg ~ Notliiiiin.ess, p. ixxv11. 
520ne of the problems here is semantical. Philosophers like 
Spinoza and Descartes have spoken or God as self-caused but have 
really meant uncaused. That is, they do not take self-caused in 
the sense of causing one's own existence but in the sense of be-
ing completely self-sufficient and not dependent on another. 
What Sartre does with this way of conceiving God shows how nnfor-
tunate it is for theists to describe God as a self-caused Being. 
1?6 
(2) Another disproof c£ God offered by Sartre is that human 
freedom is incompatible with God. summarizing Sartre's argument, 
either a man is free and does not derive his meaning from God, 
or he is dependent on God and not tree.53 That is, either man 
creates his own meaning or else God creates man•s meaning. A 
man is either self-determined or determined by God. Both are im-
possible. 
In direct opposition to Freud who contended that man is sub-
consciously determined Sartre argued that man is consciously de-
termined. 54 Man is always free to say "no. ,.55 And even "Not to 
choose is, in tact, to choose not to choose."56 Freedom for 
Sartre did not mean what it meant for Leibniz, viz., that God 
made man's essence and left the man to act freely within this 
structure. According to Sartre, if God had given an essence to 
man this would predetermine all his future acts.5? .Even if God 
has determined the end of a man's life man is not free, accordins 
to Sartre. For if God has determined the time a man's life will 
end, then the man can not be responsible for making his life what 
it will have been.58 
53:earnes, "Translator's Introduction," Being~ Nothinsmess 
p. xxxv. 
54Tb.is is the main thrust of Sartre's Existential Psychoana-
lysis, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (Chicago: Henry Regnery Oo., 1953), 
e?. pp. 46-59. 
55cf. Sartre, Beins ~ Nothingness, p. 529 t. 
56sartre, Being ~ Nothinggess, p. 589. 
57Ibid., pp. 5?3 t. 
-58Ibid., p. 659. 
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In brief, man is fundamentally and radically free. He cre-
ates his own meaning. He is responsilJle for his own life, .Man 
is condemned to freedom; he cannot escape it. And since ma.n is 
fundamentally responsible for his own meaning and life, then 
there cannot be a God who gives meaning to man's life. Either 
God gives meaning to man's life or man gives meaning to his own 
life. Me.n gives meaning to his own life. Therefore, there is 
no God. 
Whatever else Sartre's argument does, it obviously does not 
disprove God. If human freedom were absolute in a positive sense, 
this would disprove God. But if a man's freedom were absolute in 
a positive sense it would also disprove that there were any other 
~en. For it is not possible for any more than one being to have 
freedom in a positive and absolute sense. However, freedom as 
negation is possible for many beings. That is, one can have the 
ability to say "no" even though one is forced to ~ the opposite 
he wishes to do. A good example of this is Sartre's contention 
that the French were never so free as when the Germans occupied 
!'ranee. Obviously he doesn't mean that this was the positive de-
sire or choice of the French, but that the French were free not 
to "accept 0 the Germans whose forceable occupation was neverthe-
less "there." In fact, for Sartre "'To be free• does not mean 
'to obtain what one has wished' but rather 'by oneself to deter• 
mine oneself to wish.'"59 If this is so, then however morally or 
59Hazel E. Barnes, "Key to Special Terminology," Sartre's 
Bein~ ~ Nothingn.ess, p. 3?0. 
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existontially distasteful it may be to think that God has in some 
way limited one's freedom or independence, it certainly is not 
logically contradictory. 
Furthermore, Sartre by no means Rroves that man ia as free 
au he thinks. It is philosophically possible that man is not 
free at all in the sense of doing other than what is predeter-
mined. For it is not philosophically contradictory to hold that 
events are both determined and freely chosen, i.e., that the free 
choice was part of the predetermination. It may be existentially 
disconcerting for one to discover that his creative powers are 
not a~solutely original, that he is willing only as God wills, 
but it is certainly not logically impossible. That is, it is 
possible that there is a God who in some way is the ultimate 
source and circumscription of our freedom, whether this is the 
way we desire it to be or not. No amount of existential or ex-
periential reaction to divine intrusion into one's life can rule 
out the logical possibility that there just may be a God anyway. 
It is just as much an illusion to conclude that there is no God 
ecause one doesn't want an invasion of his independence and 
creativity as to conclude that there is a God because one wishes 
to have a cosmic comforter. 
(3) Sartre's third disproof of God is really more serious. 
He contends that it is impossible !or God to transcend the total-
ity of consciousness. ..For if God is consciousness, he is inte-
grated in the totality .. and does not really transcend it. ..And 
1?9 
if by his nature, he is a being beyond ~nsciO'!!!!,._f!...SJ! (that is, an 
"in-itself" which would be its own foundation) still the totality 
can appear to him only as object or as subject," neither of which 
is possible. That is, if God has no consciousness, then he can 
not be conscious of any totality either as a subject or as an ob-
ject. "Thus no point or view on the totality is conceivable; 
the totality has no 'outside,' and the very question of the mean-
ing of the 'underside' is stripped of meaninp;."60 
Since we have already spoken to the issue of how it is mean-
ingful to speak about a beyond or transcendent,61 we will speak 
only directly to Sartre's problem here. Of course it is meaning-
less to speak of God as being beyond the whole in any strictly 
literal sense of the word. But it is not meaningless to speak or 
God as more th.an the whole the way unity is more than the parts 
of a thing or the way depth of experience is beyond the factors 
~hich comprise it. In like manner it is possible that God may be 
beyond or more than our limited consciousness in the sense that 
he!! consciousness while we only .h!!! consciousness. 62 
60aartre, Being ~ Nothingness, P• 370. 
61see the last p~rt of Chapter One. 
62Koestenbaum distinguishes the "empirical ego" (the one per-
~eived) trom the "transcendental ego" (the one perceiving). And 
he argue£ that the "transcendental ego" should be identified 'VV'ith 
God because l) It is experienced as the source of all conscious-
iness; 2) As always the came; 3) As unthinkable 138 to its non-ex-
istence; 4) As existing of its own necessity; 5) As external to 
the time-space world; 6) As the Unity in the nexus of intersub-jectivity; ?) As the subjective center of all consciousness; 8) 
As contentless consciousness or the pure subject; and 9) As com-
plete freedom. Now in view of this, said Koestenbaum, even 
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In other words, i·t is l?ossible for God to be consciousness 
and yet be beyond OlL"'." consciousness 1'11 thout contradiction. For 
the very theoretical or ideal existence of a transcendental ego 
reveals that it is not im;eossible to speak of a transcondcnt con-
sciousness. In brief, Sartre's disproof of God does not .follow, 
for it is possible that there is an ultimate subject or center of 
consciousness which goes beyond our limited conscious:mess. It is 
tpossible that there a.re different levels of consciousness. That 
is, there is no reason why man can not he conscious of something 
w:i:Ii.le at the sru~e time be conscious that this something trans-
cends his consciousness of it. This seems to be the case of 
one's consciousness of his own self. That is, an individual 
seem.a to be aware ~hat there is more to himself than he is con-
scious of in any given state of consciou~ness. Likewise, when 
one is conscious of another person he seems to be aware that his 
!Consciousness of that person does not exhaust the porsonality of 
!that person. So, there seems to be no reason why one can not bA 
~onscious of' a being like God which transcends his consciousness. 
'l'he Status of Disproofs ot God 
To summarize, we have found no valid disproofs of the real-
ity of' God or the transcendent. All admit of some possible al-
ternative; none show that it is logically inpossible that there 
is a transcendent reality. Indeed, it would appear to be an 
though Kant and Husserl did not identify the transcendental ego 
with God, its characteristics lend themselves naturally to this 
identification. See Peter Koestenbaum, "Religion in the Tradi-
tion of Phenomenology," pp. 1R5, 186. 
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impossible task to absolutely disprove the reality of God. One 
would have to possess absolute knowledge in order to be absolute-
ly certain there was no possibility of a God. In brief, he would 
nave to be God in order to disprove God. 
But it must be remembered that for many modern thinkers nei-
ther is it possible to prove the reality of the transcendent. 
Does this mean that we have reached a stalemate of proof and dis-
proof? Is this the best that one can conclude, viz., that the 
reality of the transcendent is possible but not provable or dis-
provable? Are there no ways to test the reality basis tor reli-
sious experience? This situation calls for a reassessment of the 
role of argumentation in religion. 
I!!,! !!21! .2! Reason !!! Determining ~ Realitl 
ot the !ranscendent 
-- --- ....................................... ....... 
From the position that proofs are not possible it by no· 
•eans follows that reason has no role nor that adequate criteria 
are not available nor necessary. Religion, too, is subject to 
error and illusion. As even ardent defenders of the reality of 
the transcendent will sometimes admit, "It is hard to rid our 
)uinds completely of the haunting suspicion that the entire reli-
gious structure may be nothing more than a grand and beautiful 
castle in the air."63 As Novak observed, "The believer often 
fails to recognize that he needs a criterion for distinguishing 
63Trueblood, Philosop;9l .2.! Religion, p. l?. 
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in himself true belief as opposed to false; he needs a way of 
guarding against illusion. 1164 
Despite this fact, there are some who contend that the 
transcendent needs no verification but is self-authenticating. 
Robinson, e.g., argues that "God is, by definition, ultimate real· 
ity. And one cannot argue whether ultimate reality exists. One 
can only ask what ultimate reality is like. u65 • • • Here he is 
following Tillich who contended that the question ian•t whether 
God exists but rather which of the many symbols most adequately 
expresses him. "This is the problem, and not the so-called •exis" 
tence of God'--which is in itself an impossible combination or 
words. God as the ultimate in man's ultimate concern is more 
certain than any other certainty, even that of oneself." Indeed, 
the very .fact that one forms the question "Does God exist?" re-
veals that the symbol nGod" has lost its meaning for him. said 
Tillich. In other words, "It is meaningless to question the ul-
timacy of an ultimate concern ... Atheism is actually impossible 
.for Tillich. For "• •• he who denies God as a matter of ulti-
mate concern affirms God, because he affirms ultimacy in his con-
cern. "66 This does not mean that man is conscious of his ulti-
mate concern (i.e., of "God"), but he has one nonetheless. 67 
64Nova.k, Belie! and Unbelief, p. 21. 
-
65Robinson, Honest ,!2 ~' P• 29. 
66Tillich, I?.ynamics or Faith, 
-
pp. 46, 4?, 63, 88. 
67Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p. 50. 
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Tillich is not alone in his contention that God's existence 
cannot really be questioned. S'ren Kierkegaard said: "Thus I al-
ways reason from existence, not toward existence • • • • "6B In 
a similar way, Bultmann argues that the revelation of God is self· 
vindicating and to ask for a criterion for questioning the direct 
revelation of God is ''• •• to presuppose that we can ascertain 
the truth of the revelation be.fore recognizing it as revelation. 0 
God doesn't have to justify himself to man. ENery demand for 
criteria must be dropped as soon as the face of God appears, he 
arguea. 69 
Now there is something deceptively oversimplified about this 
position that must be clarified before we can fully appreciate 
the need for criteria to determine the reality basis for the 
transcendent. Jaspers spoke to the heart or the issue when he 
wrote, .. It is not God who must justify himself, but every mani-
festation in the world that pretends to be the word of God, the 
act of God, the revelation of God... In other words, "It is not 
God who is to be tested, but whether what a man says is true •• 
n?O 
• • Or to restate it, if we know that it was a transcendent 
reality that one is aware of in religions experience, then there 
~ould be no need to verify it. But that is precisely the problem, 
b 
68Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments. p. 32. 
69Bultmann in ~ ~ Christianitl by Jaspers and Bult-
mann, p. 68. 
?OJaspers, M;rth ~ Christianitz, pp. 80, 81. 
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viz., we do not know that it is a transcendent reality. The 
reality of the transcendGnt is what is undar question. That is, 
since our experience itself is not God or the transcendent, it 
is necessary to have some means of determining whether or not our 
experience has a reality behind it. 
Certainly, we cannot identity the experience itself with the 
ultimate tor thenit becomes redundant to ask if there is any real• 
ity behind it. For we have already contended that by the trans-
eendent object of religious experience we mean more than a sub-
jective condition of human experience; more than a projection of 
human imagination; more than an illusion of human wishes, and 
~ore than a subconscious continuation of human experience.71 If 
the basis for religious experience is actually no more than a 
projection of the experience, it is meaningless to call it "real~' 
And if it is meaningful to ask about the reality basis for reli-
gious experience, then it is needful to find some adequate cri-
teria for deciding on the question. 
The search for adequate criteria for determining the reality 
of anything is not easy but it is necessary, particularly in reli~ 
gion. As Novak said, "If by intelligence we cannot know whether 
there is a God: if, that is, a man has no way of defending him-
self with critical intelligence against illusory beliefs, then 
the edifice of revealed religion is--for us, at least--on shaky 
grounds."?2 Certainly if a man is ultimately concerned about 
?lsee Chapter One for further elaboration of this point. 
72Novak, Belief and Unbelief, p. 40 • 
.......... 
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what isn't even real, he ought to know about it. For the reli-
gious person o.f. n.11 rr1'7n :-;hould be concerned with ma.turi ty and 
.fidelity to the truth whatever .i.t may be, even if' it is the dis-
covery that ·the object of his ul tima.te concern is not real. Eli-
ade said that the religious man by nature is one who thirsts for 
reality with all his heart.73 If not, at least he ought to be. 
For as Froud remarked, anyone with a sense for reality will not 
be satisfied to worship a God who is no more than an illusory 
proj c':lction of his own wishes. ?Lt-
The Logical Criteria 
Two logical criteria may be suggested for testing the real-
ity of the transcendent, one negative and one positive. Nega-
tively, whatever is logically contradictory cannot be real. Pos-
itively, whatever is rationally inescapable :munt be real. 
~ Negative Oriterion.--This will be used in determining 
the possibility of the reality of the transcendent. For certain-
ly a logically contradictory position is not to be held as true. 
Contrary to c. I. Lewis and those who hold that the principle of 
non-contradiction might not apply to reality we would argue that 
this assertion itsel!. makes no sense unless the law of contradic-
tion does apply to the real world. As Francis H. Parker re-
~arked, the justification for holding that the law of non-contra-
diction must apply to the real world is that no one can assert 
?3.Eliade, ~ Sacred ~ ~ l'roi'ane, P• 80. 
?4Freud, ~ Future £!. !!! Illusion, pp. 49, 50. 
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or even believe that it does not apply without implying that it 
does.75 Furthermore. no meanin~ful statement can be made which 
denies the principle of non-contradiction. The principle is 
literally undeniable. And to say that the principle is undeni-
able is not to argue in a circle; it is not using the principle 
of non-contradiction to defend the principle of non-contradic-
tion. That is. we are not affirming that it must be true because 
......... 
we could not even make the statement that it is true unless it 
were true, thus enabling us to make the statement that it is true 
in a non-contradictory way. What we are contending is that the 
law of non-contradiction must be true since there is no way to 
deny it without affirming it in the same breath. That is. it is 
not the fact that the law of non-contradiction is affirmable 
which necessitates its truth but the fact that it is undeniable. 
The principle of non-contradiction is such that one must assume 
its truth to affirm it and one must even assume its truth to deny 
it. In either ease there is no way to even think without assum-
ing that the principle of non-contradiction is true. So whether 
one affirms it or denies it. he really affirms it. The law of 
?5:rrancis Parker, "The Realistic Position in Religion" in 
ion in Philosophical and Cultural Perspective. p. 88. He ~c·o·n~e~n..,...s tnat "• •• the opponent of the realist thesis of cogni-
tive independence is. at bottom. in the self-defeating position 
of denying his thesis in the same breath with which he affirms it 
of implying that the principle of non-contradiction is true inde-
endently of our knowledge of it just in order consistently to 
eny it. But this is, on the one hand, exactly not to maintain 
any consistent position at all and also, on the other hand to 
grant the independent truth of the principle of non-contradiction 
d hen e also of the demonst~ation of the realist thesis of cog-
t ve nd p ndence which is based upon the independent truth or 
18? 
non-contradiction is not non-a!firmable, which means it must be 
affirmed to be true. Hence, no position about the reality of the 
transcendent can be held to be true if it is contradictory. 
~ Positive Criterion £! Reason.--Not only is it impossible 
for the contradictory to be real, but it is necessary for the 
rationally inescapable to be real. By rationally inescapable is 
meant a non-contradictory position the only possible alternatives 
to which are contradictory. If it were not so that the only al-
ternative to contradiction were true, then it would follow that 
nothing could be true. For if the only logically possible view 
there can be can not be true, then nothing can be true tor there 
are no other possibilities. But to say that nothing can be true 
is contradictory by the negative criterion of reason, the law of 
non-contradiction, since the statement that nothing is true would 
have to be a true statement in order for it to make any sense. 
But if it is a true statement, then something is true, viz., the 
statement that nothing is true. However, to say that it is true 
that nothing is true is to utter a contradiction. Therefore, if 
it is ~ true that nothing is true, then it must follow that 
something is true. And if something must be true, then it must 
follow that the only possible thing that can be true really is 
true. 
It, then, the rationally inescapable (viz., the only logical 
possibility) must be real, then tr1is would invalidate the earlier 
objection to theistic proofs, viz., that they could be rationally 
inesca able without bein so For that ve e-
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ment about what is ontologically so could not be true unless the 
rational ~ apply to the real. Therefore, if any proof can be 
shown to be rationally inescapable then it would settle the ques-
tion of the reality or the transcendent. The question, then, is 
this: are any of the proofs for the existence of God rationally 
inescapable? 
Applying the Logical Criteria 
Since we have already discussed the application of the nega-
tive criterion under the alleged disproofs for God and concluded 
that noDe of them show that it is logically impossible that the 
transcendent is real, then it remains only to ask if any of the 
alleged proofs are rationally inescapable. For granting, as we 
have argued, that the rationally inescapable is also real, then 
if any of the proofs are without logical defect it will follow 
that God is real. 
Alternative !2 !,h! Teleological 4rgument.--It was admitted 
in the formulation of the Teleological proof that the conclusion 
is not rationally inescapable. Tb.at is, there is a non-contradic~ 
tory alternative, viz., that the world happened by chance.76 And 
even if this alternative is not probable, nevertheless it is pos-
sible. And if it is possible, then it is not irrational to hold 
this position. Furthermore. if it is possible that the world 
happened by chance then maybe it lli happen that way. For things 
that only have "one chance in a million" sometimes ~ happen. 
76This alternative is developed by Hume's Philo in his Dia-
logues. See Donald Burrill, The Cosmological Arguments, pp.-rB°5-
1qa. - -
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Th.at is, just because the possibility of getting three sixes in 
one throw is only l in 216, it doesn't follow that it will take 
216 throws to get it. It may come on the first throw. At any 
rate, whether the world did or did not happen by chance, it is 
not logically contradictory to hold that it happened by chance. 
Hence, the Teleological argument is not rationally inescapable. 
Alternatives 12 !!!! Moral Argument.--Neither is the Moral 
argument rationally inescapable. For it is always possible that 
what appears to be independent of man, what appears to come from 
beyond him is no more than a vague undefined ideal existing only 
in individual human minds and nowhere outside of them. Or it is 
possible that what men think is a moral law independent of them-
selves is no more than their own sub-conscious, i.e., it exists 
only beyond their own consciousness but not beyond their sub-
consciousness.?? Then, too, the moral law could be nothing more 
than the collective sub-consciousness of men, which would_explain 
both its apparent beyondness and also why no one individual com-
pletely understands it, viz., because it doesn't exist in any one 
man in a complete form. 
J'urthermore, it is not irrational to hold that there could 
be an objective moral law, independent of mankind without holding 
that there is a Moral Law-Giver. For it is not contradictory to 
hold that the moral law is a structure which exists on its own 
or as the binding force of interrelationships among 
??This is the position of Carl Jung. See Psychology ~ 
Religion, Chapter Two. 
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men.78 Nor is it contradictory to hold that th~ moral law is no 
~ore than an accidental order resulting from chance arrangement 
in the universe. That is, it is ~ impossible that mind, idea, 
and law could be the result of matter, however unlikely this may 
be. 
Alternatives ~ !!'!! Cosmolottica1: !_rggment.--Rational ;:,.lter-
natives to the Cosmological argument ar~ not as easy to come by, 
at least not in the form ot the Cosmological argument stated 
above. One could deny that the world exists but it is di.f:f'icu.l t 
to see how he could consistently 11eny that he axists, .for he woul 
have to exist in order to deny that he exists. And if he cann.ot 
deny that he exists, then the argument could start from his con-
tingent existence and move on from there with the RA.me logic. 
Of course one could deny that it is rationally n.eeessa.ry for 
contingent things to ba caused. Tha.t i~ to say, he could deny 
that it is not rationally necessary to conclude that there muRt 
be a reason or explanation as to why a being exists when it n~ed 
lnot exist. This denial would amount to an attack on the princi-
ple of sufficient reason. It would be saying that everything 
~oes not have to have a sufficient reason, that some things just 
~and don't need a reason, explanation, or cause. In other 
!Words, the world is uncaused; its being is gratuitous or just 
!there without any explanation.?9 That is, one could deny that 
?81'h.is criticis~ is mentioned by M. Rader in &ldurinf Ques-
tions (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), P• 34 • 
?9This position is suggested by Sartre's analysis. See n. 
68 above. 
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everything needs a sufficient reason either inside or outside it-
self by simply holding that only some things have sufficient rea-
sons, and the world is not one of them. This would avoid the 
trap of having to say that nothing has a sufficient reason while 
one has a sufficient reason for saying that, thus contradicting 
one's self. What this position could say is that there is a suf-
ficient reason (whatever it may be, evil, absurdity, etc.) for 
holding that the world does not need to have a sufficient reason. 
And even if one didn't have a sufficient reason for saying that 
the world does not need to have a sufficient reason, still this 
position would be rationally possible (even though it would not 
be rationally compelling since it has no reason for its conclu-
sion), for it has not been shown why the world ~ have a cause. 
That is, it has not been shown why the world can't simply be 
there. 
The other alleged alternatives to the cosmological argument 
don't seem to be rationally possible alternatives once one grants 
the need for a sufficient reason or cause. An infinite regress, 
e.g., is not rationally possible, tor if an explanation is neces-
sary then putting it off forever is not sufficient. That is, by 
adding up an infinite number of non-explanations one does not get 
an explanation. If each individual cause is inadequate to ex-
plain the effect and an explanation is necessary, then an infin-
ite number of inadequate causes will not add up to an adequate 
explanation; all an infinite series provides is one infinitely 
inadeauate explanation. That is. an infinite re~ress doesn't 
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really give an explanation; it is an attempt to explain away the 
need for any explanation.80 
Nor does the Cosmological argument necessarily commit a 
"Four-term" fallacy, for the conclusion or an "Infinitett cause 
is not necessarily a different term from the "finite" cause of 
the premise. For all that need be meant by "Infinite" is in-
-
finite or not finite. Or to put it another way, the word "cause" 
-
can have the same meaning in the premise and in the conclusion, 
but it must be remembered that the conclusion is that there is a 
a.2!-eaused (i.e., l!!!,-Caused) kind of ttcause" which accounts for 
the existence of the world. Tb.at is, the word "cause" itself 
has the same meaning in the premise and in the conclusion; only 
in the conclusion the "cause" is said to be a not-caused kind of 
"cause" which makes it a very special kind of ttcause." 
Alternatives !2, ~ Ontological Argµment.--Since Kant it has 
been widely held that the Ontological argument (which involves 
existence as a predicate) is not valid. But since Malcolm's re-
statement of the argument argued that existence is not a predi-
cate but that necessary existence is a necessary predicate for a 
81 
Necessary Being. this form.er objection does not necessarily hold. 
800n the impossibility of an infinite regress of dependent 
causes see John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, pp. 44-46. 
81Norman Malcolm in "Anselm's Ontological Argument," wrote, 
"Previously I rejected existence as a perfection. • • • but [now 
hold, that the logical Iliiposs!bllity of non-existence is a per-
tection. Inotfier words, neeessar:y enstence is a per?iction," 
~· ill·. p. 142. -
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Does this mean, then, that the argument is rationally inescap-
able? Not even Malcolm claims that. He holds merely that "The 
only intelligible way of rejecting Anselm's claim that God's 
existence is necessary is to maintain that the concept of God, 
as a being a greater than which cannot be conceived, is self-
contradictory or nonsensical." He con.fesses, however, "I do not 
know how to demonstrate that the concept of God--that is of a 
being greater than which cannot be conceived--is not self-contra-
dictory. "82 He felt, of course, that no one has yet shown that 
it was contradictory and that it was not likely that anyone would, 
but he did admit that it was possible that someone could. And if 
it is possible that the concept of God as a being possessing all 
possible perfections is contradictory, then Malcolm's form of the 
Ontological argument is not rationally inescapable. 
Furthermore, other thinkers have attempted to show that 
there are other rational alternatives to Malcolm's argument. 
Alvin Platinga, e.g., argued that Malcolm's restatement of the 
Ontological argument is not rationally inescapable since (1) Mal-
colm has a hidden conditional, viz.,!! God exists then he must 
exist always and necessarily and since (2) Malcolm overlooks the 
alternatives that (a) it might have just happened that God has 
always existed and always will exist or (b) that God never has 
existed and never will-exist.83 And if any one of these is 
82M.alcolm, .2R.• ill•, P• 15? • 
83Alvin Plantinga, ~ Ontological Argument, PP• 165-166. 
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shown to be a possible alternative to Malcolm's argument, then th~ 
argument is not logically inescapable. And since neither Mal-
colm nor his opponents hold the argument to be 'air-tight,• ad-
mitting of no possible alternatives, then it is not rationally 
inescapable. 
The :Function ot Reason 
It the reality ot God or the Transcendent is neither ration-
ally impossible nor rationally inescapable, then it can neither 
be proven nor disproven in the strongest sense of the term 
••proof." However, it does not follow trom this that reason has 
no role in determining the question of the reality of the trans-
cendent object of religious experience. On the contrary, reason 
plays an essential role in the resolution of this problem, for 
without the critical function of reason one would have no way to 
examine and evaluate his experience. And in this case one would 
never be able to get beyond the bare possibility of there being 
a transcendent reality. He would never be able to speak even or 
the probability or improbability ot its reality. And the sheer 
possibility or there being a transcendent reality is scarcely 
enough to warrant a total commitment to its reality, at least 
not tor a critical thinker. 
In order to avoid this rational impasse and thereby warrant 
a religious commitment to the reality of the transcendent it is 
necessary to spell out more precisely the role of reason in de-
termining this question. '?he following guidelines are suggested: 
{l) In view or the inability of reason to decide the issue in a 
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rationally inescapable way it should be recognized that there are 
certain options available to the rational man and that there is a 
significant role for "decision" in determining "lihis question; 
(2) However, so that the conclusion as to the reality or unreal-
ity of the transcendent is not left to purely "subjective" choice 
there must be adequate criteria established by which one can de-
termine the probability or improbability of the reality of the 
transcendent. (3) But in order that the criteria are more than 
purely abstract and arbitrary norms there must be a relationship 
established between the criteria and religious experience which 
they are testing. It will be necessary to explain this in more 
detail. 
The Need for Decision.--Actually the inability to prove ab-
- - -
solutely whether or not there is a real object of religious ex-
perience turns out to be a definite advantage, for it leaves room 
for the involvement of the whole person (including his will) in 
determining this basic question. Th.at is, if as Aquinas argued 
that once something is proven demonstrably there is no longer any 
need to believe in it, then this basic dimension of religion 
would be simply a matter of the mind with no room for faith or 
decision.84 For once something is proven the mind cannot escape 
assent to it; there is no need for the will to venture out in 
faith to believe it.85 
84Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, 1, 5, body. 
85Aquinas, On Truth, XIV, 9, reply. 
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But the problem with proofs in this sense, were they possi-
ble, is that they sacrifice personal commitment for rational eer-
tainty--they leave no room for the person to make a decision of 
his own. In this sense they destroy responsibility. As Tillich 
correctly noted, "This element of uncertainty in faith cannot be 
removed, it must be accepted. And the element in faith which ac-
cepts this is courage."86 But this doubt is not the academic 
doubt of the sceptic but the doubt of one who is ultimately con-
cerned. For where there is no doubt of this kind there is no in-
dication that one's attitude is a religious one.8? J1or ". • • 
serious doubt is confirmation of faith. It indicates the seri-
ousness of the concern, its unconditional character."88 
Furthermore, as Jaspers observed, "It is only when there is 
no such objective guarantee that faith acquires meaning and 
strength, for only then is it authentic decision."89 Kant seemed 
to be getting at this same point when he wrote, "I have therefore 
found it necessary to deny knowledge [of God] in order to make 
room for faith."90 In brief, a strict rational proof' would elim-
inate the personal, responsible, and volitional involvement of 
the total man in his total commitment, which is incongruous with 
86Tillich, Pynamics .2! Faith, p. 16. 
8?Ibid., p. 20. 
-88Ibid., p. 22. 
-89Xarl Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann, l1yth ~ Christianity, 
p. 69 
90Kant, The Critiaue o:t Pure Reason, p. 29. 
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the very nature of the religious commitment. Rationally inescap-
able arguments, if there are such, would be a hindrance to reli-
gious experience; there must always be room for decision if 
there is to be a personal or responsible commitment made about 
the transcendent. John E. Smith summarized this point very well 
when he wrote, .. When the reality of God is made into a necessary 
logical outcome, to be acknowledged merely as something required 
by thought, there seems to be room neither for love nor for that 
voluntary movement toward God which is essential to religious 
faith."9l 
~ ~ !:£!: _c_r_1_t_e_r_1_a.--It goes without saying that a deci-
sion will not be meaningful or reasonable unless there are ade-
quate criteria by which it can be judged. For religious exper-
ience no less than other kinds of experience is subject to misin-
terpretation and illusion. At least for the philosopher of reli-
gion, the unexamined religious experience is not worth having. 
Here it is not a matter of a strict proof or disproof of the ob-
ject of religious experience but of establishing its reasonable-
ness or unreasonableness. For unless there is some significant 
role for reason we are left in the clutches of subjectivism. 
Even the appeal to some kind of special religious revelation will 
not avoid the problem for it too is part of religious experience 
and is therefore subject to interpretation and verification like 
other experiences.92 
91John E. Smith, Ex2erience ~ ~' p. 110. 
92see Chapter Five for further elaboration of this point. 
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So, then, neither strict proof nor uncritical experience ic 
a sufficient basis for a religious commitment to the reality of 
the transcendent. For as John E. Smith said, "If the assertion 
of God•s reality cannot survive critical questioning then we must 
fall into unintelligibility and succumb to doubt •••• n93 That 
is, the appeal to experience is not naive. The reflective person 
must have a set of principles for analyzing experience. And in 
view of this it will be our task (in the next chapter) to elabor-
ate a set of criteria which one can apply to religious experience 
in or~er to determine whether or not the transcendent object 
thereof is real. 
1h! ~ ~ ~ Basis !.!! :§xPerience.--In order to ensure, 
however, that the criteria are more than abstract unrelated 
ideas arbitrarily imposed on experience there must be a clear 
relationship established between these criteria and the experi-
ence which they purport to test. Otherwise one can easily back 
out of the snare of subjectivism where there are no tests for ex-
perience into ~he trap or a rationalism where there is no basis 
in experience for the ideas which are to evaluate it. In other 
words, it must be remembered that rational analysis is a secon-
dary operation based on the primary data of experience. That is, 
even though reason is essential, experience is basic to it. Ex-
perience is tl:e 'stuff' out of which reason builds the structure. 
Experience gives content and meaning to ideas. 
93John E. Smith, £?cperience ~ ~. p. 111. 
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Especially is it appropriate, if not necessary, in asking 
the question about the realitl of the transcendent that there be 
strong ties established with experience. For if humans are to 
have any contact with the real it will have to be through human 
experience. 
Summary ~ Conclusion 
The classical attempts to prove the existence of God, which 
apply also to the broader designation of the transcendent real-
ity, have not received an enthusiastic response among most modern 
thinkers. Most thinkers have found them to be either psycholo-
gically unconvincing, logically invalid, epistemologically defec-
tive, axiologically misplaced, or ontologically inadequate. 
The most radical response to the attempts to prove the real-
ity of the transcendent have been the counter attempts to dis-
prove it. However, upon analysis of Feuerbach's epistemological 
disproof, Findlay's ontological disproof and Sartre's existential 
disproofs it was discovered tha~ like the proof~ these disproofs 
were not rationally inescapable. There is always the possibility 
that there is a transcendent reality. 
Concluding, then, that the reality of the transcendent was 
neither rationally impossible nor logically inescapable, we are 
left with the task of finding some meaningful criteria for test-
ing the reality basis for religious experience. It was further 
suggested that these criteria must be both closely related to 
experience and also leave room for decision or the responsible 
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involvement of the whole person. Otherwise, the process would 
not be a truly religious involvement. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that in view of the con-
clusions of this chapter and the proposed criteria for evaluating 
reli.gious experience, the force of the reaction to "proofs" may 
be obviated. For it is granted that the proofs are not logically 
inescapable. Further, it we can establish adequate criteria for 
determining the reality question this will answer the problem 
about the epistemological defects and the ontol~gieal inadequacy. 
Finally, if the criteria are based in one's personal experience, 
there should be no problem as to these criteria being either psy-
chologically convincing or axiologically relevant. If t on the 
other hand, adequate criteria cannot be developed, then some ot 
the force of the reaction to proofs could also be leveled against 
the criteria as well. 
CHAPTER V 
FORMULATING TESTS FOR DETERMINING THE 
REALITY OF THE TRANSCENDENT 
The plan of this chapter is ~ to establish the probability 
or improbability of the reality of the transcendent object of 
religious experience. Rather, the purpose is to lay down tests 
by which one may determine for himself whether or not there is a 
reality beyond religious experience. Besides being a more modest 
task than most theistic endeavors, this procedure has several 
advantages. First, it is more in accord with the spirit of our 
endeavor to base a philosophy of religion in experience. Second, 
it encourages each man to exercise his own responsible judgment 
in deciding on this question about ultimate reality. Pinally, 
it avoids coming to any categorical approval or disapproval of 
given or special religious experiences and brings the criteria 
to bear on religious experience in general so that one may see 
which (if any) of the various kinds of religious experience are 
reality based and which are not. That is, if each kind of reli-
gious experience is tested on its own merits, then one is not 
forced to the hasty conclusion that either all religious experi-
ence is based in reality or that it is all an illusion. 
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Summarizing ~ Nature .2f Religious Experience1 
Before suggesting some tests f orreligious experience perhaps 
it would be well to review precisely what we mean by religious 
experience. In this way one will be in a better position to know 
exactly what it is to which the tests are being applied. 
First, it should be pointed out that religious experience is 
taken here in the broad sense of an awareness of the transcendent 
and not in the narrow sense of specific religious experiences 
like mystical experiences. Not that special religious experiences 
are illegitimately religious, for there is a sBnse in which they 
may be even more religious than the other kind. , Namely, they may 
be a heightening or more highly concentrated awareness of what is 
sensed in the religious experience in general. Among other th:ings 
the value of limiting our analysis to religious experience in the 
broad sense is that the tests will be available to a much broader 
group of persons who have not had these special religious exper-
iences. 
The Awareness of the Transcendent 
One of the fundamental factors in a religious experience is 
an awareness of something which goes beyond the limits of the 
consciousness of individuals, that is, a transcendent. Ye have 
seen that there is always a more or beyond which the individual 
religious man senses to be other than himself. That is, he al-
ways !eels that there is something beyond himself which is more 
1This is a summary of Chapter Three. 
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ltimate than himself. He is convinced that there is an all or 
hole of which he is only a 'part' and on which he is dependent. 
Now this transcendent takes on various dimensions and des-
riptiona in different reli.gious experiences. In some religious 
experiences it is viewed as the transcendent origin which can be 
eached only retrospectively by going back via myths of origin 
Others view it as the transcendent top or point of 
unity which can be approached only by going upward in a 
ertical transcendence (ct. Plotinus). Still others consider the 
ranscendent to be the ultimate end of a forward or eschatologi-
al transcendence (ct. Altizer). And finally, there is the reli-
ious experience which moves inward in a kind of introspective 
ranseendenee toward the ultimate depth (et. Robinson). But 
hatever the direction taken by religious experience or whatever 
he description given to the transcendent, religious experience 
lways involves an object which transcends the individual. 
A Total Commitment to the Transcendent 
Not only does religious experience always involve a con-
ciousness of a transcendent object but it also involves a total 
ommitment to that object as ultimate. Simply to be aware of the 
ranscendent is not sufficient; commitment is necessary. For as 
he ultimate it demands an ultimate commitment; a partial commit-
ent will not suffice. To qualify as a religious commitment it 
ust be a total commitment. Mere concern is not enough; reli-
ious concern is an ultimate concern. 
Of course if one is com 
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ltimate it is because he sees worth in it--ultimate worth. And 
it is in this sense that a religious experience is one of wor-
ship, because of what the religious person feels to be the worth-
ship of the object. That is, he worships it because he finds it 
ompletely worthy of his complete adoration. 
Implied also in a total commitment is a sense of absolute 
ependence on the object of religious experience. For one would 
ot need to be totally committed to it if he felt that he could 
ive independently of it. It is the very essence of religious 
experience that one feels a sense of utter dependence on what he 
onsiders to be the ultimate. The religious person feels that 
e cannot transcend without depending on the transcendent to ena-
le him to transcend. 
S~gestinf Criteria for Testin~ 
t e Reali y of the '.lTaiiscenden 
Now that the basic structure of religious experience has 
een summarized we are in a better position to suggest criteria 
or testing its reality basis. But first we should review what 
e mean by the term "reality.n 
Meaning of Reality 
First, by "reality" is meant more than a subjective condi-
ion of human experience, for in this sense of the word the tran-
cendent would be real as long as someone felt he were experienc-
ng it. Then too, we mean more by reality than a mere projection 
f human imagination, for in this sense of the word one would 
ave to unfairly conclude that even atheists like Feuerbach hold 
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to the reality of the transcendent. Nor do we take reality to 
mean the object of human wish-fulfillment, tor on that ground 
even the Freudian religious illusion would be a reality. Further~ 
more, reality means more than human subconsciousness whether in-
dividual or collective, for in that sense the transcendent would 
be no more than the part of human consciousness ot which indivi-
duals are no longer conscious. That is, God would be no more 
than what man does not recall about himself. 
On the positive side we suggested that by reality is meant 
what has an independent existence of its own beyond that exis-
tence it has in the consciousness or subconsciousness of men. 
That is, the transcendent must exist outside of subjective human 
experience before we considered it real. Also, by real is meant 
~hat has an objective existence outside the subjective existence 
in human experience. That is, the real is something which exists 
outside of other subjects and is not merely an objectification 
(i.e., an idea) of a subject or mind. 
Some Tests for the Reality of the Transcendent 
Now that a review has been made of what is meant by reli-
gious experience and what is meant by reality we are in a posi-
tion to suggest ways of determining whether or not there is a 
basis in reality for the transcendent object of religious exper-
ience. We offer only "tests" since it was concluded in the pre-
vious chapter that there are no "proofs 11 or "disproofs" available 
at least none which are logically inescapable. Therefore, we are 
2see Chanter lour for a fuller discussion of this noint. 
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n search only of principles which can yield reasonable or proba-
concl usions which are sufficient to determine whether or not 
is justified in concluding that the transcendent is real. 
of course, that it is always EOssible for one to be 
ong about the reality of the transcendent. But this is part 
risk involved in a religious decision. In fact, this is 
the reasons that a religious commitment necessitates the 
esponsible and critical involvement of not only one's mind but 
lso his will and the whole person. Three tests for the reality 
f the transcendent may be offered. The first test is that of 
eed, ultimate need; the second is the ultimacy of the object; 
the third is fulfillment. 
Ultimate ~ .!!_ ~ l!.!! !2£ Reality .2! ~ Transcendent.--
was argued forcefully by Freud that the human wish for a Cos-
............. 
was not a sufficient ground for concluding that 
here really is such a being. With this we completely agree. 
no matter how sincerely or even earnestly one wishes for a 
of gold at the end of his religious rainbow his wish can in 
be taken as a guarantee of the reality of its object. 
Indeed, Freud was certainly right in being suspect of the reality 
f things whieh are merely objects of human wishes. More speci-
ically we may agree with him when he wrote, nwe say to ourselves 
"t would indeed be very nice if there were a God who was both 
and benevolent providence • • • , but at the same time it 
is very odd that this is all just as we should wish it our-
20? 
selves."3 That is, we agree with Freud that one has the right to 
oubt the reality basis for religious beliefs whose sole support 
is that humans hope that they a.re true. Such is surely wishful 
thinking or what Freud called an "illusion ... That is, it could 
ossibly be true that there is a Heavenly Helper just as men wish 
here to be, but this belief remains suspect because its basis 
is so wishful. 
However, while subjective human wishes are no firm basis 
for determining the reality of something, nevertheless an objeo-
ive human ~ may be a good reality criteria. It may be a.r-
ed, for example, that nature manifests a general teleology or 
which it is unreasonable to assume that nature 
ould produce a need tor which it does not intend a fulfillment. 
nature has produced thirsty creatures, then it is reasonable 
that nature has also provided water somewhere to fill 
his thirst. It nature has produced hungry creatures, then it is 
ot unreasonable to conclude that nature has also provided food 
omewhere to satisfy them. And if nature has created males, then 
t makes sense to believe that there are females somewhere to 
ate with them. In brief, wherever the world has produced a need 
assume that it has also provided an object to till that 
Wherever there is really an objective need tor something, 
e may reason that its object really exists (or existed) some-
For all ot nature seems to abhor vacuuas and rushes to 
3:rreud, Future .2! .!!'! Illusion, pp. 5?-58. 
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fill them. Nature fills its own voids. 
And even if it could be shown that there are some exceptions 
to this general principle that wherever there are objective needs 
(i.e., needs produced by nature) there really are objects to ful-
fill them, nevertheless one could argue that wherever there is an 
~ltimate need there must be an ultimate object to fulfill it. 
For even if one could explain the failure of the universe to care 
~or some minor and immediate needs, it would surely be unreason-
able to conclude that there is really no ultimate object to sat-
isfy an ultimate need. Or, in other words, if men really need a 
r:;ranscendent, then there probably is a transcendent reality to 
fill this need. If men really need the ultimate then it is rea-
sonable to conclude that there is an ultimate reality. 
Of course it is nossible that objective human needs, even an 
~ltimate one, are not fulfillable. It is just possible that the 
Lmiverse is mocking man, saying, "I made you so that you really 
~eed love. but love is not a reality. You really need friend-
ship but there are no friends anywhere, etc. 1• That is, it is at 
~east possible that life is absurd and meaningless. It is possi-
Ple that man has a God-sized vacuum in his heart !or which there 
~s no God to fill it.5 Or, in the broader terms we have adopted 
~o say that wherever there are needs that they will be fulfilled. 
Jertainly there have been many hungry and thirstY'People who have 
riever received f'ood or water. But would the world produce hungry 
llld thirsty people if it had no food or water anywhere to provide 
~or them? It seems reasonable to assume that it would not. 
r.: 
/Th.is is the position of Sartre, and it is discussed above 
.. n Chapter Four. 
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n this study, it is possible that man really needs a transoen-
ent but there is no tra~scendent reality anywhere. Tb.is is no 
possible, but on the other hand it does not seem very proba 
It seems much more reasonable to believe that if men have 
objective need for a transcendent that the transcendent is 
bjeetively real. Objectivity of a need, especially an ultimate 
indication of the reality of the object of that need. 
or it an object really must be (in order to fulfill a real need) 
it is reasonable to assume that this object must be real. 
There are other kinds ot need which do not argue tor the 
their objects the way that objective needs do. These 
be called subjective needs. For example, there are personal 
social needs which are by no means a guarantee of the reality 
t their objects. Society can create its own needs. A competi-
ive society, e.g., can create the need tor success. 
an create the need for children to see television. 
Television 
Luxury can 
need for more luxury. Drugs can create the need tor 
ore drugs, etc. But none ot these needs is objective and cer-
ainly none is ultimate. None ot these is created by nature and 
is basic to the nature of man. 
An objective need, as opposed to a mere subjective one, is 
.!!!!.!. gua !!2!! for actualizing full human potentiality. An objec 
a real need and not a mere wish, however strong the 
ish may be. Men may wi9h to have honey, but they really need 
The real problem is to establish that "Man cannot live by 
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eeds the transcendent? 
To establish that man's religious need is not merely subjec-
is not an easy task. For ;>•:?rhaps Freud was rif~ht that men 
lo not really need. God but only wish to have ono. If the need 
or the transcendent is to be used as a test for 1 ts rea.11 ty, 
hen the burden of proof is to show tha.t I!len really n<:ftd the tran 
cendent. There are several ways one re.ight ai;tempt to demonstrat 
man needs the transce11den.t. First, he might attempt the 
difficult task of isolating the social and personal condi-
ions which. might have created an artificial or subjective need 
transcendent. In this way one might be ~ble to discover 
or not men reared without religion in their environment 
ould still have a basic objective need for the transcendent. 
. is task, of course, would be very difficult both bee a.use o.f the 
of such totally religions-free environments and because 
the coilplexi·ty of factors invol vea.. Another approach whieh 
less sociclogical and more philosophical is as follows. For 
xample, one could analyze the nature of human exp<~rience as 
escribed by both religious and non-religious nien to see if, des-
ite obvious dif.ferenc~s in the way bel.ievers and non-believera 
express thei.r experiences, there might not be some common cosmic 
ranscendent of which both find themselves in need in an objec-
way. 
Since we have already detailed the multi-dimensional need 
for the transcendent expressed by religious aen earlier, we need 
only to remember here that at the very heart of the religious 
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xperience is the need for the transcendent. Even some religious 
theists (like Altizer) who deny all traditional torms of trans-
endence see a new direction for man to transcend, viz., a tor-
ard one in the eschatological dialectic ot history. 'rb.ere seems 
o be little doubt that religious men both theist and non-theist 
eel a real need tor the transcendent. 1'b.e question is whether 
telt need has a real objective basis ot whether it is just 
a peculiarity of the religious temperament. Although an examina-
ion ot the experiences ot non-religious men would not be detini-
i ve as to whether or not there is an objective need tor the 
ranscendent, nonetheless such a study is quite illuminating. As 
matter of tact, some of the strongest testimony to man's need 
or God has come from some contemporary non-believers. 
In his autobiography, Jean Paul Sartre confessed, "I needed 
God, He was given to me, I received Him without realizing that I 
as seeking Him." rtirther, he said, "I reached out tor religion, 
I longed tor it, it was the remedy. Had it been denied ae, I 
ould have invented it myself." But "I needed a Creator, I was 
iven a Big Boss."6 Nor is Sartre alone in expressing man's need 
God. Walter Kaufmann said, "Han is the ape that wants to be 
•••• Religion is rooted in man's aspiration to transcend 
self • • • • Whether he worships idols or strives to perfect 
imselt, man is the God-intoxicated ape."? Others have expressed 
6sartrei The Words, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: 
George Brazi l'ir; 1964), PP• 102, 97. 
?waiter Kaufmann, Oritigue .2! Religion ~ Philosophz, pp. 
354, 355, 359. 
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an's need to transcend as a serious search tor God. Franz Kaf-
novels express lonely man's unsuccessful attempt to communi-
with some important otherness beyond his own self. Samuel 
play, Waiting !2.£ Godot, reflects a similar craving to 
God. As William Barrett noted, "Surely the audience 
at Beckett's play recognized ••• some echo, however veiled, of 
emptiness, in Heidegger's phrase, it's 'waiting tor 
Of course it may be argued that whether biographical or 
uthobiographical these are no more than expressions ot what we 
ave called subjective needs for the transcendent, in which case 
hey can not be used as evidence tor the reality of the transcen-
However valid this objection may be with regard to others, 
certainly does not apply to all of what Sartre said. 
Sartre saw man's need tor God to be so great and so basic to 
very nature as man that God is said to be man's fundamental 
Sartre wrote, "to be man means to reach toward being 
d. Or if you prefer, man fundamentally is the desire to be 
d."9' Ot course, Sartre felt that the whole project was absurd 
d vain because it is logically impossible tor there to be a 
However, it has already been pointed out that his logical 
ejection ot God was based on the faulty conception ot God as a 
elf-caused rather than an !l,Bcaused being. And as to the existen 
absurdity of man needing the transcendent, it the need tor 
8william Barrett, Irrational !'.!!!!• p. 63. 
9aartre, Being ~ Nothingness, pp. ?62, 766. 
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great in each man, then we are cruelly dishonest with 
when we give up in despair. That is, it men really 
transcendent the way they seem to need it, then there is 
least a prim.a tacie reason for continuing the search. 
other atheists admit that man does have an objective cosmic 
for the transcendent, but they are not willing to identify 
with a religious experience. In a key passage Freud agreed 
Sohleiermacher that men do have a sense of dependence on the 
iverse or all. J':reud, however, was not willing to call this 
It is not the feeling of cosmic dependence 
n the transcendent whole which is religious for J'reud. On the 
ontra.ry, religion is round in the response man gives to this 
eeling in seeking a remedy for it.10 But it Freud is willing 
c admit that there is a basic sense in which men are dependent 
the transcendent--even though he is unwilling to call this 
eligious--then at least on the level of experience there seems 
o be a basis tor arguing that men may have an objective need for 
he transcendent. Whether or not all men are willing to recog-
ize this need tor the transcendent or even should recognize it 
the point here. Por the issue here is not whether men 
subjective awareness of an objective need for the trans-
endent but whether or not there really is an objective need. 
or if there is really an objective need tor the transcendent, we 
argued that the transcendent is probably objectively real. 
10:rreud, Future of an Illusion, P• 52. 
------ -- -- ---------
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Or, in other words, if there is really an ultiaate need tor the 
transcendent, then no dcubt the transcendent is ultimately real. 
The objectivity of the need favors the reality of the object of 
that need, especially when the need is ultimate. 
As to whether a man feels that it is necessary to affirm 
this need subjectively is another question. In the final analy-
sis each man will have to decide this question tor him.self. 
But !! it can be shown that there is an objective and ultillate 
need for the transcendent, then whether or not one decides to 
ake an ultimate commitment to it we may assume that it is real. 
Ultimacy gt_ !!'!!, Object .!!. ~ ~ !.9.£. !!!! Reality .!!.! !!!! 
Transcendent.--Mot only does the ultimacy ot the need argue for 
the reality of the objeot of that need but the ultimaoy of the 
object itself can be used as an indication or its reality. Ot 
course not all religious experience involves an ultimate object. 
Some men make an ultimate commitment to what is less than ulti-
te. Idolatry happens. Some men make a kind of ultimate coa-
tment to their country, as appears from the patriot's "My coun-
Other men make an ultimate colllllitment to 
ocial causes and still others to a human lover. But the problem 
th any such ultimate commitment to objects which are less than 
ltimate is that the object is not adequate tor the commitment. 
errs, the cause fails, and the lover dies. Nothing 
an ultimate object is capable of full7 satisfying an 
commitment. The reason for this is that the thirst for 
limited satisfaction can not be full satisfied b 
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As it is put in the Wisdom Literature ot the Old Testa-
ent, there is nowhere "under the sun" that a man can find ulti-
ate aatisfaotion. 11 Everything in this world is temporal, and 
tor the eternal. Or, as Augustine said it, the heart 
s restless until it finds its rest in God. 
Ot course some objects which are not ultimate are capable 
satisfying an ultimate commitment, at least in part and tor a 
But even it a limited object were capable ot tull7 satis-
an ultimate commitment indefinitely, it would still be 
that nothing short of what is actually ultimate would be 
apable of justifying an ul. timate comm.i tment. Por nothing short 
t an ultimate object is worthy of an ultimate commitment. But 
n either event, no religious experience is adequate unless its 
bject is ultimate. Probably onl7 an ultimate object is adequate 
o satisfy an ultimate commitment, and certainly only an ultimate 
bject is adequate to justify it. Therefore, even it one agreed 
ith Tillich that all men are religious in that they have an ul-
imate commitment to some object,12 it would not follow that all 
en were adeguately religious. There are many objects ot ulti-
concern--weal th, fame, country. However, as Smith said, 
11Eeclesiastes Chapters 1 and 2. 
12oertainly all persons have a center of their personnlity, 
, a unifying core or concern (cf. Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p. 
106 and ~a.mies ot Faith, p. 105), but whether or not this con-
ern is C>a! or Uitl:mate is the question. At least some men de-
that they have any kind of ultimate concern about anything 
(Jean Paul Sartre, e.g.). Furthermore, even if one can't be a 
person without some kind of ultimate concern, then it might be 
said that some individuals lack personhood tor this very reason. 
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"But the final question is whether our ultimate concern is fixed 
on the really ultimate or upon some lesser object which, being 
inite, must be regarded in the end as an idol.•13 So we may 
onolude that all men are not adeguatelz religious; not all have 
object which is really ultimate, even though they Jla1' have 
iven an ultimate commitment to it. 
But trom this we may also draw a further conclusion, viz., 
hat it a religious person does have an object of his ultimate 
..... 
ommitment which is really ultimate, then he has no reason to be-
ieve that it is not ultimately real. '!hat is, ultimacy is a 
est tor reality in religious experience. Yor if the ultimacy 
t the object of religious experience is not a test tor its real-
ty, then it would follow that what is really ultimate is not 
timately real. And it we are willing to use the word "real" ot 
ot human experience and concern such as things 
d persons, then there seems to be no reason not to use it of 
ultimate object which is really ultimate. Why should the !m-
ediate be real but the ultimate not be real? If on the other 
and, one is willing to say that whatever is reall7 ultimate is 
timately real, then in order to test the reality ot the object 
t one's religious experience he need only find a way ot deter-
ining whether or not this object is really ultimate. 
Ot course it is not an easy task to show that the object of 
ne's ultimate commitment is really ultimate. It certainly is 
13John E. Smith, "Ultimate Concern and the Really Ultimate," 
n Religious Experience !!!S Truth, p. 67. 
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sufficient merely to say that it is ultimate. Idolatry comes 
only in many forms but in subtle forms. Some idols are metal 
some are mental. Some men may consciously worship something 
inite; others would only unconsciously worship a limited object. 
ow, then, is a religious man to be sure that he is neliher con-
sciously nor unconsciously committed to what is less than the 
timate? The answer is not easy nor is it necessarily hopeless. 
One way to assure oneself of the ultimaoy of the object of 
religious commitment is for him to make a conscious and deli-
effort to purge himself or all idolatry. !hat is, he 
never permit his religious devotion to focus on or settle 
n any finite object or image through which the ultimate is mani-
est to him. It is at this point that the religious person may 
rofitably use what Ramsey called disclosure models, that is, 
etaphorical ways to manifest what is beyond the empirical but 
hich will leave its transcendent 1D7stery intact. Ramsey's de-
ice for assuring that the religious person did not toeus on the 
aspects of the conceptual models was what he called qual-
that is, words which qualify the model or conceptual 
transcendent in such a way as to force it to go on 
d on until it reaches a disclosure of what is beyond it. For 
xample, when God is spoken ot as an ":Everlasting Yather" the 
of a father is qualified by the word everlast-
ng in such a way as to force the mind to think on and on until, 
f orsa.king the empirical anchorage of the meaning of 
earth! father it will receive a diaclosure of the trans 
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What Ramsey attempts to do with qualified models Tillich 
with religious symbols which, he saidt point beyond them 
In like manner both Jaspers' cipher language and Bult-
ann's demythologized language are attempts to de-objectify ex-
ressions of the ultimate so as to avoid verbal idolatry. !rhis 
as been the basic motivation behind the mystic's negative lan-
age and even the metaphysioian's analogous language. In each 
ase the aim has been to find an adequate way to focus the ~ind 
n that which is being revealed in the religious experience (viz., 
he transcendent) rather than focusing on the instrument through 
hich it is being revealed (viz., language, etc.).14 
However, it is not sufficient merely to be able to !!!!£ 
the transcendent or ultimate; one must be assured that 
is a transcendent there abput which he is talking. !hat is 
o say, the disclosure language must disclose something; the 
odel must manifest something. Since ~he .f'unction ot religious 
anguage is to reveal the transcendent, the final test ot its 
dequac7 will be whether or not it opens up a meaningful experi-
nce ot the ultimate. For an adequate language about an ultimate 
a no guarantee that there is an ultimate. It is possible that 
ne could devise an adequate language about an ultimate or trans-
endent that does not really exist. The ability to speak mean-
ngtully about something is no guarantee of the reality of that 
bject, else one would be forced to conclude that all persons and 
14oompare Chapter Two for a discussion of the adequacy of 
eligious language. 
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events in novels are actual. 
The acid test of religious language is twofold: does it 
eaningfully express the ultimate, and does it evoke a religious 
esponse? That is, does the language about the ultimate bring 
face with an ultimate which can evoke an ultimate 
ommitment? Ma?17 men are willing to make an ultimate commitment 
o what is less than ultimate; this is idolatry. But when a man 
s willing to give an ultimate commitment to what is really ulti-
there is no reason to believe that it is not ultimate-
real. Can man be mocked as to the reality of so serious an act? 
Of course it does not necessarilz follow that the transcen-
is real on the grounds that it can be shown to be ultimate. 
ere is no logical necessity here. We have already set aside 
he position that one can show the reality of the ultimate in a 
ationally inescapable way. But just because something is not 
ationally inescapable does not mean that it is not reasonable. 
one is unwilling to consider what is adequately reli-
ious (viz., what involves an ultimate commitment to what is real 
y ultimate) to be real, then it is difficult to see what, if 
~~· ..... hing, he would consider real. The refusal to acknowledge the 
is both worthy of and the recipient of an ulti-
te commitment could be tantamount to having a "blik" against 
ultimate reality of what is really ultimate. 
Julfillment .!!. ~ !!!!]. !.2E. Realit1.--0ne more test for the 
eality of the object of religious experience may be suggested, 
Not just any kind of fulfillment but ulti-
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ate fulfillment. Por if the object of one's religious experien 
s completely adequate to satisfy his ultimate need, then we may 
ssume that its complete adequacy in this regard is an indication 
f its reality. That is, if a man finds ultimate satisfaction 
the ultimate object ot his devotion, then we may conclude that 
he object is really ultimate. And, as has already been argued, 
if it is really ultimate then it is probably ultimately real. 
The ascumption of course is that nothing but an ultimate can sat-
isfy ultimately. And so we may argue conversely that whatever 
satisfies ultimately must probably be ultimate. ~at is, nothing 
short of finality will satisfy finally. Or, in theistic terms, 
it man has a God-si~ed vacuum in his soul, then fiothing short of 
God will be able to fill it completely. If man has a capacity 
or unlimited happiness, then nothing short of unlimited happi-
ess will fill it. If man needs to transcend ultimately, then 
othing short of ultimate transcendence will fulfill this need. 
Another way or stating this test for the reality of the 
ranscendent is that whatever really enables man to transcend 
imselt is really transcendent, and whatever is really transcen-
ent is transcendently real. For it seems reasonable enough to 
onclude that if an object of religious ex:perienee enables a man 
o transcend his own subjectivity, then this object must be ob-
jective to man. And since we have already decided that what is 
objective is real, then it would follow that that ultimate ob-
ject wbich enables a man to transcend himself is real. That is 
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way and if he finds a way to do this, then we may assume that the 
transcendent by which he transcended himself is real. 
If, for example, to transcend ultimately be taken to mean 
the ability to overcome man's feeling of alienation, then the 
transcendent object which can bring this unity into one's life 
ill be considered real. Or, if by transcending ultimately one 
eans the forgiveness of sins, then that object which provides a 
of ultimate forgiveness will be considered real. And if 
y transcendence one means a self-transcending love which enables 
one to overcome his own egocentricity, then that object which is 
itself transcending love will be considered real. That object of 
experience which does not fulfill the very drive of 
eligious experience will not be counted as adequate, and what-
really adequate to enable a man to transcend ulti-
ately will not be counted as the ultimate reality. It may be 
eal, of course, but it will not be the ultimately real. Only 
hat is really ultimate, ultimately needed, and/or ultimately 
atisfying will be considered to be a real object of religious 
xperience. 
The meaning of ultimate fulfillment or ultimate transcen-
ence often has two sides in one's religious experience. There 
·s the inward side which is called variously unity, peace, bar-
ony, forgiveness, etc. There is also an outer dimension which 
's manifest in character, conduct, love, saintliness, etc. In 
outer sense of transcendence it would be proper to conclude 
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enabled him to manifest the ultimate in saintliness is real. 
For it would be strange indeed if that which produced real per-
fection and completion of character were itself completely withou 
basis in reality. In other words, the reality of a religion can 
be judged by its fruits. If there is ultimate transcendence in 
the fruit of the religious experience, then there is no compel-
ling reason why we should not conclude that there is ultimate 
reality in the root or basis of the religious experience. 
But even if it is granted that the object of religious ex-
~erience which could ultimately fulfill man's need for self-tran-
scendence would be real, it does not follow from this that it is 
an easy task to determine which object can do this or, indeed, 
~hether ~ object can do this. That is, the problem with this 
test is that it is difficult to determine whether or not a man 
is really transcending in such a way as to be completely satis-
~ied or ultimately fulfilled. What are the earmarks of ultimate 
fulfillment? Can one see them from the outside, i.e., in the 
life of another? Can one even recognize them in bis own life 
if they were to appear? 
In attempting to offer suggestions which answer this problem 
it would seem wise first of all to agree with James that reli-
gious fruits must be judged on the whole, rather than on the 
~asis of trying to judge the value of specific acts which are 
alleged to flow from specific attitudes. 1 5 Indeed, Schleier-
l5w1lliam James, Varieties .2f. Religious Experience, p. 268. 
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macher was probably correct in saying that specific ethical acts 
don't follow from specific religious beliefs. Rather, "Religion 
produces action only as a ~1urn of activity flows from. a sum of 
feeling • • • • But while a man does nothing [specifically] from 
religion, he should do everything with religion."16 Now let us 
I 
agree with James, who calls this collective fruit of religious 
experience on the whole, "Saintliness," that it includes such 
things as felicity, purity, charity, and self-discipline. 17 Or, 
in other words, by fulfillment is meant an inner unity and tran-
quility which enables one to live in harmony and charity with the 
world around him. The purpose of ultimate fulfillment is to 
overcome or transcend the internal and external dichotomies which 
sepRrate a man from himself and which separate him from other 
selves. Fulfillment, then, will be the achieving of wholeness 
in one's life as a whole. It is a whole-liness of life which 
results from a commitment of one's life as a whole to the whole 
which alone can wholly satisfy it. 18 
The outward characteristics of this wholly filled life 
should be obvious from a man's ability to transcend. That is, 
if one is able to overcome the barriers that divide himself and 
other men, then he is transcending. And if be is transcending 
b.imself, then he is having his need to transcend fulfilled. And 
16Schleiermacher, .Q!1 Religion, pp. 57-59. 
17James, Varieties .2f Religious Experience, pp. 280-285. 
18This "whole-ness" of life is what is commonly referred to 
as "holiness. 11 
224 
this fulfillment in his own life of transcendence can be counted 
s evidence that there is a transcendent which made his self-
ranscending possible. 
As to the inward characteristics of fulfillment, only the 
will know for sure whether or not he has a sense of 
with himself and with the transcendent. If he experiences 
and harn,iony of soul; if he has no struggle of soul but 
in the resolution of tensions made possible by the higher 
to which he has committed himself, then he can be assured 
has fulfillment. Of course, self-deception is always 
Only constant self-examination and self-scrutiny can 
ard against this possibility. 
But if a life is wholly unified, always capable of transeen-
the limitations of itself and the hindrances in its environ-
ent, then there is reason to believe that it has fulfillment. 
fulfillment in the sense that it has finally 'arrived' nor in 
sense of a final static goal, but in the sense of the contin-
ability to find unity within and to unify without. That is, 
ulfillment is the ability to maintain a fullness or wholeness 
f life, despite the constant attempts from. both within and with-
ut to divide it. And if the object of one's religious experi-
nce is able to bring him this kind of fulfillment, then there 
's no good reason why he should not consider this object real. 
it would be strange indeed if that which can really unify 
is not itself real. If the ultimate source of unity and ful-
illment in human ex erience is 
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wrong concept of the real or else it would seem that the question 
of reality loses its significance. 
But we have already carefully defined what is meant by real-
ity, and we have concluded that the reality question is signifi-
cant. The thinking person does want to know if the object of 
is ultimate commitment is nothing more than a projected or un-
ecognized part of himself or whether it is something really 
other than himself. So, we can only conclude that if there is 
n object of religious experience which can bring ultimate ful-
illment, then it must be real. Of course, if an object of reli-
ious experience does not bring unity and fulfillment into one's 
then there is no basis therein to conclude that it is real. 
ut in any case fulfillment is still a key to reality. 
Analyzin~ the Criteria for Testing the 
Rea i~_g! the Transcendent ---
Now that we have suggested several tests for determining the 
eality basis for the transcendent, we should analyze more close-
ly how it is that these tests function in relation to religious 
exrverience and in making a decision about the reality of its ul-
timate ooject. Just what is the role of these tests or criteria 
nd how do they relate to the traditional proofs? 
The Relation of These Tests to 'l'raditional Proofs 
Each of these three nests bear3 some relationship to at 
least one of the traditional proofs. The test of need bears a 
similarity to the traditional Cosmological and Teleological argu-
ents. The test of ultimacy is similar to the Ontological 
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argument. Also, the test of fulfillment relates to the ontologi-
cal argument. But in all cases there are crucial differences. 
Let us examine them briefly. 
Relation of Need to the Cosmological and Teleological Argu-
ments .--First of all the need criterion is similar to the Cosmo-
logical argument and Teleological argument, since they both imply 
that there is a ~ to explain the world which we experience by 
something beyond it. In the Teleological argument there is a 
need to explain or account for the apparent design in the world, 
viz., the adaptation of means to ends, etc. The argument is 
built on the premise that the order and arrangement of things as 
we see them does not explain itself; the design in the world is 
in~ of something else to justify it. Likewise, the Cosmolog-
ical argument is built on the premise that something is needed 
to account for the existence of things as we experience them in 
this world. That is, we experience things that~ (i.e., that 
exist) but~ !12! ~(i.e., .£2 .a£i ~ i2_ exist). We experi-
ence things that are 'may-bes' but not •must-bes,• that are con-
tingent but not necessary beings. On the basis that these beings 
really exist when there is no necessity that they exist (for they 
are not necessary beings) it is argued that they need an explana-
tion as to why they .£2 exist rather than do not exist. So in the 
Teleological and Cosmological arguments there is an appeal to the 
need for an explanation for the facts of design and contingency. 
But as we have already seen, this ~ for an explanation 
is not a logical necessity (i.e., in the sense of rational 
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inescapability) for an explanation beyond the things experienced. 
That is, it is possible that they just ~ (or, exist) but that 
there is no need to explain why they exist. In other words, 
their existence could have just happened or simply be given; it 
ould simply be there or gratuitous. Since this seems to be a 
logical possibility, then if one is going to raise the question 
as to why they are there or exist when they do not have to be 
here, then he must justify asking this causal question. He must 
explain why he is asking "why?tt That is, he must explain why he 
feels that an explanation of their being there (i.e., their exis-
ting) is called for. 
It is not sufficient simply to say that man is the animal 
hich asks causal questions, for this gives only a psychological 
explanation of how it came about that men ask questions like this 
about anything. Rather, it is necessary to justify the applica-
ion of the causal question to things that exist but might not 
ave existed. At this point there seems to be one basic answer: 
hese kinds of beings ~ an explanation; they don't explain 
hemselves. But here again we have made a complete circle, for 
o affirm that they need an explanation is precisely what is to 
e proven. There is no rational need (i.e., logical necessity), 
or there are definitely other logical possibilities (viz., they 
ight just be without an explanation or they might just happen 
to ~ by chance). 
But what kind of need is this? Surely it is not merely the 
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_psychological need in the indi11idual to ask the question why, 
regardless of the fact that there is not any rational necessity 
for asking this question about these things which exist. For 
mere psychological need of asking causal questions (i.e., ration-
al curiosity) is not a sufficient ground for demanding an onto-
logically causql explanation. It would make sense, however, to 
raise the auestion of need for an explanation if man has an exis-
, -
-tential need to know, i.e., if it is a matter of his very exis-
tence. In other words, if man has a need to justify his very 
existence, an ultimate need to explain why he is rather than is 
not, then .it would make sense to ask the causal question or exis-
tence. That is, the Cosmological and Teleological arguments 
would make sense (even though they are not demonstrative proofs) 
if the basic sense of need which prompts one to elaborate these 
arguments is an objective need rooted in a sense of cosmic con-
tingency. 
In brief, we might say that if there is a real need at the 
basis of the Cosmological argument which can adequately explain 
why men posit a first cause as necessary, then it is not a logical 
need but an existential need; it is not a rational need but an 
experiential one; it is not cognitive but cosmic. For nothing 
short of a 'life and death' sense of cosmic contingency is ade-
quate to explain the necessity and ultimacy which religious men 
attribute to the transcendent. Certainly no mere psychological 
curiosity about causes adequately accounts for the motivation to 
nosit a necessarv cause of ever:vthin'2: which exists. If'. hJ.vev..,r. 
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a man feels a sense of absolute dependence on the universe for 
his very existence, then it is understandable how this existen-
tial need could be the basis for concluding an ultimate and nec-
essary cause from premises which fall short of rational inescap-
abil i. ty. That is, it is not difficult to see how the religious 
an could move (without rational necessity) from the existential 
necessity of explaining bis own being to the logical necessity 
of postulating an ultimate cause. If there is a need for an 
ltimate cause it is basically an experiential need arising out 
of the fact that a man finds himself, and perhaps his world, 
tterly and inexplicably contingent or dependent. 
And if this sense of ultimate need is not merely a subjec-
ive psychological phenomenon of certain men but is really an 
objective need of all men (whether they subjectively sense it or 
ot), then it is reasonable to assume that the object of this 
eed is real. For if there is a real need for the ultimate 
there is no reason why the ultimate should not be real. 
Relation of Ultimaci ~ the Ontological Argument.--The Onto-
ogical argument, it will be remembered, is based on the pre~ise 
hat in tbe one unique case of an absolutely perfect being, exis-
ence or reality must be attributed to it. This necessity for 
-
redicating existence of an absolutely perfect being arises out 
of the .fact that such a being cannot be lacking in any perfec-
tion, since it is necessarily perfect by definition. And even 
though the argu'llent is formulated arourid the logical n'3cessity 
of concludin that a necessar 
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exist, yet the conclusion does not really follow with logical 
necessity. It is not a rationally inescapable argument. This 
fact is admitted by both some friends and by most foes of the 
argument. Malcolm admitted that it is possible that the very 
concept of an absolutely perfect being is contradictory, in which 
~ase one cannot consider the argument conclusive. Plantinga ar-
gued that it was ROSsible that a necessary being might just hap-
pen to have existed or might just happen not to have existed, 
either alternative of which would invalidate the logical neces-
sity of the conclusion that this Being must exist. 19 
But if it is not logically necessary--if there is no logical 
need--to conclude that there is an absolutely perfect being, then 
why do men come to this conclusion? Or, what is even more basic, 
why do men even come up with the concept of an absolutely perfect 
being? Here again the need must surely be more than a rational 
curiosity, for at best that would only explain why the question 
is raised but not why it is answered the way it is. That is, 
curiosity might ask whether or not there 1£ such as an absolutely 
werfect bing. But this doesn't explain why men conclude that an 
absolutely perfect being is necessary. There must be some more 
~ompelling reason for this conclusion than the psychological. 
And we have already seen that such a reason is not logical, for 
there is no rational necessity for concluding that such a being 
exists. 
l9see discussion above in Chapter Four. 
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Here again the basic reason or need for postulating a per-
fect being can be supplied from experience. That is, some men 
feel that they not only have an ultimate ~ but that they also 
a need for the ultimate which can satisfy or fulfill that 
in an ultimate way. Whether or not this need is objective 
or merely subjective is not for us to decide here--that is the 
ask of applying the tests or criteria of ultimacy and fulfill-
ent--but simply to note that religious men do feel this way. 
the fact that they possess this tremendous conviction that 
object of their religious experience must be ultimately per-
i t is to be worthy of an ultimate commitment and if it 
be capable of ultimately fulfilling them) indicates at 
that they feel a need for an object which is ultimately 
It is in this way that the tests of ultimacy and fulfillment 
the experiential bases of the Ontological argument. For at 
heart the Ontological argument is a conceptual attempt to 
how the logical necessity (i.e., rational need) for what is 
the base an experiential need. And to the degree that 
that he has come in contact with this ultimate perfec-
ta satisfy his life completely, to this degree his 
xperience of ultimate fulfillment may also be at the base of 
concept of ultimate perfection. 
But just how does this concept of an ultimately or absolute-
perfect being arise from experience? Malcolm suggests that 
232 
"a greater tban which cannot be conceived."20 Anselm argued that 
one could arrive at the concept of an absolutely perfect being by 
uilding the concept gradually from the less perfect through the 
ore perfect until be can arrive at the concept of the ~ per-
fect. 21 Smith says that it is derived from the experience of 
the Christian revelation in which God is depicted as the absolut 
ly exalted. 22 But neither of these latter two explanations shows 
men conceive this as a necessary way to view the transcendent 
only (at best) ~ the transcendent can be viewed in this way. 
Unless these latter explanations intend also to point out that 
somewhere someone must have had an experience of ultimate ~ 
efore he would have been prompted to view the transcendent as 
ltimately perfect, then they really do not account for the ac-
ual origin of the idea of an absolutely perfect being. It does 
ake sense, however, if the concept of an ultimately perfect be-
ing arises out of the sense of ultimate need which religious men 
experience. For only an ultimately perfect being is adequate to 
ulfill an ultimate need for perfection. 
In fact, anything short of ultimacy in perfection is a reli-
iously inadequate concept of the transcendent. For nothing 
hort of the best being possible is worthy of the best devotion 
20Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Arguments,n ~ Ex:istence 
of God, p. 66. 
21Anselm, "St. Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo," ~ Ontological 
......,_... ...... e.-n.,.t , p. 24. 
22John E. Smith, Ex:perience ~ Q2£_, p. 129. 
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possible. Nothing short of ultimacy in perfection is worthy of 
ultimacy in concern. Nothing short of what is totally perfect 
is worthy of a total commitment. And since a religious ex:peri-
ence by its very nature involves an ultimate commitmant 9 then the 
recognition of the ultimate perfection or worth of its object is 
necessary in order to make the commitment a worthy one. In t1~is 
sense we agree with Findlay who, despite his futile attempt at an 
Ontological disproof, argued that a God limited in perfection is 
religiously inadequate. "An object of this sort," he wrote, 
"would doubtless deserve respect and admiration, and other quasi-
religious attitudes, but it would not deserve the utter self-
abandonment peculiar to the religious frame of mind. 1123 In 
brief, it is idolatrous to be totally committed to any object 
which is less than ultimately perfect. 
In summary, the experience of ultimate need is the basis of 
the Cosmological type argument (which includes the Teleological 
and the Moral arguments). 24 The crucial question is whether or 
not this need is objective or real. If it is a real objective 
need (as opposed to a wish or subjective need), then we would con-
~lude that it argues for the reality of the object of this need. 
Further 9 by saying that man has an ultimate need one would be 
arguing that man has a need for the ultimate. For only an 
23Findlay, "Can the .Existence of God be Disproved?" New 
Essays la Philosophical Theology, pp. 52-53. ---
24The Moral argument too is built on the premise that there 
is a need to explain the sense of duty or "oughtness" which men 
have. 
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~timate can satisfy an ultimate need completely. And to be wor-
this ultimate commitment the ultimate object must be ulti-
ately perfect. For nothing short of what is ultimately perfect 
can fulfill the requiremen0B of being worthy of an ultimate com-
itment. It is in this sense that the absolutely perfect being 
of the Ontological argument arises from the need for an ultimate-
ly worthy object1:o justify an ultimate commitment. Of course, if 
this need is unjustified then the reality of the object may be 
rought in question. But if there is a real need and if there is 
an ultimacy about the object which can bring ultimate fulfill-
ent, then these may be used as tests for the reality of the ob-
ject of religious experience. The objective need functions as 
he experiential basis of the Cosmological argument ann the ulti-
acy of the object serves as the experientinl basis to the Onto-
argument. That is to say, the sense of ~ for an ulti-
ate is the experiential basis for men going on to posit the ra-
ional need for a cause to explain the world. And the feeling 
hat the ultimate would have to be ultimately perfect to fulfill 
his need and to warrant an ultimate commitment is the experien-
ial grounds which leads men to elaborate an Ontological argu-
ent. And whereas neither of the arguments is logically 'air-
ight', yet they do have a basis in experience and are reducible 
o tests for the reality of one's religious experience. If 
~
there is a real need for an ultimate and if that to which one 
gives an ultimate commitment is really ultimate and is ultimate-
l fulfillin then one has no reason to doub 
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object of his religious experience is real. 
The Basic Assumption of these Tests Examined 
Throughout the discussion of the tests it was asserted that 
if there is an ultimate need, or if the object of this need is 
really ultimate, or ultimately fulfilling, then it was more rea-
sonable or probable than not to conclude that the object is real. 
But just what is the basis for asserting that it is more probable 
than not? \.Jhat kind of probability is this? We have already 
called into question rationally inescapable proofs and disproofs. 
But if the reality of the transcendent is neither rationally im-
possible nor logically unavoidable, then what would be the basis 
for a.f'firming that it could be more or less than merely possi-
l ·> e. Would this probability or improbability a priori or a pos-
teriority? 
The probability or improbability of the reality of the tran-
scendent is not a priori in the sense of being independent of ex-
perience, for the tests are based in experience and are designed 
to be applicable to experience. Nor, on the other hand, is this 
probability a posteriori in the sense that it depends on a statis 
tical average of how many times human needs were fulfilled, etc. 
~ather, by probably we mean whatever within the realm of possi-
bility can be reasonably expected to be so. But it is proper to 
ask just what is meant by "reasonable." 
Perhaps we can best explain what is meant by "reasonable" by 
referring again to the principle of sufficient reason which was 
used in the Cosmological proof for God's existence. The 
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justification of the principle of sufficient reason given was tha~ 
one could not deny the principle of sufficient reason without 
having a sufficient reason for this denial. For in this event he 
is using the principle of sufficient reason to deny the princi-
ple, which would be a contradiction. But in retort it was poin-
ted out that this argument would be true of a universal denial of 
the principle of sufficient reason (for that broad a denial would 
include the <Enial itself),, but it would not be true of a partial 
denial. That is, one could say without contradiction that he did 
have a reason for saying that ~ things do not have reasons and 
the world is one of them. Therefore, it is not rationally ines-
capable to conclude that there must be a sufficient reason to ex-
plain the existence of the world. 25 For, on this argument, the 
world is one thing which does not need a sufficient reason. That 
is, the world is a special case to which the principle of suffi-
cient reason does not apply. 26 
However, even though it is not rationally inescapable to 
hold that the rule of reason applies to the universe as a whole, 
nevertheless it is "reasonable" to believe that it does. That 
is, there is no reason why the universe as a whole cannot be rea-
sonable• and in fact men rather generally tend to believe that 
25Richard Taylor makes this same point in a restatement of 
the Cosmological argument. See Chapter Seven of his Metaphysics, 
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 91-92. 
26This objection goes back at least as far as Hume's Dia-
logues, IX, where Cleanthes asked, "Why may not the materiaI""""uni-
verse be the necessary existent Being • • • ?" 
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it is reasonable. And even tbough there is no self-evident rea-
son for holding that the universe is reasonable, there is some 
evidence for believing that it is. This evidence is not purely 
rational nor is it purely empirical. It is based rather in basic 
and is confifmed by ~ general behavior 2f 
In brief the evidence for holding that basic human 
eeds are fulfillable is that men expect that they are and world 
events confirm that they are fulfillable. An examination of hu-
an consciousness supports that fact that men do have a native 
expectation that needs are fulfillable, even when their own par-
icular needs have not always been fulfilled. And the course of 
osmic events may be used to support the premise that the uni-
erse does not produce needs which it does not intend to fill. 
the expectation from within and the confirmation from 
support the contention that purpose is at work in the uni 
erse as a whole, that this is not an absurd and irrational world 
In other words, there is no reason why the principle of rea-
should not be extended to the universe as a whole, even thoug 
not logically necessary to do so. And if the world as a 
does operate according to the principle of sufficient rea-
on, then we may rightly conclude that whatever real needs there 
re call for a fulfillment which one can reasonably expect. The 
eal question is whether or not religious experience is based on 
real objective need or merely in a subjective wish. 
238 
Summary ~ Conclusion of the Chapter 
A religious experience is one involving an ultimate commit-
ent to an object which transcends the individual. This trans-
cendence may occur in many directions and on many objects and 
still be essentially religious in nature. However, if the object 
of an ultimate commitment is not really ultimate, then the exper-
ience is not adequately r~ligious. For to be ultimately commit-
ted to what is less than ultimate is both unsatisfactory and un-
orthy, to say nothing of it being idolatrous. 
Several tests have been suggested for determining the real-
ity of the object of religious experience. First, if it can be 
shown that man really needs' to transcend, then the transcendent 
is probably real. For it is not reasonable to suppose that 
there are basic human needs that are not some how fulfillable. 
Second, if the object is really ultimate, then there is no reason 
to believe that it is not ultimately real. For if the object is 
adequate there is no reason to suppose that it is not real. 
Finally, if the religious experience is ultimately fulfilling 
then the object which makes this possible is .no doubt real. For 
if it can really ultimately fulfill, then it is reasonable to 
assume that the ultimate is real. In brief, if man really has 
an ultimate need, or if the object of this need is really ulti-
ate, or if it can fulfill a man ultimately, then these may be 
taken as indications that the object o.f one's religious experi-
ence is real. And on the contrar if 
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does not have an adequate object (i.a., an ultimate one) nor an 
adequate fulfillment, or if it can be shown that man rea11~ bas 
"' 
no ultimate need. then these would be indications that the object 
of that religious experience is not real. 
These three tests for the reality of the transcendent are 
the experiential bases for the traditional arguments for the ex-
istence of God. The Cosmological type arguments (including the 
Teleological and the Moral arguments) both involve the contention 
that there is a need for an explanation. But this need is nei-
-
ther that of psychological curiosity nor logical necessity; ra-
ther, it is based in the experiential need for the transcendent 
which is felt by the religious person. The Ontological argument, 
despite its logical form is really based in the need for an !!!1!-
matel:v .Perfect object which alone is worthy of one's ultimate 
commitment. For less than an absolutely perfect object would not 
be worthy of an ultimate comm.:'.":1ent and probably would not be 
fulfilling either. These tests, however, differ from the tradi-
tional proofs in that the tests are based in experience and they 
are not categorical approvals or disapprovals of religious exper-
ience but, rather, ways of determining which if' any of the ob-
jects of religious experience are adequate and therefore real. 
Since the tests do not provide any :proof for the reality of 
the transcendent but only at best a probability, it is best to 
understand the basis of their probability as being neither 
strictly a priori nor a posteriori, but as being a probability 
which is based in basic human eXPectation. 
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